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LIBYAN STUDIES CENTER

THE ISLAMIC PUBLIC OPINION DURING THE LIBYAN WAR 1911 - 1912

By:
DR. ORHAN KOLOGLU.

Revised by:
DR. MOHAMED FARHAT MEHDI

G.S.P.L.A.J.

1988

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NOTES

ABBREVIATIONS

FO: British Foreign Office Files (From the Public Record Office)
OP: Meclisi Mebusan Zabit Ceridesi (Journal of the Ottoman Parliaments minutes)
RHM: Revue d'Histoire Maghrébine
SA: Seradj ul Akhbar
SM: Sirat-i Mustakim
SR: Sebil-urresad
TCAI: Tripoli e Cirenaica e L'Azione Italiana
UP: Union and Progress (Ittihat ve Terakki)

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FOREWORD

This book has come into being by enlarging the paper I presented to the Second Conference on Turkish-Arab Relations, which was held in Tripoli (Libya) in December 1982. It dwells upon the period between the last days of September 1911, when, due to its interest in Libya, Italy declared war against the Ottoman State, and October 1912 when the peace treaty was signed.

It concentrates upon the formulation of public opinion in Islamic societies in general, rather than specifically on the Turkish and Libyan-Arab communities which had a much more genuine and direct reaction to the events of the war as the real targets of the attack. It is beyond doubt that the material related to the formation of public opinion in Turkey and Libya for the period concerned is so abundant as to fill volumes, and that this material could also be the subject matter for other qualified studies.

In this book, I have only tried to define the main lines of the attitudes adopted by the Turkish (Ottoman) and Libyan-Arab societies, including their efforts aimed at influencing the Islamic communities other than theirs. I have also tried to reflect the other communities in the Islamic world, in as much detail as possible.

In social groups where the ruling ideology is religious-tinted, protestations can also beprimarily religious, although it is only natural for a community under attack to show a direct emotional reaction without resorting to religious pretexts.

In the case of the Libyan War, confrontation of the public opinions between capitalist and precapitalist (or colonial/dependent economic structures), between distinctly class-shaped societies and societies formed more of social strata(*) or layers displays a pronounced

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(*) The concept of "social strata" or "social layer" suits better the Islamic communities, as at the turn of the 20th Century no industrialized Islamic society, shaped clearly into the class structure like in the West (i.e. bourgeoisie, proletariat; nor a pure feudal) existed. Furthermore, without denying the structural similarities among all societies I consider that the particularity of Islam had always been — as it will be exposed in more detail in the summary — to alleviate the contradictions between classes. Thus, a totally diverted slave system, a different kind of feudal-

religious bias; as well as the confrontation between the imperialist and independist forces is expressed similarly in religious terms.

The 1911-12 Libyan War is one of the main corner-stones of the 20th Century Islamic history and has had an important impact on the development of the Islamic mentality of the following decades. Indeed it has been illuminating to investigate the interaction between the religious and secular trends in public reaction during this war, for tracing the roots of some of the political, religious and economic developments taking place in our days.

The capitalist world, confronting the Islamic communities involved, has been dealt with, in the first place, in terms of its capacity to influence the Islamic mentality through the circulation of information aimed at shaping or guiding public opinion at home and abroad.

Secondly, the capitalist world's influence has been looked at "behind the scenes" where public-opinion-forming mechanisms such as the press, parliamentary debates, influence of financial circles intermingle.

In order to prevent this research from becoming a study of political history, the ramifications of diplomacy have been included only in terms of general impact. As opposed to that, the efforts by the mass-man to influence the flow of history and the makers of policy, have been dealt with in detail. And as a counterpoint to this, the efforts made and the methods utilized by the politicians to make their views known to the media, and therefore to the public, have also been taken up in detail.

Since it is my wish to refrain from entering into discussion of the scope of the concept of public opinion, which has been discussed for decades without reaching a consensus, I will suffice by giving only one of the most appropriate definitions:

"(Public opinion) signifies a dominant sentiment in a social community which is accompanied among subjects more or less clearly by the impression that this sentiment is common to them all."(ii)

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like system (Timar) could not drive Muslim societies towards the same kind of class structure and contradictions which existed in the West.

A comprehensive summary on the subject of "social strata" can be found in "Dictionnaire Critique de la Sociologie" by Raymond Boudon et François Bourricaud (Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1982), article on "Stratification Sociale", pp. 516-524. The concept is also used by the Marxists, Kh.Momjan, **Landmarks in History,** Progress publ., Moscow,1980, pp. 52, III: **ABC of Dialectical and Historical Materialism,** Progress publ., Moscow. 1976, p.351.

(ii) Stoetzel, **Esquisse d'une Thèorie des Opinions,** p.147, quoted by A.G. Dimopoulos, **L'Opinione Publique Française et la Revolution Grecque** (1821-1827), Univ. de Nancy, 1962, p.13.

(iii) **Faire de l'Histoire,** sous la direction de J.Le Goff et Pierre Nora, Gallimard, Paris 1974, p.80.

As the activator of the public opinion I will focus on the mass-man (common man, l'homme quotidien) who is a typical member of the base of the society, his opinions having been shaped in and by this mass. He shall be studied to discover how he adopts his attitudes and how his actions affect the general flow of events and life during this war.

Jacques Le Goff defines the place of the "mass-man" in a society as follows:

"At the junction of the individual and the collective, of long duration with the daily, unconscious with the intentional, marginal with general etc.."(iii)

The mentality of the mass man is specified as "the things common to Christopher Colombus -on his way to discover America- and to one of his crew, to Cesarand to the last soldier of his army."

The Marxist approach considers the masses "as the decisive force in all social change". For such a role the mass has to be conscious of their behaviour which leads to a revolution. Such examples being quite a few (French, Russian, Chinese revolutions etc..) even the marxists felt the need of a more reconciliatory approach to explain the long "non-revolutionary periods" in the life of the mass-man:

"The activity of the people may differ in identical conditions, for it depends on their mentality and also on their desires, emotions and those intellectual and social values on which they rely and numerous other subjective factors."(iv)

For the Marxists, the mass man is placed "at the interface between the infrastructure and the superstructure."

There is no doubt that the structure of the mass-man implies a plurality of public opinion in the same society at the same moment, on th same subject. At the same time it is possible to develop a unified concept of public opinion by the whole of a society.

This study encompasses research on the historical role of mass-behaviour and of public opinion. Thus it can be classified in the context of "Histoire des Mentalités = History of Mentalities"(v) rather than

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(iv) A.N. Yaksolev and others, **Fundamentals of Political Science,** Progress, Moscow, second ed., transl. David Fidlon, p.51.

(v) Mentality is an expression in desuetude for long, which "was saved by the use of the expression Histoire des Mentalités" introduced since 50 years by the French "Annales" historians. From French it was reintroduced in English, German, Italian, Spanish (J.Le Goff, a.m.b, pp. 82-84). In Turkish and Arabic the word zihniyet = defines it better than the word fihir = . Anglo-American researchers conceive it sometimes as the popular thought, but

"Intellectual History" or "Social Psychological Research" which are more individualistic or evitates the change. We have to point out also that it will be an error to consider a pure "History of Mentality" isolated from social claches. The class conditioning of mentality cannot be denied. And the deep-rooted belief of the Muslim mass-man in "the way of existence of an Islamic structure and entity", was the result of such a conditioning. While the upper strata was subject to changes during the 14 centuries of Islamic life, the lower strata was conceived as unchangeable. Considered in that context, it is not possible to omit a new concept of time advanced again by the Annalists as a determining factor in the flow of history: **The long and the short duration.(vi)**

Particularly, the belief that Oriental societies were almost motionless, necessitates such an approach. Social time exists underneath the political and economic times, and progresses much more slowly than the latter two (vii) to the extent that social change sometimes seems to cease to occur. During the interaction of countless parameters of the occurrences which orient societies, one of these (economical, political, social or to a lesser degree personal etc...) may come to the forefront. The speeding up of the social time may take place when the mass man who is usually a receiver of the impact of changes in the other spheres of society, adopts a role of motivator instead.

In the example of the Libyan War, we withness the coming to the forefront of the "mass man", the street demonstrators from Istanbul, Beirut, Cairo, Bombay etc.., who exhibits common action principles with the Sultan-Caliph or the war heroes (Mujaheeds from bedouin stock or of the caliber of Anwar Bey).

The interaction between the intellectuals or elite of the Muslim World and the man of the lower layer has undergone many changes

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more often as a cultural trend or intellectual activity. For the French it is "The traditional way of thinking of a human group".

For **Worterbuch der Soziologie,** (Stuttgart 1969, p.690) "Mentalitaet" is "the general behaviour of a certain social cotegory vis-à-vis its surrounding."

(vi) Fernand Braudel, **Annales E.S.C.,** no. 4, Oct-dec. 1958, Débats et combats, pp. 725-753; - From the Marxists Althusser accepts this concept, while Jean Chesneaux criticises it (Du passé faisons table rase? A Propos de l'histoire et des historiens. Lib.F.Maspero, Paris. 1976).

See the article of Jean-Paul Charnay, "Temps Sociaux et Interprétation Historique en Islam", **Studia Islamica,** XXVIII (1968), pp. 5-24.

(vii) E.Labrousse, in introduction to the book of G.Dupeux, **Aspects de l'histoire sociale et politique du Loir-et-Cher,** cited by J.Le Goff, amb, p.77.

In his article "Temps sociaux et interpretation historique en Islam" **(Studia Islamica,** XXVIII, 1968, 5-24) Jean-Paul Charnay reminds the proposals of the sociologist Georges Gurvitch **"La vocation actuelle de la sociologie,** Puf, Paris 1963) on "long, misleading, explosive etc..." durations; he himself proposes for Islamic societies, conceptual duration (interrupted d.), daily duration (rhythmical d.), historical duration (continuous d.).

during the 14 centuries of Muslim history. There have been periods of full understanding between the two levels of society as well as stages of complete absence of interaction. With the advent of the 19th century, a new and exceedingly forceful external impulse affected this interaction and the accelaration of the social time brought new factors into the traditional structure of Islamic communities. A rapprochement between upper and the lower strata occurred while new and sharper contradictions began to supplant the old ones. A new kind of mentality came into being in the Islamic World which displayed some new common elements from Morocco to Java.(viii)

Th base, traditionally more conservative and contemplative, realised the necessity of changing its own mentality and becoming more active. With the War of Libya, we come face to face with the phenomenon of the mass man directly influencing the leaders and intellectuals and coming into contact with their various proposals which would affect his actions, as well as, his gradual quiescence. We see the revival of his action some time later by various leaders though the mass man himself has retracted to his initial, contemplative spot, as in the case of the Holy War declaration during the First World War.

The 1911/12 War broke out immediately after a series of crises (Bosnia, Crete, Eastern Roumelia, Central Africa, Morocca among others; all lost to the West) and developed at the same period as the Iranian crisis; the tension reached its climax suddenly and quickly. By examining this particular crisis it was possible to follow the sequence of events, and though certain stages were skipped over, to inquire about how events shaped and reached a climax in public opinion, and how they gradually subsided. After studying the elements leading to that climax and those which counter them, I attempted to analyze the results obtained and the connection of these results with the reality.

It is interesting to note certain behavioral stereotypes in common with the actions of the Muslim societies in the 19th Century, i.e., since the full Western influence in politics, economics, military fields and media was imposed. By comparing them, I think, one should be able to

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(viii) Concerning the structure and relation of the elite and the lower strata in Islam, interesting research based mainly on Weberian concepts, but also not ignoring Marxist approach, was conducted by Professor Sabri F.Ulgener:

1- **Iktisadi Cozulmen Ahlak ve Zihniyet dunyasi** (= The Moral and Mentality World of the Economic Decadence), Der ya., Istanbul, 1981 (1st ed. 1951).

2- **Zihniyet ve Din-Islam, Tasavvuf ve Cozulme Devri Iktisat Ahlaki** (= Mentality and Religion — Islam, Sufism and the Economic Moral of the Decandence Period), Der.Ya., Istanbul, 1981.

derive the means of the emergence of public opinion concerning specific topics in Muslim societies during the East's decline and how they influenced later events. In addition, one should also be able to discover the reason behind various actions or events based on the assessment of the Islamic mentality versus Western Mentality, in regard to Islam's concept of the world.

In brief, by undertaking this type of reserch into the different events of our past, we can develop a frame-work for self-criticism and assessment which will aid us in evaluating our past actions in a more accurate way. This type of exercise may even lead us to develop a forecast of our future.

★★★

I must remind the reader that this research could evolve into an in-depth study of Islamic mentality only if the interaction between the masses and the elite groups (politicians, religious men, businessmen, thinkers-publicists, military leaders, etc.) can be investigated and put into the frame-work of the existing class or social layer structure. In the light of this type of research, many of the questions exposed in the present work could be answered. Of course it would require a more thorough research on the socio-economic structure of each Muslim community during the period examined here, which exceeds the scope of this work. Unfortunately, we have to confess that research in this field is very scarce.

From the technical side, concerning the transcription of the Islamic names, I have tried to follow the general trend of simplifying them. On the use of some words like Muslim (which is also used as Moslem, Moslim, Musselman, Mohammedan, Mahomedan, etc.) Jehad, Caliph, etc. which were used in different forms in the publications of the day, I tried to create a unity by using only one form consistently.

Finally, I have to express my thanks to the institutions which helped me in the completion of this work. First, thanks to the personnel of the Libyan Historical Studies Center of Tripoli, from its chairman to its library staff, who were very helpful. My thanks also go to the following institutions: Public Record Office, India Office, British Library and the School of Oriental and African Studies, in London; National libraries in Ankara, Paris, and Rome, as well as, the Parliament's Library in Ankara. And to M. Gerçeker and B. Zabci for the re-reading and correction of the text.

I- STRUGGLE FOR FREE CRITICISM AND FLOW OF NEWS

A-OTTOMAN STATE: A PRECAPITALIST STRUCTURE LONGING FOR "OPEN SOCIETY"

In the Ottoman State, reaction to the "muted society" of the **Abdul Hamid** period (1878-1908) had reinforced the concept of "open society in such a way that the years following the declaration of the "Second Constitution" (1908) became, from every angle, the most liberal age of its history. So much so that it degenerated into a period of anarchy of freedom. Each one of the ethnic and religious groups, composing the Ottoman Nation was expressing unrestrictedly its demands, including national rights, autonomy and even separatist tendencies.[1] That had forced the State to deal with rebellions in different parts of the Empire with different groups (in Yemen, Albania, Hauran, and with Armenians everywhere) during the year preceding the Libyan War.

> "With the declaration of the war the Ottoman press, both local and foreign, naturally teemed with articles on the present situation of every shade of opinion according to the political views of the writer."[2]

The observer who reported this added cynically:

> "But I cannot say that any single useful contribution to the discussion has yet appeared, and I have not therefore troubled you with any account of them."

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[1] This sudden explosion of the public opinion and the press in the Ottoman empire has been surveyed in paper I presented to the "First Turkish-Arabic Relations Conference" held at Hacettepe University, Ankara, Turkey, between 18-22 June 1979;

The book of the **communications** to the conference, pp. 96-121, "Turkish-Arabic Press during The Period when the Ottoman Empire was disintegrating (1908-1918). And its impact on the present day."

Here we intentionally avoid the expression **Nation** because for Muslim communities, still in 1911, the concept was never used in the Western sense. An Ottoman nation was accepted but which had nothing in common with a Western nation. While Christians of the Ottoman state (Greeks, Bulgarians etc...) who had outside the empire their own independent states meant by nationalism the full content of the concept, Muslims (Arabs, Albanians etc..) understood always a local entity on a common Islamic base: "The nation and Islam were one and the same thing" as C.Sammut puts it (L'Action des Jeunes Tunisians: Reformisme d'Assimilation ou Nationlisme d'Emancipation?", RHM, January 1978 No. 10/11. p.129). As we will clarify in the section "Parties and Islamist Press" both Tunisian and Egyptian wataniyyun were not for national sovereignty but were for the incorporation of their communities to the Ottoman Empire which was the symbol of the Islamic sovereignty.

[2] FO- 371/1254-41226, Lowther to Grey, Therapia 15.October.1911.

It was right to say that the dense and fiery discussions initiated by all the political tendencies in the press, were not meant for a "useful contribution", but more to implement their own political views, by criticising the government and the **Union and Progress (Ittihad ve Terakki = UP).** It was a craze of criticism to such an extent that, even the government which was in power with the support of the UP votes, was under heavy criticism by the UP press.[3] In the above mentioned report, the British ambassador refers, as an example of this tendency of "criticism for the sake of criticism", to an article of a Unionist paper which criticizes very sharply the whole Central Committee of the Union and Progress.

In another report the same diplomat sumnarizes the struggle for freedom of criticism as follows:

> "The newspapers of the 10th October published a communiqué from the court-martial forbidding the publication of articles attacking the present or future cabinets collectively or individually.
> This decision evoked a storm of criticism directed against the court-martial and Lutfi Fikri Bey, the opposition deputy published a strong protest in the form of an open letter to the Grand Vizier, which appeared in the Tanzimat... [He qualified the move] as a coup d'etat preventing the functioning of the Constitution. Even he declares his intention, in the event of obnoxious measure not being withdrawn, of demanding on the opening of the parliament that the culpable responsibility be fixed upon your highness.
> The Tanzimat was suspended by the court-martial, but at once reappeared under the name of Islahat... There is a notewarthy tendency on the part of the opposition papers to a more out-spoken criticism of the committee than has hitherto been common..."[4]

The Prime Minister approved this demand and refuted the decree as unconstitutional.[5] Censorship was in practice during that period, but was not preventing the newspapers from publishing news and criticism coming from various European sources even including the Italian sources, directed towards the Ottoman government and army.

The Ottoman parliament was very sensitive to that point. The concept of an open society had reached such a degree that a deputy of the ruling party was able to criticise the Minister of the Interior for not having made public a very important secret report on a political crime, which could inflame the Baikans in a moment.[6]

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[3] Orhan Kologlu, Al Maaraka al-Sahafi al maahad li-Maaraka Libiya a'm 1911, paper presented to the Seminar **"The Turco-Italian War in Tripoli and its place in World Press" held** in October 1979 at Tripoli.

[4] Fo- 371/1255-41656, Lowther to Grey, Therapia 18.October.1911.

[5] Sitting of 9.November 1911 of the Ottoman Parliament, OP.p.256.

[6] Sitting of 28.November.1911, OP., p.115.

It was a common belief that a constitutional regime was the last hope of survival for the Ottoman State; so it was not conceivable to face such a crisis without a parliament and everybody agreed that the participation of the public through its representatives was a rule in the case, but nobody knew exactly if the situation would be appropriate for fully open discussions.

When the war was deciared, the Ottoman parliament was on summer vacation. The majority of its members were in their own constituencies. Around 20th September the necessity for convening the parliament had already been mentioned in the press. The 28th issue of all papers contained an unofficial invitation to the deputies and senators present in Istanbul to meet at the parliament. The next day 30-35 deputies met including the speaker **Ahmad Riza;** only the senators refused to attend any meeting, as it was not in conformity with the regulations of the parliament.

Deputies, mostly of the opposition, criticised and attacked the UP very sharply -most of whose leaders were in **Salonica** at that moment, for their yearly congress of the Central Committee. Deputies tried to contact the Prime Minister who was in audience with the Sultan. They dispersed and agreed to reconvene the next day. On the 30th of September there were some 55-60 deputies in the Parliament. The unofficial discussions concentrated particularly on criticising the UP apart from conversing on the international and military situation. All the main orators of the opposition, the famous defenders of freedoms were attacking the UP for its alleged attempt to prevent the convening of Parliament. This allegation was proved to be absolutely unfounded later on. [The fear of not having a free rostrum for discussion later caused more tension than the Italian attack itself.[7]]

The speaker of the parliament had to intervene and invite them to calm down. He reminded them that those under attack were at a very legal and long-convened meeting in anther part of the country. In reality, nobody was against the convening of parliament and the Sultan, under the suggestion of the new Prime Minister, issued an invitation to meet two weeks later, On the 14th October, 1911, a month before its usual meeting time.

The aim was to show that the highest institution of the country was on duty during the war and, to prove consequently, that the Ottoman nation was united against the enemy. But the parties concerned had been infected with internal fights for 3 years - since 1908 - and they

[7] On these discussions see **Tanin,** Sabah and the other papers published in Istanbul between 20 and 30 September, 1911.

kept on creating so much trouble that every one from the Prime Minister to **Yusuf Shetvan,** (Deputy of Benghazi coming directly from the war front) and many other speakers warned repeatedly that these discussions, instead of proving unity, were on the contrary, weakening the country's image and preventing European support, as well as attempts towards peace.

A Yemeni deputy, **Ahmad al-Kabisi,** was insisting on the importance of parliament for the formation of public opinion with the use of some very peculiar expressions: **"Let's not confuse the public opinion... Don't let torture the nation's opinion, don't let it be confused..."**[8]

But it was to no avail. The Sultan, instigated by the government, was obliged to dissolve the parliament, in the middle of January 1912, there by demonstrating to the world that there was no unity. [From the end of January until the beginning of April, the elections played a more prominent role in the formation of public opinion than the war. Political tension were more inflamed than ever before.] The sittings of the new parliament, which lasted only four months, contributed even more to the degeneration of the political atmosphere with discussions focusing on the legitimacy of the elections and the autonomy struggle of the Albanians. It was resolved on the 5th August 1912, in order to proceed with the new elections which had to be completed in three months time (within November). Thus Ottoman political life reached an even higher state of tension.

During the spring and summer of 1912 the **Albanian uprising** spread all over the Balkans and gave the four Balkan states **(Montenegro, Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia)** the pretext for an attack with the aim of expelling the Ottoman Empire and the Turks from Europe (October 1912). The **Balkan War** accelerated the peace talks between the Ottoman State and Italy which ended with the signature of the **Ouchy (Lausanne)** agreement (October 1912), thus ending officially the Italo-Turkish War in Libya.

All the other lands with a Muslim community -outside the Ottoman territories- were under the rule of a European power. In general a censorship existed in these lands, to control the autonomist or Muslim solidarist tendencies.[9] Each of the colonialist Western states was

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[8] Sitting of 10.January.1912, OP., p.746.

[9] For example in Egypt since 1909, the liberal implementation of the Law on Press was suppressed and many newspapers of the Hizb-al-watani had disappeared. When the Libyan war came, the Egyptian vernacular press was in struggle with the new application (See Yunan Labib Rizk, "A'thar Kanun al matbu'at fi al haraka al wataniyya al misriyya kabtl al harb al'alamiyya

yielding to the freedom of expression as long a critics were directed to other European governments. Its own perfect conduct vis-a-vis the Muslims was inherent in those tactics. It must also be kept in mind that western-language papers published in the Islamic countries enjoyed greater freedom than the vernacular press.

B- ITALY: A CAPITALIST STRUCTURE, CLOSING THE SOCIETY FOR IMPERIALISTIC AIMS

Italy entered that period by proclaiming censorship on the matters related to the war, even before the declaration of it. Beginning from 26th of September 1911, any publications beyond the official reports were prohibited.

Italian public opinion had been preparing for that expedition for years. Furthermore, since 1911, that had become the only exciting subject of the Italian rightist-nationalist press. Supported by business circles and **the Banco di Roma,** as well as the clergy, it received only a limited reaction from the Socialists, who were soon split into two groups. Those who claimed that the Libyan War would be profitable for the Italian proletariat **in learning** how to fight -by serving the imperialistic aims of the bourgeoisie- and then to use their fighting skill for the workers' revolution, were supporting the expedition. With a Marxist approach they were evaluating it as a progressive stage in the historical unity of the Italian society, and as a **"revolutionary conquest".** While the second group lost its impact very soon; stern measures by the government prevented them from any radical move.[10]

During the first days of September the all influential **Corriere Della Sera** sided unconditionally with the nationalists, then all the dissidence

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al ula 1909-1912", **al madjalla al tarikhiyya al misriyya,** 1968, vol:14, pp. 259-316; also, Mahmud Zayid "The Origins of the Liberal Constitutionalist Party in Egypt" in **Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt,** Ed. by P.M.Holt, Oxford Un.Press, London,1968, pp 339).

In Tunisia, the existing control over the press was reinforced following the Djellaz cemetery events (7.11.1911), martial law proclaimed and all the newspapers closed. (Sec, C. Sammut, art.cit., p.139); concernant le régime en Algerie nous référons au livre de Ihaddaden Zahir, **Historie de la Presse Indigéne en Algérie,** (Alger, 1983):

"There existed a regime of controlled liberty in Algeria between 1881-1925... Although Algeria was considered a 'French province' the law of 29 July,1881, on the liberty of press was never applied to the indigenous press." (p.23), "the French law on the press was applied only to the colonial press, while the indigenous press was ruled by particular dispositions" (p.69) furhtermore the entry and distribution of the Turkish and Arabic newspapers (from Istanbul, Beyrout, Egypt etc...) were strictly forbidden (p. 55-56).

[10] For the discussions among socialists see: G.Barni, A.Labriola etc..., **Pro e Contro la Guerra di Libia,** Ed.Partenopea, Nåpoli 1912; Paolo Maltese, **La Terra Promessa -La Guerra Italo-Turco e la Conquista della Libia 1911-1912,** Sugar Ed., Milano 1968; Maurizio Degl 'Innocenti, **Il Socialismo Italiano e la Guerra di Libia,** ed.Riuniti, Roma 1976.

ceased to exist. This was the decisive contribution which instigated the Giolitti Government to declare war. **Albertini,** the editor of **Corriere della Sera** remarked:

> "Once the decision was taken [Decision of Corriere to support the government] it was vital to present to Europe the impression of a united and fighting Italy. Never had a political question aroused among the Italians a larger consensus... At the moment in which [it was] **attested our right to the statuete of a Great Power in front of Europe, the will of the immense majority of the nation was expressed irrevocably".**[11]

Less than 3 weeks before the declaration of the war, the Turkish Chargé at Rome, reported to his Prime Minister that "conceptions are such that any person or any paper which formulates a contrary opinion is immediately condemned as a traitor and a bad patriot."[12]

Prof. **S.Bono** also confirms that the effect of the North-African expedition on the life of Italy was complete **"and possibly not any other colonial action of Italy or of any other state had been realized with a stronger participation of the country."**[13]

Under such a consensus, the propaganda based on the riches of Libya (Granary of The Roman Empire), the easiness of the military campaign (military promenade), the dislike of the Arabs for the Turks (Barbarian Ottoman regime), the sympathy of the local people for the Italians, was intensified.

This "imposed unity" was strengthened by strict censorship. Even the Rome and Torino correspondents of the **Figaro** complained of the rigour of the censorship because their telegramms were intercepted systematically.[14]

Concerning the censorship in the Italian controlled areas of Libya, immediately with the first landings, the expedition command felt the

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[11] Albertini, **Venti Anni,** Vol.II, p.123, quoted by Denis Mack Smith, **Storia di Cento Anni di vita Italiana visti attraverso il Corriere della Sera,** Rizzoli, Milano 1978; André Duboscq remarks: "Till the second hald of 1911, the Italian public opinion had never expressed the desire of the annexation of Tripoli. Efforts in that direction were purely capitalist and governmentaly.", **Syrie-Tripolitanie-Albanie,** Paris, 1914, p.89.

[12] M.Kraïem, "La Question de l'Annexion Italienne de la Libye", **Revue d'Histoire Maghrebine,** No. 6, Juillet 1976, p. 171-2; It is the letter by the Turkish Ambassador in Rome to the Prime Minister on 11.9.1911.

La Revue du Monde Musulmane (Vol. 22/23, 1913, pp. 110-144) article of Antoine Cabaton "L'Italie Puissance Musulmane" states "The Italian press, including the socialist newspapers, pushed the nation on the way of colonial conquests... it glorified with a naive enthusiasm the return of the smallest patrol, and was enervated with the least of criticism coming from abroad" (p.113).

[13] Salvatore Bono, "La Guerra Libica (1911-1912) Considerazioni A Margine di un recente Libro" estratta da **Storia Contemporenea,** 1972/1.

[14] Le Figaro, 1.10.1911.

need for a communication officer with the press, who was in charge of not only informing the journalists, but also of controlling their telegrams; and of course primarily, of guiding and directing the public opinion as much as possible.[15]

Soon after, it was felt that a simple control was not enough and on the 13th October, the Minister of War sent a directive to General Caneva, concerning the telegraphic services of Tripolitania; with that order started a real rigourous censorship to which even the Italian journalists were not used to. It was forbidden to them to participate and watch the military oporations.[16] They were warned that the article 141 of the "Regulations of the Services in Wartime" prohibits strictly such participation:

> "The secret is the first condition for the proper conduct of all operations. Spreading the news which seems to be the most insignificant can always be harmful, because even the only date and place of an expedition can provide the enemy with information to evaluate its situation."[17]

The ship sevices connecting Italy to Tripoli were continuing regularly and many journalists, Italians as well as foreigners, applied for permission to land in Tripoli. At the end of October and beginning of November journalists of world fame were already in Tripoli.[18] But soon they noticed that the severity of the censorship was increasing gradually. They were allowed only to transmit the official communications of the Italian command. Even news of the Cirenaican expedition was communicated in the same manner and journalists absolutely ignorant of what was happening, had to rely on the Italian information. A ban was also imposed on sailings between Tripoli and Malta so that no unwanted news could leak out from the fighting area.[19]

The foreign press, and even the submissive Italian press revolted against such a severe limitation. The President of Italian Journalists sent a telegramm of protest to the Minister of Interior:

> "Administration committee of correspondents protests against the uncivilised and most rigourously applied censorship. The prohibition covers even the transmission of news which has already passed

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[15] **Campagna di Libia,** Ministero Della Guerra Ufficio Storico, Vol.V, Roma 1927, p.279.
[16] P.Maltese, **La Terra Promessa..., p.124.**
[17] **L'Italie,** 15.10.1911.
[18] Barzini, Bevione, Civinini, De Frenzi, Vassallo, Giorni (Tribuna), Girdano (New York Herald), Piazza, M.Bélanger, Andrés Cipolla the two Scarfaglio, Bennett = Burleigh, Bartlett, Pol Tristan, Rilly were already in Tripoli, **Campagna di Libia,** V/279.
[19] **Times,** 3.11.1911; "The 1st October 1911 the Tripoli = Malta lihe was cut and thus all communication with Istanbul was interrupted" G.Roncagli, Guerra Italo-Turca, Vol.I, p.173.

through the censor; furthermore it is even forbidden to communicate outside news if it has an official nature."[20]

DE Luca, the correspondent of **Sicilia,** was expelled from Tripoli for his criticism. To the protest of other journalists, a reply was sent in the name of **Giolitti,** reading:

> "An Italian who at this moment, when the honour of the nation is at stake, attacks the commanders and discredits them abroad with false news, is not qualified to stay in contact with the honourable forces, defenders of the country."

Even the correspondent of **Corriere Della Sera** was expelled for his news concerning the opening of four houses of prostitution for the Italian soldiers in Libya.

As it may be noticed it was no more a simple censorship. Orders had been given even to cut the teleplone communications of the journalists if they talked about the war. Furthermore all journalists were forced to give their word not to communicate messages out of the control of the censor-officer, through **Malta, Gerba (Tunisia), or Egypt.** Even the Italian correspondent of an Italian propaganda paper, published in Cairo, confessed "the severity of the censorship."[21] But the excuse for it was the most peculiar ever heard:

> "The senator Garroni, our new ambassador to constantinople, while talking with a publicist from Geneva, declared that the Turks have qualified informants in the Italian newspapers more than those Moltke has had in 1870 in the French newspapers."[22]

The ridicule of the motive is apparent as we will see afterwards that the Ottoman Empire, that has informants in the Italian papers, did not even have a regular press information service in its own land.

The contradiction between the concept of open society which Europe was trying to create in the East, and the application of such a severe censorship had even struck the minds of Libyan warriors. **Sidi Mohammad Ali,** from the **Zaouia of Oum Chikanab** in the **Ojebel Akhdar,** asked the French journalist **George Rémond:**

> "Is Europe not sufficiently informed by his consuls so that it sends us a journalist to get information on the subject of war?"
> G. Rémond's reply was that "the consul of France in Benghazi, being among Italians, may not be sufficiently informed of what is happening in the Turkish camp; that furthermore Italians can have interest in hiding from him the realities; and that at last, being an

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[20] XP.Maltese, ibid., p.125; De Luca affair, p. 168-169; Carriere Della Sera, p.249.
[21] ibid, p.125; **Messaggero Egiziano,** 30.9.1911.
[22] **Messaggero Egiziano,** 4.10.1911, Report of Beniamino Rinaldi from Rome.

official he could not communicate to the newspapers his observations.

Mohammad Ali laughed and replied:

"Then what is that famous liberty which you are talking so much about in Europe?"[23]

Another tactic to prevent the public opinion from discussing the problems of war had been the prevention of the meetings of the parliament, when Socialists suggested it. The **Corriere Della Sera** as the leading porte-parole of the war party remarked that **"it is not the proper time to talk, since at the moment the war is still going on."**[24] A month later, when the minority group asked again for the convocation of the parliament **Corriere Della Sera** published an interview "with a personality from the government":

> "If the parliament meets it is difficult to prevent a comprehensive discussion not only on the subject of the Turkish War, but also on all our international relations, which can be very dangerous at this moment...."[25]

By delaying the meetings of the parliament till the 22nd of February 1912 -it had started its summer holiday on the 10th July 1911- the Government was able to prevant the open discussions. **Giolitti,** the Italian Prime Minister, by bringing before the parliament in its first meeting of the 22nd February 1912, the decree on the **"Incorporation of Libya into Italy"** had prepared the ground for exciting demonstrations and prevented any critics. In a parliament full of deputies shouting **"Viva l'Esercito, Viva l'Armata, Viva l'Italia, viva la Libia Italiana"**[26] nobody could have the courage of reminding the reverses suffered, and the expenses exceeding all predictions. So a war which was not progressing very successfully for the Italian army, and accepted to last long even by official spokesmen[27] was imposed on the public opinion as a victory. And the parliament by a fait-accompli represented the unity of the country, contrary to the image presented by the Ottoman parliament.

As a résumé, one can say that while Italy was trying to prevent any discussion or open judgement on the problems of war, in the Ottoman Empire the majority of the forces were insisting on open discussions and

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[23] G.Rémond, **Aux Camps des Turco-Arabes,** Hachette, Paris 1913, p.156.

[24] **Corriere Della Sera,** 14.10.1911, quoted by Maltese, **Terra...,** p.126.

[25] **Corriere Della Sera,** 16.11.1911, quoted by Maltese, **Terra...,** p.183.

[26] **Atti del Parlamento Italiano Camera dei Deputati,** Sessione 1909-12, le Della XXIII Legislatura Discussioni Volume XV, Del 22 Feb.1912.

[27] FO. 371-1258/46642, of 22.11.1911. In his report to the Foreign Office Lord Onslow state that the Italian Charge d'Affaires said that "Italy hoped to bring Turkey to peace terms shortly, but feared conquest of Tripoli hinterland would be a matter of years."

vindicating past political accounts. Even the motion of the Libyan deputies, who were all from the UP, on the responsibilities laying with **H. Hakki Pasha** government was utilised for that purpose. While Italy, basically an open society, was transformed into a closed society for imperialistic aims, the Ottoman Empire was forced internally to play the open society which was against its structure, and helpful to the tactics of the imperialism.

II- THE IMMEDIATE ISLAMIC REACTION

A- OTTOMAN PARLAIAMENT'S CONTRIBUTION

It was inaugurated with a speech of the Sultan, read by the Prime Minister, who was surely the one who prepared it. The emphasis was on the importance of Ottoman unity, Islamic solidarity and brotherhood in backing the government in its deeds. The Sultan pointed out especially the extraordinary reception extended to him only four months ago during his trip to Balkans, when he visited and prayed at the mausoleum of Sultan **Murad I,** the conqueror of Serbia:

> "... the expression of Ottoman brotherhood demonstrated in the provinces of Kossova, Manastir and Salonica and the national glory expressed by hundreds of thousands of patriots from different elements at the holy mausoleum of the shaheed in Kossova as well as in other places have really impressed me, and made me proud. It is my purest desire that all the Ottomans spend their efforts in complaying to the perfection of this brotherhood and unity which are the tools of efforts for the happiness of the homeland."[1]

The Speaker of the Senate, the Prime Minister, all Ministers and deputies from Union and Progress as well as from the opposition were all insisting on this Ottomanism and Ottoman solidarity. The theme of "fight till death" became the common slogan:

> "The holiest, the highest aim is to prepare ourselves to die for the safety of the **Watan,** day and night. See the nationalist demonstrations, everywhere people from seven to seventy are shouting to be sent to any corner of the country to defend it by arms."[2]

This feeling expressed by the people's representatives was confirmed also by the people themselves directly through messages sent to the parliament.

At first, two telegrams arrived from Beirut through **Rida al-Solh,** deputy of **Beirut.** One, signed on behalf of the newspapers **Mufid, Al**

The Ottoman Sultan visited Ottoman provinces in the Balkans between 5 and 26 June, 1911, especially to calm down the Albanian revolt, and made prayers on one occasion with **100 thousand of Muslims** (Danismend, I.H., Osmanli Tarihi Kronolojisi, Istanbul 1955, vol:4, pp: 383-5).

[2] Ahmad Mahir, deputy of Kastamonu, 19.10.1911, OP. p.19.

Sabbat, Ettehad 'Uthmani, Lisan al-hak, Anasir, Hakiykat, Ray al'am, Al adjwal al Bark, and a Lebanese Muslim leader, **Mukhtar Bayhoum,** stated:

> "Here the public opinion is decidedly for resistance, we prefer the death of all the Ottomans than to leave a foot of land to the enemy. People are in expectation in a very quiet and calm way. They are decided on any of sacrifice to protect the national honour."[3]

In the second telegram, which bore only the signature of Mukhtar Bayhoum, it was stated that **"instead of losing one single bit of land from Tripoli, they rather prefer to be buried under the ruins of the city."**

Other messages from different parts of the world reached the parliament at different times. We can name the cities of **Genç, Ceyhan, Siroz, Beirut, Karçova, Zor, Antalia, Medine, Prichtine, Akka, Erzeroum, Van, Aleppo, Latakieh, and Baghdad** within the frontiers of the Ottoman Empire. Messages from Egypt, India and even Brazil came from the outside world.[4]

They were signed mostly by the mayor or mufti of the city, in the name of the local population. One from **Erzeroum** was signed by the governor, by a judge and by the Armenian and Catholic representatives with the expression of solidarity and brotherhood for the salvation of the country.

Some had noteworthy contents, for instance, the representative of **Amir S'aud al 'Aziz iban al Rashid** stated in his telegram he sent from **Soutari (Istanbul)** that the said Amir was ready to provide 60 thousand of cavalry, out of the voluntary infantry men.

Mohammad Fadil from **Baghdad** (signing retired Lieutenant General - Birinci Ferik- from the command of the National Defence) indicated that he was ready to fight in the name of all of **Iraq.**

Mehamed Kamil, a descendent of **Sheikh Shamil-** the hero of the Caucasian resistance against the Russians wrote from **Medina,** that he was ready for action with the "mujaheeds of Daghestan and Caucasia".

The desire to join the fight was shared by every Moslem so much so that soon that tendency gave birth to a more common current-Jehad or Holy War. **Hassan Shaybi,** deputy of **Hedjaz,** stated at the parliament:

> "I arrived only today from Hedjaz. The treachirous and barbarian attack by Italy on Tripoli has created an alarming reaction on all the people of Hedjaz... They consider that the painful events of Tripoli

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[3] 16.11.1911, OP. p.190.
[4] Sittings of 9 and 11 Oct.1911, OP. pp. 274 and 265.

> necessitate Jehad... The Amir of Mikka and Medina, the people of Hedjaz, including bedouins, believe that they have the right of priorty in the Tripoli Holy War. That is an obvious right. As it is accepted as Jehad, it is normal that they be more interested than the Moslims of other islamic countries. Consequently they will not give up the fight and will expect an order or a sign from the Sublime Caliphate."[5]

Four days later another deputy declared that **"to preserve Tripoli till the day of judgement they are looking forward to the order of the Sultan to act under his guidance."[6] Ahmad al Kabisi** (Yemen) reacted to the description of an Arab deputy **('Abd ul-Hamid al Zahrawi** from **Hama)** who named the nation "poor + miskin". He replied by saying that when Turks, Arabs, Albanians etc.. are under the Ottoman flag, Tripoli cannot be "miskin" and added:

> "We will sacrifice our blood for every inch of it. Thus I declare and confirm in the name of the Yemenite people and Imam Yahya that we are ready to sacrifice our lives."[7]

Imam Yahya had been fighting the Ottoman armies for decades to gain his independence and refused to recognise the Sultan as the Caliph. Later when an agreement was reached to cease the rebellion it was claimed that this was the result of islamic solidarity. And now, confirming the recent reports on the wish of the Imam to join the fight[8], the statement of the Yemeni deputy was considered as an official proof of this solidarity. Strangely, comments on how he could join the fighting area, some 3500 km away, filled the columns of the press.

It is absolutely clear from all those messages that the call for the Holy War was simply a defensive move to stop the attack.

B- ISLAMIST PARTIES AND PRESS

1. UNION AND PROGRESS (ITTIHAD VE TERAKKI)

While Italy had been coveting Libya for a quarter of a century, Ottoman Administration and press, well aware of this passion, avoided any open discussion on the subject remained and remained contented with some warnings form time to time. Both **Abd ul Hamid** and the UP governments prevented the Italian economic infiltration. At the beginning of 1911, when the Italian press started a campaign for Libya, only the local -Tripolitanian- newspapers, which were alert on anything

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[5] 16.11.1911, OP. p.353.
[6] Ismail Pasha deputy of Tokat, 22.11.1911, OP. p.394.
[7] 10.1.1912, OP. p.746.
[8] **Times,** 6 and 12.Oct.1911.

Italian, kept the pace with it. The nationwide press of Istanbul, like **Tanin** the porte parole of UP, kept quiet for a while. Bablali did not want to add a new conflagration to the already existing ones. The first open warning came out only on the 5th September 1911, less than a month before the declaration of war.[9]

During the whole of September, Italy denied officially any intention to fight. The Ottoman press was on the defensive and careful on not throwing fuel on the fire. But in the last ten days of September when military preparations of Italy became undeniable, some open letters (like the one by the deputy of Tripoli **Sadik Bey,** in the **Tanin** of 12th September) and some articles, reflected the determination of the Ottoman State and the Muslim people to resist any invasion.

When the war was unexpectedly declared, the UP leaders were all in Salonica for their annual congress. The Government resigned and a new one was formed by Said Pacha. The first reaction of the UP was to consider the situation with calmness. Two proclamations were issued. The first, an appeal to the humanism of Europe asking the powers not to allow the committee to be impeded in its task of reforming the nation and guiding it on the way of progress and civilization etc... The second, calling on the populace to remain calm and to insult no foreigners, not even the Italians.[10]

It is only after the Italian bombings that the genera' tone of the UP and the Turkish press turned to a warlike shouting. As the **Ikdam** put it in its leading article of the 29th October, "**Haydutluk daha dogrusu Italyanlik + Banditry or more clearly Italianlike behavior**" became a daily slogan of the Turkish press.

The reaction of an Islamist review, **Sirat-l Mustakim,** to the Italian ultimatum is significant in that regard. Even that publication -qualified as "fanatical" by Western circles- before calling for an Ottoman unity recommended coolness:

> "It is easy to guess its effects on the Islamic World. But the delicacy of the situation and its seriousness invite us to wisdom and reasoning, instead of following our sentiments."[11]

Declaration by the **Central Committee of the Ottoman Union and**

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[9] O.Koliglu, Al Maaraka al Sahafi...

[10] FO- 371/1254-40526m Annexe to the letter of Lowther to Grey, Constantinople 8.10.1911, Report by J.Morgan, British Consul at Salonica, dated 3.10.1911.

[11] "Italyan Ultimatomu hakkinda", **SM,** 30.9.1911, No.160, quoted by Mustafa Oguz in his unpublished research, **Sirati Mustakim ve 8 Mart 1912 'den itibaren Sebilurresad' da Trablusgarb Harbi;** All the quotations from SM and SR are from that research.

Progress to the Islamic World on the subject of the war was parallel to the Islamic solidarity feeling in the parliament:

> "Tripoli is a beloved trust of God in the hands of Muslims. The sublime Islamic Caliphate is using all his material and spiritual powers to prevent this holy Islamic land from falling into the hands of Italian traitors. As it is a holy duty (fard) and obligation to declare war against the enemy of the country and the religion, you as well as the brothers in religion are obliged to join the Caliph in this fight and to care especially for protecting the holy **watan** and the honour of Islam."[12]

Here also the spirit created by the extraordinary demonstration of the Islamic brotherhood during the trip of the Sultan to the Balkans is felt. Religious oriented press, in that period, made such publications that the political circles of Europe were irritated by a Panislamist revival. One of the most representative of those publications was the article entitled **"allah-u Akbar"** by the **"Mufid"** newspaper of Beirut. **Mufid** which increased the number of praying men in the plain of **Kossova** to 300 thousand, pointed out that their call was in the name of 300 millions:

> "It is necessary for all to know that if the Imam calls: Hayya 'ala Sala!.. 300 million will follow immediately his step and all the world will be submerged with this call: Hayya 'ala Falah. Thus, Allah-u Akbar!. When all this crowd will start marching for suppressing the rebels and the enemy, the face of the world will change."[13]

Praising the importance of the Caliphate, to which, it claims, no believer can and must disobey, it adds that the unity of Arabs and Turks will undoubtedly render the Ottoman Empire even greater.

Thus the already existing religious tendency, encouraged by the UP declaration, prevailed in the Turkish and Arabic press circles, although some criticism was directed to the whole of Europe for backing

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[12] General Kurmay, Turk Silahli Kuvvetleri Tarihi, Osmanli-Italyan Harbi 1911-1912, Gn.Kurmay Basimevi Ankara,1981, s.169.

[13] **Mufid,** 20.6.1911; reported also in the **Reveil** of 24.6.1911. The writer is condemning not only the non Muslims who are attacking the Caliphate, but also all the Muslims who rose against the Caliph and even the reformists.

Italian press also was affected by the Kossovo demonstration. **Messaggero Egiziano remarked** in its issue of 1.7.1911:

"Everybody felt these days the need to be dragged by the enthusiasm created by the noisy union of the Muslims, with the big gesture of the Caliph. Open Egyptian papers, yuo will find them full of that dream; listen to the people, you will hear sincere hopes of renovation... The day when the Caliph makes his call to the believers, will rise to expel the unbelievers, they say... Egyptian Muslims look with hope to Turkey and with insolence to the West. We are for the progress of the Muslims, but why with the Caliph?... We ended the theocratic type of state with many revolutions. You have to end it also".

Italians.[14] UP did not lead the public opinion only through declarations, but also through spreading and guiding the news. There is evidence that UP informed sometimes directly its local representatives in Anatolia, Beirut and Syria, that **"Muslims had been worked up systematically by telegrams from Constantinople about their victories, and that the Committee of Union and Progress, which is very influential there, encouraged the jubilations."**[15]

The texts of the two declarations by **Anwar Bey (Pasha)** to the mujaheeds dealt both with this Islamic solidarity; perfectly in line with the UP declaration and even exceeding its limits on some points.

> "Ayyuha'l Ikhavan!
> The Italian state attacked an important part of our Watan-l aziz, the province of Trablousgarb, by trampling down national and international rights. Its aim is to constraint the Islamic world and limit its breaths of freedom, by expelling the Ottomans from that area.
> The Ottoman army, which cannot help its brothers over there because of the weakness which afflicts our navy, due to the wickedness of the past regime, is in a state of suffering and suffocation.
> In spite of this our State is firmly decided to defend this dear province and to oppose the enemy's aggression.
> Yes, we will struggle with all our efforts and tenacity to eliminate the existence of the enemy of the religion. We will continue our fight till the death of the last citizen of the Ottoman nation. There is no doubt that we will not permit the infamous feet of the enemy to soil this unspoiled land, to trample on the blessed graves of our ancestors who lost their lives while running from honour to honour, from victory to victory.
> Our respectable brothers living in the Ottoman Africa,prove with all their acts and behaviour that they share the serious determination of our government. Oh, you respectable brothers be sure that we will not leave you, ever. If we have to die, we will die together in honour and glory. Oh, respectable mujaheeds lets hold each others hands and let's defend our honour in the path of God in such a way that our enemies will understand that we are the honourable sons of our glorious forefathers, and that he must be obliged to withdraw his hands from us.
> The Islamic world in every part of the earth is extremely excited and in distress vis-a-vis this cruel and unlawful Italian attack. It expects everyday with impatience news of victory that we have destroyed and

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[14] Deputies like Riza Tevfik (Edirne) and Karolidi (Izmir) painted on the role of Europe and insisted that is simply another part of the "Oriental Question", but the government -especially- the Prime Minister — carefully avoided entering to such a discussion.

[15] From the British Ambassador to Istanbul to the Foreign Office. dated 18.11.1911, based on the report of 9.11.1911 No.65 of the British Consul at Beirut; FO. 371/1258/47158.

expelled the enemy, proving that we are defending with our blood and lives the Ottoman honour and the Caliphate. Consequently, the greatest duty which is 'Fardh' on us is to destroy the enemy with our raised sword which is drawn from its scabbard by our heroic hands for the sake of the Islamic Caliphate and the sacred 'watan', to show signs of success and victory by serving with self-sacrifice the Islamic and Ottoman aims.

The dislike and hate shown by all Muslims against the treacherous attack by Italy may instigate some states which have interests in the Islamic world to proceed for mediation in our favour. But this cannot prevent us from teaching a lesson of warning to that aggressive and cruel enemy. It is a must for us to destroy and expel them. We must never be afraid of dyiny for our country, and our glorious history compels us to it.

Our brothers at Homs, Benghazi and Derna, although they are not very many, stood in an unimaginable and unexpected way against the enemy like lions and crushed the Italian army, destroyed its navy. Being their brothers, we must also attack with such a lion-like move that the enemy must be ruined and not a single sign must remain of them on this holy land. The enemy is so infamous and so coward that he cannot stand our (Jehad) ing attack.
I repeat it to you. We will fight this enemy till the last drop of our blood. God's help is our support."[16]

In the second declaration the same arguments are enriched and completed with the following:

> "... Our fleet.. is in such a state that improvements in three or five years could never make it strong enough to fight with Italy which built its own navy in the last forty years. This is why our coasts surrendered temporarily. They are making false arguments and telling lies, which are pure inventions, such as that 'Your Caliph sold you to the Italians.' You, the obedient and beloved sons of the sultanate, be sure that the Caliph has sworn to sacrifice all his sons, to save you.
> The great Caliph has sent me here to save you from the enemy's hands. Come to me. Come and join your sincere brothers. Embrace your brothers whom our Sultan has sent to your help. I will provide weapons and ammunitions to those who want to take part in the fight. Those who aim to make trade, might have more opportunities here in larger and more suitable conditions.
> I am expecting all of you in 15 days. Let the city remain as a ruin in the hands of the enemy. After that warning period I will consider those who will not join me as having accepted Italian laws and I will behave accordingly."[17]

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[16] **SM,** VIII/167.
[17] Celal Bayar, **Ben de Yazdim,** Vol.II, p.654, from **Hak** newspaper of 28.4/4.5.1912.

Immediately after the declaration of war, the approach of the whole Turkish press joined the UP line. We will suffice by giving only some clear examples:[18]

> **Tanin:** — "The basis of the resistance at Trablousgarb is not Ottomanism but their devotion to the Sultan-Caliph... This is the sublimation of Islam."
> — "The Ottoman state cannot submit to the demands of the enemy; a state can be destroyed, crushed, but cannot commit suicide... From now on hate and enmity will start between the Ottomans and the Italians which will continue till the annihilation of one of them... From now on the lullaby of the newly born Ottoman children will be shouts of hate and revenge."
>
> — "The religious solidarity is particularly important, because the attack is precisely on Islam!"
> **Ikdam:** — "The problem of Trablousgarb became an Islamic problem. If Italy will not be condemned by the civilised world for what it has done and will be easily the master of this country, that will prove that Islamic life will nowhere be in security. Consequently the Trablousgarb problem is a matter of life and death for the whole of Islam."
>
> **Hakikat** (Eskisehir): — "If the British and the French will approve Italian action, the whole of Islam will fight on our side. The remedy which will prevent us from an insurrection which might shed blood on humanity is simply the respect for our religion and our watan."
> **Silah** (Salonica) — "Oh you Muslims!. What are you waiting for?... The history calls you under the banner of Jehad. The holiness of our beloved Prophet, with a sound like that of the Bilal-i Habashi under the crescent of Islam, recites the call of union, call of Jehad, and call of gaza... What are you waiting for?"
> **Siratl Mustakim** and later **Sebil-ur Resat:** — "The banditry and the murdering by Italy is not directed to only one region, it is to the whole of Islam."
>
> — "Italy thought that attacking the Ottoman State is an easy and unimportant act. But she realised very soon how much influence the Caliphate had on the Islamic world."
> — "Alhamd-o-lillah we are 300 million of a united Islamic community. We don't need money. We are all ready to sacrifice our lives and belongings for the Caliphate al Muhammadi."

There are also lots of poems and qasidas of which we will present only part of one of them depicting anxiety of **"An Ottoman at the Trablousgarb Beach":**[19]

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[18] Examples from: **Tanin,** 13.10.1911; **SM,** VII/162, 164, 167; SR, I(VIII)/4, 7, 8.
[19] SM, VII/164.

— On one side a large army, prisoner by the sea;
Create the sorrowful on the sea, in pain.
The nightmare has already reached Egypt, India, Morocco and Iran.
Justice, civilisation and honesty remain only in the weak.
Waves are simply a laughter of malediction to that strong wind.
Open the way, let me give a blow of annihilation to that blood-thirsty.

Another imprtant centre of public opinion was Beirut.

Two islamist newspapers of Beirut, **Al Balagh** and **Al Ettehad**[20] were inviting the Muslima of India, Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Russia and South-East Asia to a general stike under the prophet's banner for a holy war. **Al Balagh** had specially stated that it was the war of the Pope against the Caliphate. The article was judged as being too provocative by the Christians of **Beirut,** and their leaders decided to protest the newspaper.[21] **Al Balagh** explained that it did not mean the Ottoman Christians but the Western Christians, and the Jehad was meant against the European powers. Both the local administration and local Christians were satisfied by that clarification.[22]

The constancy of the Beirut's Islamist press and circles on their views is proved when later on they sent a telegram to the presidency of the parliament:

"Rumours are spreading that the government is intending to make peace with Italy. Any abandonment of the Tripolitanian soil will provoke the dissolution of the Ottoman national entity. Our patriotism forces us to inform you that any abandonment of land must not be consented to whatever be the price; and the parliament has to take such a decision and has to communicate it to us."[23]

2. HIZB AL-WATANI

The theme of Christianity and West against Muslims was also common to the Egyptian Muslim papers, where even the moderate papers were having an anti-Italian line. An Italian observer stated that **"Egyptian public opinion became immediately united and compact in favour of Turkey and against Italy."**[24]

Here the tone was guided by the **Hizb al Watani** and by some ulama of **Al Azhar** who decided to pray for the Islamic victory in daily prayers. The main claims of the wataniyyun was expressed in the **Al Djarida** by

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[20] **Reveil,** 6.10.1911.
[21] **Reveil,** 10.10.1911.
[22] **Reveil,** 14.10.1911.
[23] **Reveil,** 13.1.1912, from **Al Ettehad al Othmani.**
[24] Roberto A.Rossetti, "L'Egitto e la Guerra Libica" in **Africa Italiana,** No. 37, November-December 1914.

Ahmad Lutfi and in the **Al Lawa** by **Muhammad Farid.** Both were in favour of Egypt entering the war on the side of the Ottoman Empire.[25] Since they claimed that the Ottoman State held the right of soverignty over Egypt, they wanted the Turkish Army to be permitted to move freely in Egypt.

Another nationalist paper **Misr al-Fatat** accused the Egyptian government of rendering secret services to the Italian cause. It attacked also England for preventing the Egyptian government from providing for the Ottoman army a force of 18,000 soldiers, which according to the agreement of 1882 had to be proposed. **Al Fatat** insisted mainly on the religious aspect of the war and asserted a religious involvement by Egyptians. It had only a short period to carry on its campaign as it was closed by the authorities only a week after the declaration of the War.[26]

Al Lawa was calling for Jehad and attacked Europe for being united against Turkey; and emphasised that Moslems of all the world are ready not only to protest, but also to act against those who are humiliating Islam. It related Italy's mistake in believing in the lethargy of Islam and in its surprise vis-à -vis Islamic solidarity.[27] **Al Djarida** judged the Italian attack as a crusade and was favouring at least a demonstration of **"ties of brotherhood"** by the granting of a permission of passage through Egypt. It proposed also a boycott of the Italian goods[28].

Al Lawa declared openly that Egypt could be saved from the British occupation by taking part in the war. The same theme was repeated in a three-day-long-article by **Ahmad Lutfi**[29] who opposing the collection of money to help the mujaheeds and was recommending instead joining the front, i.e. becoming mujaheeds.

Al Alam proclaimed as the most Italio-phobe newspaper of Egypt[30]— and banned a little later by the government for its provocative articles — wrote that this was **"a religious war and interested the whole of the Muslim world".** it attacked sharply the Italian fanaticism.[31]

The Egyptian government was very attentive to the spread of a Jehad call, and made every effort to prevent it — including the closing of

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[25] With the declaration of war both newspapers started a campaign by publishing everyday important articles. Especially during the month of October. Special attention for 1st, 5th, 12th October in Al Lawa, and 3d, 7th, 27th in Al Djarida. More can be found in: Orhan Kologlu, **Mudhakkarat al dubbat al atrak hawl ma'araka libiya,** Markaz al Jehad al Libiy, 1979.

[26] **Egyptian Gazette,** 6.10.1911.

[27] SM, VII/168.

[28] Vol.12, No. 14.

[29] 27.10.1911.

[30] **Messaggero Egiziano,** 10.1.1912.

[31] 13.10.1911.

newspaper. This is why the extremist Egyptian papers did not have a long period of free expression on the subject.

The comportement of the newspapers called "**ministerial**" meaning siding with the government and indirectly with the British, but substantially Islamist, is particularly interesting. Entrusting the study of the fullscope of their policy to the particular part of this book, we will only relate their contribution to the spreading of the Jehad idea.

Al Moayyad is the most important of those papers. As Sayyed Rashid Ridha, the editor of **Al Manar** contributed extensively to **Al Moayyad,** and published the same articles in his own review, we will study the two simultaneously. **Al Manar,** a real authority during that period on the Islamic problems, had an undeniable effect on the public opinion in Egypt as well as abroad.

In his research on the contribution of **Al Manar** to the war efforts, **A.I.Diyab** remarks:[32]

> "Certainly al Manar considered the problem of Italian attack on Libya not directed to the Libyan and Ottoman territories but as a Crusader's expedition against the Islamic territory and people."

Indeed considering the aggression by the European powers during the same year on Morocco and Iran, **Al Manar** insisted on the existence of a Crusade and stated that the aim is to extirpate Islam from the world. The belief of colonialist powers, particularly England and France, that the Islamic World is dead and that the lethargy of these societies will not permit the revival of the Islamic energy and patriotism, as witnessed in the case of the Moroccon and Iranian examples, is illustrated by **Al Manar.** It reminds the Muslims that the disappearance of the Ottoman State from the earth will mean the disappearance of the Islam from the world. It adds that it is a religious obligation of every man in faith to offer his wealth and life to save it. If not, a full partition seems to be on the way, Trablous will be followed by Macedonia, Syria, etc.. In another issue it reveals the principles of the Crusaders as being:

> "Whatever the Cross tears off from the Crescent must never be returned back to the Crescent, and whatever the Crescent took off from the Cross has to be returned to it."[33]

and adds that their final aim is that

> "Not a single belonging on the earth must remain with the crescent."

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[32] Ahmad Ibrahim Diyab, "Mawkif Madjalla al-Manar al-Masriyya min al Gazv al Ikhtilal al Itali li-Libya", paper presented to the Second Turkish-Arabic Relations Conference in Tripoli (Libya), 13-20.December.1982.

[33] Al Manar, XIV/10, p.755; XIV/12, issue of 20.12.1911.

Al Manar recommends the necessity of the "**Islamic solidarity = Rabita-i Islamiyya**" for the whole of the Islamic world. And invites personally, the **Albanian** chiefs, leaders of the **Kurdish** tribes, amirs of **Arabs,** the **Amir of Mecca,** the **Imam of Yemen, amir of Nayd,** ruler of **Kuwait, Ibn Saud, Ibn al-Rashid,** the ulame of **Najaf** and **Iran** to the fight on the way of Allah (sabil Allah) to serve Islam, to prove the fraternity (Uhuwwa al-Iman) of the faith and to support the fighting Muslims, to protect whatever remains to them from their independence.[34]

While the coverage of **Al Manar** was limited mainly by the serial "**Al mas'alat al-sharkiya**" — published originally in **al Moayyad** — that newspaper, having more space, enriched its content with the news of the front and by publishing many qasidas.[35] One of which by **Izz al-din Salih,** addressed to the people of Tunisia and Algeria on the subject of Jehad.

3. YOUNG TUNISIANS

In maghreb, Tunisia had undoubtedly the most dynamic elements. Before going into the details of the Tunisian activities we like to remember the state of Albier and the reason behind its inactivity.

> "In Algier -till the First World War- Islamic public opinion did not dispose of any organ or publication worthy of that name. Few papers published by the young enlightened (Al Misbah, Al Hack, L'Islam, Le Rachidi) concerned only the few hundreds of Muslims cultivated in Franch. The press in Arabic language, which could have interested a sufficiently large Muslim public, were yet rudimentary. Out of semi-official Al Maghrib (1903-1913) edited in Algier by Fontana, whose mediocrity shocked Mohammad Abduh during his trip to Algier in 1903, one had to wait for the eve of the First World War to witness the birth of some Muslim newspapers in Arabic."[36]

Then the writer adds that Algier had, during that period a very limited communication with the outside world, the pilgrimage was restricted and even trips of study in Mashrak meant exile, as they were not permitted to return to Algier.

Even the activities of **Amir Ali,** the son of Algerian hero '**Abd-al Kader,** who joined the mujaheedeen in Libya, did not have any

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[34] Al Manar, XIV/11, (21.11.1911), pp. 852-853.

[35] As in its issues of 5, 9, 30 October.1911; 3, 37, 29 November; 4, 5, 7, 12, 25, 31 December etc...

[36] Ali Merad, "Islam et Nationalisme Arabe en Algérie à la veille de la première Guerre Mondiale", **Oriente Moderno,** 1969 (49), pp. 216-17.

repercussions in Algier, but were sufficiently commented on in Tunisia.

In Tunisia there was not an organised party but a group of intellectuals **"Les Jeunes Tunisians"** (The Young Tunisians) of whom **M.Bash Hamba** was a leading spokesman, and liked to repeat that "Tunisia is an Ottoman province"[37] and that it represented for them the symbol of the Islamic sovereignty.

Immediately after the declaration of war the Sheikh A. Tha-alibi started publishing a newspaper in Arabic **"Islamic World"** and organised collection of material help for the Tripoli warriors. **Ali Bash Hamba** also publised a newspaper under the name **"De L'Union Islamique"** and disclosed his views:

> "What made in the past the power of Islam was its unity. What since many centuries makes its weakness, is the division... Islam can find its lost power only by its return to the unity. Now all the Moslems of the world are aware of the necessity which is imposed if they don't want to vanish: 1) To join their rights, their interests and their efforts; 2) to recognize and accept as chief, for their thus reformed union, the Sultan Caliph of Constantinople, and 3) at last to defend with all their power and with all their means the Caliphate which then became the center of Islam."[38]

Describing as "banditism, treachery and shame for the humanity" the Italian agression he says is:

> "an agression, an insult inflicted on the whole of the Islamic world. Is it not clear that by attacking their Caliph, the guardian and defender of the holy places, it is the Islam itself and the Islamic world which is attacked as a whole."[39]

And even the need for the Islamic solidarity is defended on the basis of the European aggressiveness **Union Islamique** of the 3.11. 1912, after disclosing the two hundred years old conspiracy by Europe to destroy the Islamic Empire, says:

> "This is that abominable oppression, those black intentions of Europe which ignite in the hearts of the believers the flame of the Islamic ardour and honour; and pushed them towards unity (..) by demonstrating to them clearly that — if they persisted in their inactivity and their coward resignation the European powers will destroy the Ottoman Empire, their Caliphate and that this destruction will impair them all and will deprive them from the holy flag which sheltered all the Muslims."

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[37] For the Tunisian activities our main source was the above mentioned article of C.Sammut, "L'Action..." in RHM.

[38] 2.10.1911, quoted, ibid. p.125.

[39] 13.10.1911, ibid. 125.

This way of condemning Europe and basing its own aplogy on the enemy's aggressiveness has also been used in publications which were aimed at explaining facts only to the Westerners.

4. MUSLIMS IN EUROPE

The call for Islamic solidarity directed towards Muslim public opinion is noticed even in the propaganda campaign of the Muslims, working or studying in Europe. But when the propaganda was meant for Europeans and for publication in Western press, any reference to religion is avoided. The first of the two press releases which we will introduce, was "**Appel à l'Opinion Publique Européenne** (= Call to the European Public Opinion) published by the Turkish students at **Lausanne.** It was intended for insertion by the European newspapers. This is why it avioded any reference to the religious facts,[40] and put forth only arguments on civilization.

The second was a call in Arabic to the Muslim world from **Berlin.** Bearing the address "**155, Uhlandstrasse",** it was prepared by a mixed group. The instigators, two Turkish officers (**Ismail Hakkl and Ali Nuri-Okday** — the son of **Ahmad Tawfik Pasha,** the Ottoman Ambassador to London), composed by the Egyptian doctor **Moharram** and written by German Muslim, **Mohammad Brugsch Bey.** It was meant to be read and distributed in the mosques.

We found the Turkish version of it in some Turkish newspapers as well as in the **Sebilürresad**[41] ; **the Arabic version in the Istikbal** newspaper of **Crete Island** and **Al Bashir** newspaper of India[42]. It reached also Tangier and Algier according to the reports in **Dépêche Coloniale** (de France), **Gil-Blas** (Paris)[43] and in some more French papers. According to **Gil-Blas,** the communiqué was very largely distributed in the South Algier. On the other hand it created a political clash in Tangier between Italian legation and the local administration. All of that prove that a very effective distribution had been realized. The text reminds that the Ottoman State, owner of the Caliphate and the protector of the Holy Cities is attacked by the cruel Italian government, and that the Islamic community (umma) is a unique body. Muslims are brothers and a man in faith has to help, for the sake of Allah, its attacked brother with every means. It is time and a must to help the fighters to send out the Italian brigands. It is also useful to cut all the economic and financial relations with Italy in every

[40] The common considerations on the "might is right; treason to the ideals of the XXth Century civilization the lesson of humenism to be taught by the Muslims; the struggle of the Ottoman Empire on the way of civilization" are repeated there.

[41] I/2, p.31.

[42] **Istkibal,** 29.Safar.1330; **Al Bashir,** 19.3.1912.

[43] 9.5.1912.

Muslim country. The declaration ends with the invitation to distribute it as much as possible and to read it in the mosques.

We have to add the reaction of a very small Muslim community, that of Poland, which had nearly the same tone. Poles having a favourable consideration over the Ottoman State for the common dislike from Czarist regime, reacted against the Italian assault, and to use it as an indirect critic towards the colonialist authority. An article in the **Al Alam** review by **Dr.Ferujinski Bey** was calling for a **"Jehad for the sake of God."** and was assuring the final victory. A poem by the Polish poet **Rimigiush** in the same review **"The Lesson from Tripoli"** presented the Libyan resistance as an example:

> "Better death than life with shame; better to cut the arteries than to live in slavery; better to be a shajeed than to be a traitor;.. etc."[44]

5. ALL-INDIA MUSLIM LEAGUE

The Indian Muslim press of the period was most eager for a worldwide cooperation among Muslims, for internal reasons of the Indian politics. Already at the turn of the year, when the Moroccan affair was on the international agenda, a poem by Mohammad Iqbal, appeared simultaneously in several Muslim papers and was baptised as the **"new national song of Muslims".** Its content could be considered as the precursor of the Islamist campaign which, starting with the Tripolitanian War, spread over the years till the creation of Pakistan.[45]

> "China and Arabia (are) ours; India (is) ours:
> We are Muslims (and) the whole is our home.
> That first House of God (the Kaaba) in the Pagoda of the World,
> We are its guardians and it is our protector
> We have reared to youth under the shadow of swords.
> The scimitar of the crescent is our national emblem.

The attack on Tripoli particularly affected Mohammad Iqbal and gave a new impetus to his poetry. His poem **"Before the Prophet's Throne"** which presents the blood of the Tripoli Martyrs as the **"most valuable thing, the equal of which can not be found even in Paradise"** had particular repercussions in India and abroad.[46]

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[44] D.Francis Buhanski, "sada nidal al-shaab al-Arabi al Libi fi al sahafa al-Bolandiya..", Al Shaheed, No. 4,1983, pp. 195-206.

[45] **Hindustan** (Lahore), 31.3.1911, presented under the title "The new national song of the Muslims".

[46] The translation of the poem by V.G.Kiernan, **Poems from Iqbal,** J.Murray, London 1955, p. 15-16; The influence of Tripoli War on Iqbal's poetry is studied by Abdulkadir Karahan, **Dr.Muhammed Ikbal ve eserlerinden seçmeler,** Gençlik Basimevi, Istanbul, 1974; also Kazim Ismail Gurkan's remarks in **Turkiyedo Dr.Muhammed Ikbal,** Turkiye-Pakistan Kultur Cemiyeti, Istanbul, 1962, p.24.

Sick of this world and all this world's tumult
I who had lived fettered to dawn and sunset,
Yet never fathomed the planet's hoary laws,
Taking provision for my way set out
From earth, and angels led me where the Prophet
Holds audience, and before the mercy-seat.
'Nightingale of the gardens of Hejaz! each bud
Is melting, said those Lips,' in your song's passion-flood;
Your heart forever steeped in the wine of ecstasy,
Your reeling feet nobler than any suppliant knee.
But since, taught by these Seraphim to mount so high,
You have soared up from nether realms towards the sky
And like a scent come here from the orchards of the earth —
What do you bring for us, what is your offering worth?
Master! there is no quiet in that land of time and space,
Where the existence that we crave hides and still hides its face
Though all creation's flowerbeds teem with tulip and red rose,
The flower whose perfume is true love —that flower no garden knows.
But I have brought this chalice here to make my sacrifice;
The thing it holds you will not find in all your Paradise.
See here, oh Lord, the honour of your people brimming up!
The martyred blood of Tripoli, oh Lord, is in this cup.

With the declaration of war by Italy, the already existing fighting spirit of Indian Muslims erupted strongly. The main theme of the press was that the Muslims were very excited because they accept it as an attack on the Caliphate. Thus it is a universal danger to the Islamic world. It is a crusade against Islam. The only aim of the Christians is to extirpate Islam from the World, with the creation of a Pan Christian movement.[47]

> "Morocco, Tripoli, Rhodes, Iran are all lost. And now Europe is pressing to open the Dardanelles. The Next is Asia and the holy places. Are the Muslims going to permit the defilement of the Qoran and the mosques, the forcible baptism of children and old men..."[48]

So the question becomes **"what next?"** as the **Leader (Allahabad)** puts it in its issue of 15.11.1911.

The blame of all what's happening is thrown on the European

[47] **Rast Goftar** (Bombay) 8.10.1911; **Musalman** (Begal) 3.11; **Vakil** (Punjab) 8.11; **Oudh Akhbar** 28.11; **Durbar Gazette** 25.12; **Urdu-i Mualla** (Aligarh) January 1912; **Vakil** (Amritsar) 21.2.1912.

[48] **Qaisar-i Hind** (Fayazabad) 16.5.1912.

powers. On that point, one can notice many non-Muslim papers joining hands with the Muslim press to condemn the hypocritical behaviour of the Western civilisation.

> "European nations have eliminated from the world all the Hindu states, Muslims were proud of having a Shiite (Persia) and a Sunnite (Ottoman) state. But with their hypocritical behaviour Europe will destroy them by professing to civilize the world."[49]

we can summarize the main themes of the criticism as follows:

"Is that the progress and the civilization?... Might is right and civilization is the right of the stronger nations to usurp the territory of weaker"[50]

"Now civilization has come to mean that, except Europeans, all other nations are uncivilized and that the former should take possession of the territory belonging to the latter and should annihilate them or reduce the inhabitants to a state of subjection. It is this interpretation of the civilization which led to the formation of empires in America and Australia. Civilization had done nothing in Africa and India. Only wars are wagd in the name of civilization."[51]

"Where are those Peace Committees and the like.."[52]

"They don't give up even their racist tendency in European policy, and the white people do not admit the coloured to their civilization — "Oh! the humbug and hypocrisy of the times."[53]

"Secret agreements of partition are also a part of their civilization"[54]

The war atrocities are also described as the outcome of the Western civilization. The first bombings from the air add to that claim and the disinterestedness of Europe in the Italian atrocities is criticised sharply: **"They are not ashamed at the butcherly conduct of the Italians."** Even one paper remarks that there was but one Christian and that he perished on the cross.[55] On the other hand the execution of the Tripolitanian

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[49] **Bharat Mitra** (Calcutta), 7.10.1911.

[50] **Tribune** (Lahore) 1.10.1911; **Punjabee** (Lahore) 5.10; **Al Panch** (Barkipore) 6.10; **Indian Patriot** (Madras) 9.10; **Saddharma Pracharak** (Kangri Bijnor) 11.10; **Sahifa** (Bijnor) 12.10; **Zulqarnain** (Budaun) 7.10; **Leader** (Allahabad) 13.10; **Mahratta** (Poona) 15.10; **Lolopakari** (Madras) 16.10; **Hitavadi** (Calcutta) 20.10; **Sasilekha** (Madras) 24.10; **Swadeshabhimanī** (Mangalore) 27.10 and 6.11; **Gujayati** (Bombay) 5.11; **Zamindar** 27.12 (PS: 10 = October, 11 = November, 12 = December).

[51] **Amrita Bazar Patrika** (Calcutta) 7.10; **Akhbar-i Islam** (Bombay) 10.12; **Baroda Gazette** (Baroda) 12.10; **Lolo Pakari** (Madras) 16.10; **Hitavarta** (Bengal) 19.10.

[52] **Tribune** (Lahore) 5.10.1911.

[53] **Mahratta** (Poona) 15.11.1911.

[54] **Mashriq**, 30.1.1912; **Oudh Akhbar** (Lucknow) 17.5.1912.

[55] **West Coast Spectator** (Calicut) 4.11; **Paisa Akhbar** (Bombay) 1.11; **Zamindar** 1.11; **Political Bhomiyo** (Ahmadabad) 3.11; **Abhyudaya** 5.11; **Mashriq** (Un.Provinces) 7.11; **Wednesday Review** (Madras) 8.11; **Saddharma Pracharak**, 8.11; **Hita varta** (Calcutta) 9.11; **Al Mushir** (Moradabad) 4.1.1912.

Arabs as traitors by Italy creates real indignation, their being for centuries Turkish subjects: **"Should not the other European powers protest against such atrocities."**[56]

The Outcome of the denouncement of the atrocities was to insist on continuing war till all the culprits were punished and no peace was made before that[57]. This is especially emphasized by the news that pressure is exercised by other powers on Turkey for a peace. They are scandalized because of the inconsequence of the European power's behaviour: "When Turkey proposed a peaceful solution she was refused... Now that the Arabs are heroically defending their country against the aggression and seeing that it is very hard for Italy to keep a permanent hold on Tripoli."[58]

Any peace move by Europe is justly evaluated as the result of the Turco-Arab cooperation in Libya: **"Whenever Turks and Arabs are united and an Islamic solidarity is witnessed, Europe feels the need to intervene just to mislead that rapprochement to prevent a Christian failure. We share the opinion of Tanin** [leading newspaper of Istanbul] **that, "war to the last" has to be the only motto.**[59]

The necessity for the Islamic solidarity is the natural outcome of all those considerations:

> "The Italian-Turkish War will deepen the Pan Islamic sentiment which is beginning to make itself felt all over the world."

And soon after it is stated:

> "It is not a Turkish-Italian war, but Christianity versus Islam. The feeling of Muslims all over the world are aroused to a high pitch and it is easier to raise a flame than to quench it."[60]

Appeals for material and human help to Turkey against Europe are launched, at the same time advice on forming alliance between Turkey, Iran and Afganistan proposed.[61]

Epic poems and exulting literature to strengthen the Islamic solidarity occupies an important place in the Indian Moslem press, especially in **Zamindar,** the newspaper from Punjab contains the most interesting examples of it, which are reproduced many times by the other papers.

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[56] **Moslem Hitaishi** (Bengal) 3.11.1911.
[57] **Mukhiri Alam** (Moradabad) 8.1.1912; **Zulqarnain** (Budaun) 14.2.1912.
[58] **Oudh Akhbar** 17.3.1912; **Aligarh Gazette** (Aligarh) 20.3.1912; **Haiyari Azam** 19.3.1912.
[59] **Naiyari Azam** (Un.Provinces) 26.3.1912; **Zamana** (Cawnpore) February issue 1912; **Oudh Akhbar** 5.4.1912.
[60] **Bengalee** (Bengal) 8.10; **Hindoo Patriot** 9.10; **Oudh Akhbar** 28.11; **Sahifa** 12.1.1912.
[61] **Urdu-i Mualla** Novembdr 1911; **Saddharma Pracharak** 10.1.1912.

"The Turkish Soldier's cigarette" is a communication by Kwaja Hasan from Delhi:[62]

> "Stirke the match, light (thy) cigarette, press (it) care lessly between (thy) lips, draw in (thy) breath, and then take aim and shoot the Italian soldier. Do not fear these ne'er-do-wells. The smoke from (thy) cigarette will destroy them all.
> ... Tripoli may be lost or may remain (with Turkey). Contantinople may remain safe or may be destroyed do not care for this. Emit smoke from (thy) cigarette, but in such a way that the whole world may be enveloped in darkness... Throw down ashes so as to stain the civilization of Italy and her friends... O Soldier, with the cigarette! Gallantly step forward. Swing in the cradle of bloodshed. Raise the Shout of "Allah-u-Akbar".

Zamindar of the 8th November 1911 publishes a letter headed **"The home of the Arab martyr"** by Hasan Nizami from Delhi:

> "Look into the home of the Tripolitanian Arab!
> The grief stricken mother stands, her hands pressed against her heart, between the dead bodies of (her) two grown up sons.
> See! Here comes another body. It is that of her husband, the father of the martyrs. He is not dead yet...
> The Arab's youngest son (a boy) of twelve, is ill. He has been unconscious with fever. He has just opened his eyes and stands up in alarm on seeing the condition of his father and brothers. The father, who is in the agonies of death, says: "Go, my son. Go to the battlefield, shoot (and) get shot... and save the lamp of the faith... I wished to get him married, to deck him with the bridegroom's coat, but by good luck the Martyr's robe is available to-day... Wife, leave me. Make a bridegroom of your son. Gird him with the sword and gar land him with cartridges. Go, son. Sacrifice thyself for the faith... See, my son, this is the Quran. Preserve its honour. Lay down thy life for this purpose. The enemy has come to attack ti... The Quran is our life, faith (and) honour. Let not infidels triumph over it. Thou art not alone; the Moslims of the world are hastening to thy help".
> (The son then addresses his mother and says): "Bid me farewell, mother, lest other Moslims should forestall me and I should be prevented from becoming a martyr.
> (Mother replies): Whither goes thou my son, and to whom dost thou leave me?
> Son "No Madam, let me go. You will be the care of all the Moslems of the world, will lay their wealth and lives at my feet. Do not lose heart....
> (The mother then bewails her lot, and says): "My God! What will happen now? Will they take us prisoners, (and) carry us away to swep

[62] **Zamindar** 29.10.1911.

the Church? Shall we be made to bow before the cross? Will the Italian savages dishonour these my innocent and virgin daughters? O Muslims, I implore you. Maintain the honour of (your) religion and preserve Arabia's sense of self-respect".
(The writer then remarks): "Noble lady, have patience... God's wrath is about to manifest itself... (My) Indian brethren, will you not give subscriptions in aid of the wounded even now?"

In a poem dated the 27th December 1911 it is declared that "**once the shout of Allah-o-Akbar is raised, we will compel Rome to give up the use of arms.**" In another one entitled "**The gist of Islamic Feelings**", the Italian defeat at **Derna** and the rising of the **Berbers** and the **Senoussis** are praised. (18.1.1912)

The poem "**A scene from the Battlefield of Tripoli**" depicts the martyrdom of the Tripolitanians, the savage ignorance of Italians and the heroic defence of the Turks. The writer -an unnamed resident from **Moradabad** -characterises the war between the king of Italy and the Sultan as a struggle between infidelity and faith. He depicts how two thousand moujaheeds defeated twenty thousand Italians.[63]

Even as late October 1912, the day of the signing of the peace between Italy and the Ottoman State (18.10.1912) **Zamindar** never gave up

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[63] **Zamindar** 19.1.1912; its translation:
"Italy in a fit of rage destroyed the crescent (in the front of Tripoli) and caused it to roll in dust and blood. When the banner of Islam was destroyed in this way, the Kaaba came to be inhabited by idols. When, however, the world came to know of this unjustifiable oppression, the mujahids came in torrents from Arabia and Senoussis unfurled their banner in the desert. The news then spread that a blood thirsty army and the warlike Anwar had arrived on the battlefield; and that all would now be roused to activity.
The Shaikh (Anwar Beg) arrived and delivered a speech in which he said: "O upholders of Islam! These are the days of trial. Italians have come to practise oppression on Turks and Arabians and they desire to sweep Islam, and the time has come when we all should level them (Italians) to the dust."
These words filled Muslims with excitement — so much so that they were all blinded with enthusiasm. They drowned all their thoughts in their sole desire for Jehad, and every zealous Muslim carried his life in his hands. The welkin rang with cries of "Allah-o Akbar" and every devoted Muslim was transported beyond all bondds by his anxiety to attain martyrdom. Muslims then came on the battlefield like lions, uttering the kalima. He then challenged General Caneva and said: — "O Caneva come to the arena without loss of time if thou hast any claim to bravery. What art thou and what do we think of thy innumerable hosts? Success has always been on our side and victory follows us everwhere. We have no equals in bravery, and will sweep off thy head as if it were an ear of corn. Muslims have pronounced the ezan even in the Christian Churchies, and, while they will go straight to paradise after attaining martyrdom, thou will go to hell."
These words enraged the black-faced (Caneva) who brought his troops to the ramparts of his fort; with the result that a terrible battle ensued between Italians numbering twenty thousand on one side and Turks numbering only two thousand on the other. The battle raged fiercely and streams of Italian blood began to flow on the battlefield. In the end the Turks were victorious and regained their lost forts and fortresses.

publishing optimistic poems on the issue of the War, and the Muslim solidarity. The poem **"The Tripolitanian War"** by **Maulvi Ghulam Hazrat Khan** narrates the past grandeur of Islam, the actual troubles, the need for Muslims to shake off from the sleep and to close their ranks. After imploring the wealthy to help the Tripolitanian Arabs for Jehad he goes on:

> O Caliph of Islam! This is the day of war.
> Let the flaming sword remain out of the scabbard.
> The oppressors are harassing from all sides.
> It is necessary to display a sence of honour to-day.
> Let there be decisive war with the mischievous,
> Let the sword of Ghiza and Jehad stagger the world."

It ends with the belief that Islamic army is strong and will easily crush the Balkan states.

The role of the All-India Muslim League in this intense campaign can never be denied. But the structure of India (multiplicity of Muslim language groups, diversity of ethnic groups, of religions) makes such that many times, improvised action by the people, the role of the local Muslim leaders without the instigation of the All-India Muslim league, and the reflection of the Hindu-Muslim relations on the local politics, influenced the public opinion more than the League itself.

In that regard we mentioned the role of the Muslim League in the appropriate part of "Action by the mass man" and the other sections.

6. SHI'AH ULEMA AND HABL-UL-MATIN

As the motivators of the Iranian public opinion we have to deal particularly with the activities of the Iranian Ulema and the Persian press outside Iran, and Habl-ul Matin of Calcutta as the best representative of it.

When the Libyan War broke out, Iran was struggling to eliminate the Anglo-Russian influence from its land. The parliament was trying to reach full freedom and had passed in June 1911 an act conferring full powers on an American expert, **W.M. Shuster,** on the financial problems; that was a striking act of nationalism as the country was fundamentally under the British-Russian control since their agreement of 1907. It was an open rebellion against the imperialist powers and threats were repeated from both sides.

Dynastical circles were divided according to their interests between the Russian and British partisanship. A civil war was staged in the Western and Northern Iran by the ex-Shah with the Russian backing. Britain more concerned with the German threat, preferred to acquiesce

to the Russian policy of threat and interference in the area. The Anglo-Russian interference was approaching the stage of a military intervention when the Italian government declared war on Turkey. Seeing in that act their own future, Iranian nationalists became deeply interested with the events in Libya. **Abd ul-Hadi Hairi** states that **"The Italian occupation of Libya seems to have attracted more attention and received more antipathies in Muslim world than any other intervention"**[64]

The role of the **Habl-ul Matin** is undeniable. From its columns we can follow the parallel set up between the Libyan and Iranian affairs. In its 2nd October 1911 issue it states that:

> **"All the Christian Powers of Europe (Russia, England, France, Austria, are aiming to throw the Moslems off their guard and of weakening and blotting out the** Eastern powers... From the history of the past two hundred years it is quite clear that the Christian powers are rising with the downfall of the Muslim Empires... It now appears to be the turn of Italy to satisfy her greed by taking Tripoli... During the past hundred years nine-tenths of the Islamic countries have passed into the hands of the Christians, and the remaining one tenth is also in danger of being taken by them... This act shows how the Christian powers would one by one take all the Islamic countries, and even Mekka and Medina may one day fall into their hands... Italy has brought to light the nature of civilization and justice of Europe: strength is the law... Alas for the Muslims who are still sleeping.. ..Muslims should shake off their lethargy and try heart and soul to keep the remaining Islamic countries. The Persians, Turks, Afghans, Bokharis, Arabs, Caucasians and Egyptians should all unite together and save their religion and liberty."

In its 9th October 1911 issue, **Hablul Matin** reminds the Iranians of the mistake of the Moroccans for being uninterested in the faith of other Muslims. And adds that Iranians should, before it is too late, try to porfit by or save themselves from the possible result of the Turco-Italian War... The example of the Western allies of Turkey must be a lesson; Germany was pretending such an alliance, but in a moment of distress and necessity, no power helped Turkey; and no one will help Iran... The Iranians should know that the barbarity, faithlesness, wildness and injustice of the Europeans which were hitherto concealed have now been revealed...

After emphasising the need for self sufficiency for defence, **Habl-ul Matin** continues as follows:

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[64] Abdul Hadi Hairi, "The Responses of Libyans and Iranians to Imperialism as reflected in two documents", **Zeitschrift der Deutsche** Morgenlaendischen Gesellschaft, 1980, 130/2, p.373.

Another important and advantageous thing for Iranians today is their sympathy with and help to their Turkish brethren and all other Muslims. The Iranians should know that if the Europeans succeed in uprooting the Turkish Empire it is impossible that they would leave Iran alone. The Turks and the Iranians should try to save themselves; unity and sympathy of the Muslims with each other alone can put a stop to the greed and avarice of the Europeans. Therefore the first and foremost duty of the Iranians to-day is to help the Turks, which in reality means helping themselves.

... If Turks come out victorious, the Iranians would reap the benefit. On the contrary Iran will suffer in the hands of Russia and Britain in a similar way to those Italy has done over Tripoli. ...The salvation of not only Iran but of the whole Islamic world depends upon conservation of energy and unity among the Muslims and their Empires.

In another article in the same issue, it puts emphasis on the **"crusading"** structure of the Italian attack, based on the appeal of the **Bishop of Cremona** in Italy, who said that the Christians finding themselves superior in strength to the Muslims have proclaimed a crusade against the Turks:

"They however, call this a war for spreading civilisation... The Bishop of Italy, therefore means propagation of religion under the cloak of spreading civilisation by war... By crusade... But if a single Turkish "alim" were to give an order for jehad against Italians these very civilised powers would raise a great hue and cry... The English government rules over a hundred million of Muslims and the Bishop's orders are likely to cause a stir among them. Therefore if in this age of religious tolerance the Muslims pay their antagonists, who have legalised a Holy War in their own coin, they cannot be blamed fo it."

The article ends by reminding the possibility of a general uprising because **"the alliance of the English with the Russians, and the interference of the latter in Iran has already paralysed the English policy in regard to the Islamic world".**

The same arguments are repeated in an article in the issue of the 23 October 1911.

To continue the war whatever might be the outcome was the main theme of **Habl-ul Matin.** In an article entitled **"Turkish Brethren to read"** (16.10.1911), it warns against any agreement for Libya on the money basis:

"If you agree on such a thing you will loose the sympathy of all Muslims. Even a revolution may happen. The Young Turks should rise to defend the sovereign power of their country. They should know

that the Crescent is in fear of being put down by the cross. They should protect the temple of God and the Holy Sepulchre of the Prophet. They should fear the time, when the Muslims having no longer any hope from them, raise the question of the Caliphate of Arabia, a thing which the enemies of Islam have been desiring since a very long time. They should not fear death. "Death of sovereign power" should be their motto.... It is time for Muslims to unite. It is not the time of political party discussions. The discord has made the people sick and they expressed their sympathy for the ex-sultan Abdul Hamid. They should not bring a stain upon their good name in history... If Tripoli is lost, Egypt also will be lost and the losing of the Caliphate will follow."

To continue the war whatever be the outcome was the main theme of **Habl-ul Matin.** The same was the advice to the Iranians, if not **"The country is going out of the people's hands, infidelity seeks predominance over Islam, and the wives and the children of the Muslims are going to be enslaved by the enemy infantry and cavalry".**[65]

The same is repeated in the 23rd October issue. Criticism towards the whole of the Islamic world for their disinterestedness in other Muslim's problems and possible effect of a joint action is repeated, sometimes covering the whole of the paper. The Libyan example is continuously repeated and the danger is generalised in a way to include even the holy cities:

> "We are strangled by Europe, Islam is lost and soon we will not even have Medina and Mekka and Kaaba in our control... We have to fight: "Death or independence".

Habl-ul Matin kept continuing its campaign during 1912 with the same themes, but the Libyan example became less and less frequent; mainly the whole of Islam was put in the limelight. A letter from a Persian Ulama (29.1.1912) and the joint declaration of the ulamas in (March 1912) were directed to the same direction; the latter with a note:

> "if the Muslims still stick to their selfish interests and do not unite, they are sure to lose their sovereignty as it has happened in Spain."

And when **Mashhad,** the holy city with the mausoleum of **Imam Reza,** was bombed by the Russians, it asked:

> "The Kaaba and the Koran are in danger, will Islam not move?"[66]

Concerning the activities of the ulama we will depend mostly on the article of **Abdul Hadi Hairi:**

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[65] Hablul Matin, 16.10.1911.
[66] **Hablul Matin,** 13.4.1912.

"At the beginning of December 1911, Khurasani, then the greatest religious leader of Shi'ah issued a fatwa proclaiming a holy war against Italy, Russia and England because of the Italian action in Tripoli and the Russian and British action in Persia.[67]

Led by the same mujtahid (religious authority) and supported by the leaders of 200,000 armed tribesmen, the ulama of Iraq, including **Shaykh al-Shari'ah (Isfahani),** together with a large number of supporters set out for Iran to offer their resistance to the foreign invaders. In defiance of the sudden death of **Khurasani,** the ulama's expedition was not cancelled, only postponed. On the New Year's Day of 1912 the ulama, under the leadership of **Shaykh Abd Allah Mazandarani,** and followed by more than 500 religious students left **Najaf** and stopped in **Kazimayn** on their way to Iran. There the ulama formed an executive board and began to make contacts with authorities in several countries including Ottoman Turkey, Iran and India. They appealed to all Muslims in the world by sending numerous telegrams and publishing many manifestoes. They strongly condemned the Italian action in Libya and the Anglo-Russian occupation in Iran and made an appeal to all Muslims to rise against the invaders.

According to an official British Document, a violent antiforeign campaign was waged by the press in Iraq because of the issue of the ulama's first proclamation of a Holy War. It also gave rise to a considerable fear on the part of te Persian Government, in Kazimayn, the ulama's were constantly urged by the Persian authorities to stop their expedition to Iran. The British and Russian authorities were also anxious over the ulama's move and made a strenuous effort to suppress it. The anti-foreign press campaign, therefore, was checked in Iraq **"probably by the Vali who promised to do what he could unofficially under their direction."**[68]

The same **Najaf** government of the Ottoman Administration who was accused of having **"forcibly extorted"** the proclamation from **Khurasani,** was summoned to Baghdad to answer the charges; and the Russian consul-general in Baghdad declared that **"he had proof of governor's guilt and that if necessary he would be willing to take part in the inquiry."**[69]

As an example of anti-Western and anti-Italian publications in Iraq,

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[67] FO 424/250, Turkey: Anual report by the British Ambassador to Istanbul, 1911, p.36, quoted by Abdul Hadi Hairi ar. cit., p.379; **Vakil** newspaper of Amritsar (India) also report it in its issue of 29.11.1911.

[68] FO. 424/250, Turkey: Annual report, 1911, p.36.

[69] FO. 424/229, Lowther to Grey, Constantinople 18.12.1911, No. 140 quoted bay Abdul Hadi Hairi, ar. cit., p.380.

during the period of the Libyan war, we can present the poem "**Ila al-Harb**" of **Maruf ar-Rusafi** (1875-1945).[70]

> "You, oh Orient, rise and march to the war,
> Don't you see the violation of the sacred lands of Islam between Egypt and Tunisia.
> And don't incline to charge the guilt only to Italians, the whole of the West is responsible for it.
> The heads of the West say that this is the time of progress: Is progress killing innocent persons?
> ...Don't irritate Islam, because its swords will shine as in the past."

The Ulama issued many manifestoes and sent many telegrams in confirmation of the proclamation of Jehad. They were published by the Indian press. Among them, the one issued by **Shaykh al-Shariah Isfahani** was the most comprehensive, systematic and coherent of it all. It was published in Baghdad on the 14th February 1912, in Arabic. Less than two months later it was translated into Persian and published in Iran. The remarkable thing about this manifesto is that it attacked only Russia and Italy while ignoring the British interference in the Persian affairs, and its backing the Russian and Italian policies.

The application of Persian Parliament and Persians from Tabriz, Bombay etc... to the Ottoman Parliament for support agianst Russia's military intervention (December 1911) had also a religious tone. The Russian Pressure on the Turkish Administration to prevent any interference in the Russo-Iranian relations and to the "**pan islamization**" of it, is indicated by **Ahmed Agayef** in the **Sebilurresad** review of Istanbul.[71] In its article "**Our actual situation**" he states that Turkey cannot give up its interests in Azerbaidjan and Iran, because that will mean the losing of not only Azerbaidjan but also of Anatolia. He claims that the Persian affair is as important as the Tripoli affair and concludes that "**if we can solve it properly, we can even save Persia**".

7. AMIR OF AFGHANISTAN AND SERAJ UL AKHBAR

The Amir of Afghanistan showed the keenest interest in the Libyan War. He appointed officials to translate the accounts which appear in the foreign newspapers and these translations were read to him every evening.[72] He ordered also the convening of a durbar on the 24th November 1911 at Kabul, during which the Amir himself spoke of the

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[70] Paolo Minganti, "Una poesia di Ma'ruf ar-Rusafi sulla conguista Italiana di Tripoli (1911)", **Annali dell 'Istituto Universitario Orientale di Napoli,** n.s.XVIII, 1968, pp. 335-337.

[71] Vol.I (VIII) No. 4 (186), pp. 66-67.

[72] **Civil and Military Gazette** (Lahore), 9.11.1911.

need for help to the mujaheedin. He stressed that every Muslim feels as being attacked by the same aggressors and that every one has to help the other.[73]

The British Agent at Kabul reported that **"the people of Afghanistan were all angry".**[74] It was the result of the efforts by the only important and semi-official newspaper of Afghanistan the **Seraj-Ul-Akkbar.** The more dynamic approach of the **Seraj** towards the war, than that of its government, was due to the personal interest of its edition **M. Tarzi.** Having completed his studies in Istanbul and lived there for 15 years, he had a particular sympathy for the Turks and the Ottoman State. So he wanted a more dynamic contribution in the war-not just speeches and financial help.

The involvement of the Ottamans in three successive Wars, the War of Tripolitania, the Balkan Wars and World War I, provided **Tarzi** with inexhaustible material for his articles and for his "political résumés". In the War of Tripolitania and in the Balkan Wars, the injustice of aggression against right by might, and the injustice of the martyrdom inflicted on Muslims by Christian Europe, struck him most forcibly. The Italo-Turkish conflict in Africa was recorded regularly by press extracts, in a sort of editorial, the first of its kind, and Tarzi denounced its flagrant inequity.[75] He accused Italy of repeating in the Mediterranean region, the carnage of the martyrdom of the first Christians in the theater of Rome, although this time centuries later and against Muslims.[76] He also accused Italy of having, in its impatience, dealt the first blow in the dismemberment of the Muslim East, which had been planned jointly by all the countries of Europe.[77] Finally he said that the cruelty of the Italians in the treatment of their Muslim prisoners gave a revolting picture of the nations which called themselves civilised.[78] ...(With the Balkan War) all the resentment which he had felt towards Italy, he then transferred to all aggressors, direct and indirect... He developed his theme of the new crusades more fully and clearly. What Christian Europe wanted, he said, and had wanted for a long time, was to destroy the Caliphate, and beyond that, the Muslim religion itself by annihilating the Ottoman Empire.[79]

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[73] **Al Manar,** XIV/12.

[74] India Office L/P a. S/10.196, Kabul 12.11.1911.

[75] May Schinasi, **Afghanistan at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century,** Istituto Universitario Orientale, Napoli 1979, pp.181-182 is our main source for **Seradj ul Akhbar. SA,** I, 5, p.6.

[76] **SA,** I, 12, p.7.

[77] **SA,** I, 18, p.5.

[78] **SA,** I, 7, p.4 and I, 8, pp. 9-10.

[79] **SA,** II, 5, pp. 5-6; 6, p. 4-5 and 13, p.7.

His very deep personal attachment to Turkey and Turks... was strengthened still further by Tarzi's total religious attachment to the seat of the Muslim Caliphate. That, however, was not an individual attachment, but a collective one for all Muslims, especially the Afghans.[80] Tarzi drew particular attention to this point. Besides a religious bond between the two countries, made even closer by the fact that they both practiced the Hanefi rite of Islam, there was **"another spiritual bond"** which demanded that, **"when a Muslim country, especially the Ottoman Empire, the elder brother, was in danger, this brotherhood should be felt by the others as "an absolute order".**[81]

8. IMAM YAHYA OF YEMEN

Concerning the Islamic feelings, in Yemen we will suffice by relating only the contents of a letter sent from Sana'a by an Ottoman officer:

> "We were ready to start the military operation towards Assyre when the news of Italian declaration of war reached here. This inauspicious news was immediately transmitted through messengers to all the tribes of Yemen. A special letter was also sent to Imam Yahay. The Imam replied the same day through the messenger by sending two letters, one to Izzat Pasha the commander, and the second to the Vali. The few porblems awaiting conclusion were immediately solved by his consent. In his letter he informed us that he is ready to depart for war with his 50 thousand armed bedouins and that he is inviting all the Muslims to "Jehad fi sabil-Allah." In different parts of Yemen, bedouin notables made speeches and declared Jehad against Italy and against the enemies of Islam. That was followed by the gathering of all armed people in different places. In the city of San'a, people held a general meeting in the main mosque and invited the people to the war fi sabil-Allah. It was such a gathering that it is difficult to describe, still I will try to explain it.
> First it was announced that the meeting would be held on the subject of the Italian attack on Islam. People were walking in the streets holding white flags with red inscriptions: "Va Jahidi fi sabil-Allah", "Wa' tesimu bi Habiballahi", "Al Jannetu taht-e Dhilalissuyuf", "Fems-ul Ittihad". Some contained verses from the holy Koran as well as ahadis sharife. The biggest of the flags was the one stretched between two sticks and containing in big letters the holy inscription: "La Ilaha Illallah Muhammadun Rasul-Allah". People were following the flag repeating the Kalima al-tawhid. After the prayers, a khatib climbed to the minbar and spoke in a clear language:
> "As the Turkish government is administrated with mashwarat in accordance with the divine orders, it is an obligation to obey the

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[80] SA, VII, 19, p.14.
[81] SA, IV, 19, p.9.

orders of the Sultan-l Azam and the Caliph of Islam, Mohammad the fifth."

Then he related the problem of unjust declaration of war. He invited with the calls of "Ya, ma'sher al muslimeen!", "Ya ma'sher al adjem", "ya ma'shar al kabail" to participate in this Jehad. While mentioning the name of each tribe, he praised them for their bravery and courage, according to the Arab customs and asked them to take oath on their religion and tarikat, and be ready for war. Then while repeating the call of "Hayya ala-l Jehad, Hayya ala-l Jehad!" he implored them, with tears in his eyes, to take the oath of not betraying the Islamic government again. Then, as the unity of the people of Islam is a necessity in such a period, he asked for the dispatch of a message by Imam Yahya to the people of Assyre, who were in rebellion, inviting them to unity, and the expedition of the 50 thousand strong Imam's army on Assyre, if they refused to submit.

In short, any possibility of rebellion in Yemen is suddenly out of question. As you know, Imam Yahya means Yemen; if he is quiet, the others don't matter."

The newspaper adds its own comment on the letter:

"It is one of the Holy Koran's miracles that the sublime mystery of "Asa an takrahu shay'an wa huwa hayrun lekum" expresses itself on such an exalted way. What the world expected and what had happened. The Italian war played the role of a stimulating injection in to the weak body of Islam. At the same time, it proves the capacity of Islam to adapt itself to the civilization, that the real civilization is Islam itself. The whole world has seen and believed that, the whole of the brothers in religion can be united around the word of tawhid."[82]

TURKS OF BULGARIA

Reaction coming from another Islamic community, Turks living under the Bulgarian rule, is nearly the same. The **Balkan** newspaper of **Filibe** in its article **"The spirit of Islam"** presents the European civilization as a monster and concudes:

"What is shining in Trablousgarb is the Nour al-Allah... It must not be ignored that the spirit of Islam has even terrified a genius like Napoleon... The spirit of a lion-hearted Turkish Mehmed who - coming from the Center of Asia- sacified his life in Africa, and the spirit of an Arab, born from the noble generation of our beloved Prophet, became one heart, and propagate the sublime call of: Oh,

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[82] **SM,** VII/166, pp. 148-9, From **Hakikat** newspaper of Eskisehir.

you, Umma of Mohammad, you the world of civilization, this moment of holy Jehad had been expecting you for centuries."[83]

In a second article entitled **"Either the day of final judgement, or salvation"**, the above mentioned paper states:

"The Tunisian Muslims who once welcomed with calm and admiration the invading French forces like receiving a guest, are now running to the help of their brethren in religion of Trablous garb, by crossing mountains and deserts. They have been moved by their call of "Either independence, or the honour of watan, or death!". They donate their lives and wealth, but are not satisfied with it and try to take revenge from the Italian even in the streets of Tunisia. The Egyptians, who, once intigated by foreigners, rebelled to the Ottomans and fell under the grips of the British, are raising a hell. All Egyptians from 7 to 70 are furious. They are donating or selling their silk dresses, their jewels to provide food, meat and ammunition to their fighting Muslim brothers at Trablousgarb.... The divine judgement shows that a Kahr will bring Hayr, as it is indicated in the Hadith."[84]

C- TENDENCY TOWARDS EXAGGERATION

Italian propaganda focusing on its civilizing role had made the world believe that the Arabs would join the **"saviour Italian"** forces and attack and expel from the country the **"usurper Turks"**. The first week's panic especially in Tripoli, proved that they had prepared a ground for it.[85] Bombardments and landing of Italian forces gave them easily the control on the shores and ports of Libya. But the fight in the interior was to the advantage of the Turco-Arab forces.

As the panic of the first week was followed by a successful resistance and the news of Italian atrocities spread, nobody cared anymore about what was right or wrong. The main thing was that a war which was accepted to last only a short time, had reversed all the expectations. The surprise of a successful counter-attack was such that it created a panic among the Italians.[86] Although in the beginning, the official reports from Tripoli and Benghazi to the Ministry of War at Istanbul were not very promising and the orders sent to the commanders by the ministry were sometimes in "heart-breaking" tones, the war bulletins and

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[83] **SM,** VII/166.

[84] **SM,** VII/168.

[85] O. Kologlu, **Mudhakkarat al dubbat al Etrak.....,** pp. 117 pp.; an official Italian publication during the war years **"Tripoli e Cirenaica e l'Azione Italian"** also contains interesting information on the subject.

[86] O.Kologlu, ibid, p.114.

declarations reflected mainly the unexpected degree of success in the resistance.

As the opposition in the parliament prepared itself to wear down the UP government, it willingly spread the news of success. All went in such a way that when the parliament met two weeks after the declaration of war the enthusiasm of victory was already everywhere. A deputy could not stop remarking from the chair that **"news to make every Ottoman happy is filling the columns of the newspapers."**[87]

The British ambassador in Istanbul recalling **"the inflammatory articles in the local papers"**[88] summarized perfectly this state of mind and its reasons:

> "The scanty trust worthy news that reaches Constantinople from the seat of the war does not show that any marked advantage has been gained on either side, but on the other hand the reports manufactured by the Agence Ottomane continue to support the glorious successes of the Turkish troops. In these circumstances it is only natural to find that, although it is recognised that, as in the case of Anwar Bey's telegram announcing the capture of Derna, the alleged Turkish victories have been considerably discounted, public opinion here is by no means disheartened, but has rather been stirred up to persevere in the policy of resistance by indignation at the Italian declaration of annexation, and I feel convinced that until some serious disaster has over taken Turkish army there is no prospect that their attitude will be abandoned."[89]

Not only the official Turkish circles, but alsc the Turkish correspondents from the war front contributed to the exaggeration. Those correspondents were generally, officers from the Ottoman army. One of them wrote, after the **Homs** victory:

> "It is evaluated according to serious calculations that the enemy has lost some 20 thousand soldiers only in this area. It is obvious that they can not stay anymore here. We are producing successfully our own ammunition at Garien, Djebel, Zaouia, and Homs. We succeeded even to produce capsules. We have large quantities of powder and produce it sufficiently. And now we are trying to manufacture bomb shells."[90]

The second source of those items of exaggerated news was Egypt's nationalist-Islamist press. The contact between Cyrenaica and Egypt was never interrupted. Turkish forces were connected from **Zanzour** to

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[87] Deputy Kozmidi (Istanbul) at the sitting of 1.11.1911, OP. p.148.
[88] FO. 371-1258/47158, Lowther to Grey, 18.11.1911.
[89] FO. 1258/47171, Lowther to Grey, 20.11.1911.
[90] **SR,** I(VIII)/20, p.390, from **Koylii** newspaper.

the Tunisian, and from **Tobruk** to the Egyptian telegraphic lines. But Egypt remained a more important source of informations even for the Tripoli news.[91] Concerning the feeling and behaviour of the local people, Kitchener, the Agent and Consul General of Britain in Egypt was repeating almost the same words as the British ambassador in Istanbul:

> "At a time of considerable depression among Muslims, the sudden publication of rather exaggerated statements about Turkish successes emanating from Constantinople produced great excitement."[92]

It must also be noticed that the Islamic sensitivity reached such a stage that when in Beirut the newspaper **Ettehad** wrote erroneously relying on a report by the Italian **Stefani agency,** that the Italian flag was hoisted on the tower of **Dardanelles** (Instead of the tower **Sultanieh of Trablousgarb**), a large crowd gathered at the door of **Sheikh A. Tabbara,** owner of the newspaper, and threatened him.[93]

But more surprising is the belief shown by the Italians to those items of news, and their continuous reporting of them to Rome as trustworthy. When **Mohammed Farid Bey** the Egyptian Nationalist leader reached **Istanbul,** after taking part in **London** on the 11th October, in a meeting of Orientals, the Italian embassy warned immediately the British Foreign Office, that he was busy organizing a contingent of 20 thousand men to place at the disposal of Turkey.[94]

Kitchener, when warning Foreign Office about the exaggerated demands of the Italian foreign ministry, had specifically insisted on that point.

> "The stories -reflected by the Italians- originate for the most part from absurd statements in nationalist press here, which are apparently believed by the Italian consul at Alexandria"[95]

According to **Kitchener,** the **Alexandria** riots were the result of the **"Italian nervousness".**[96]

This Italian sensitivity and nervousness was even made public by the Italian media. The Italian porte-parole in Egypt, the **Messaggero Egiziano,** remarks on the **Port Said** events:

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[91] Foreign Office documents, the review TCAI (p.854) The Memoirs of Anwar Pasha (Mudhakkarat Anwar Basha, takdim wa tardjama Abd al Mawla Salih al Hariri, Markaz al Jehad al Libiy, 1979) contains many examples on the subject.

[92] FO. 371-1258/46992; Kitchener to Grey, 25.11.1911.

[93] **Le Reveil,** 7.10.1911.

[94] FO. 371-1254-41923? Note by the Italian embassy in London 21.10.1911.

[95] FO. 371-1258/46185, Kitchener to Foreign Office.

[96] FO. 371-1258/4661, Kitchener to Foreign Office.

> "The news that the Turkish fleet has destroyed the Italian fleet has found credit among the natives. It was even rumoured that the Italians had lost 25 thousand men"[97]

The tumults of **Alexandria,** according to the same paper, were caused by telegrams published by the **Al Alam** and **Wadi al Nil** newspapers, and it comments:

> "Supplements have been stopped many days ago, but in the evening and morning we can hear noisy Arabs who invent apocryphal telegrams, and for better marketing of their products add insults and invectives against the Italians in particular and Christians in general. The sales of newspapers and telegrams is a business and cannot be prohibited: All right, but the invented news is like adulterated products and must not be permitted when they specially produce such effects as those most deplorable of yesterday... It must be kept in mind that the European community living in Egypt has the right at least to be left in peace."[98]

It was only the Turkish and Arabic papers that Italians were complaining of. **The Messaggero Egiziano** of the 6/7 November, under the title of **"Infamous Lies"** attacked also the Reuters, Havas agencies as well as the Turkish sources. It consecrated its leading article of January 1, 1912, to blame the Egyptian press to condemn them as **"liars"** and ended by saying:

> "... a laconical telegram is enough, the smallest correspondence is enough, a voice is enough... to run (and how!) to put in orgasm a city, a nation, the whole world."

But the Italian contribution to that "war of exaggeration" was not lesser. Reports on Italian victories were even more exaggerated than the Turkish or Arabic ones. The press in Italy was in a delirium. Only Success and victories were published, no one dared -till the moment when everybody suddenly realised that this was not going to be a short, simple military promenade- to publish anything else. Even the **Messaggero Egiziano,** although knowing its adverse effects on the natives, did not stop during the war from publishing exaggerated victory news as,

> "Two thousand Turks made prisoners" (27.10.1911)
> "Turks lost 3.000 men, their banner and artillery" (29.10.1911)
> "1500 Turks killed, 2 thousand prisoners, ten banners captured" (3.11.1911)

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[97] 2/3 October 1911.
[98] 2.November.1911.

Even a superficial look into the collection of the **Messaggero Egiziano** shows that half of the main news (those on the first page, on 6 columns as the head news) aimed at denying that coming from the Turkish sources: **"Categorical denial of the Turkish Lie"**, **"Another Turkish Lie denied"** etc.. The other half tries to over-praise deeds of the Italian army: **"Italians advance-passing from conquest to conquest"**, **"Italian units advance without meeting any resistance"**, **"A glorious combat" etc...**

For the Italians **Anwar Bey** was in the center of those exaggerated news items. One of the interesting head lines read: **"The Turkish machinery of fantastic victories has again produced a new one".**[99]

Besides, their own official publications were repeating those exaggerated Muslim news items. One of the most important of those published that **Anwar Bey** was preparing and army of 40 thousand Arabs. The same, in an article enriched with photographs, announced that the voluntears in Istanbul had reached such a number that because of lack of accommodation they were lodged in the open air, and it added: **"their enthusiasm is the greatest."**[100]

Because of this tendency in repeating exaggerations of the adverse side and then believing in them, the Italian government delivered officially to the British Government warnings on **"a large number of Bedouin concentrations on Egyptian territory near Cyrenaica frontier."**[101]

Asked about the veracity of this information, the reply of **Kitchener** had a kind of humorous touch:

> "The Italian statements are much exaggerated. Up to the present only Turkish officers passed towards Tripoli, also nine boys who ran away from primary school. No assistance has been given to Turkish officers by Egyptian coast guards, nor have any bedouin gone from Egypt, and certainly no Egyptian officers. The report that 100 Turkish officers landed at Marsa Matrouh is entirely false... In view of your instructions I have however advised Khedive to stop all Turkish officiers using his private railway. The Prime Minister will also today notify the Turkish High Commissioner that Turkish officers cannot be allowed to pass, and he will be asked to inform Constantinople of this. The coast guards will also receive instructions in the above sense... to draw attention of the Porte to the undesirability of sending here any more Turkish officers who will henceforward be prevented

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[99] 22.2.1912.
[100] **Tripoli e Cirenaica e L'Azione Italiana,** pp.56, 155-56.
[101] FO. 371-1256/43303, Grey to Sir Rodd, 30.10.1911.

from proceeding to Tripoli, and whose presence in this country may very probably cause difficulties."[102]

The Italian behaviour (nervousness and belief in exaggerated news) was important because of the fact that Eastern societies had a general tendency to trust more the western reports than their own governments reports. So it helped to create a chain reaction.

Beirut papers which had Egypt as their main source played an important role on that chain reaction. **Al Ettehad** declared that **Fetni Bey (Okyar)** who had just reached the Tripoli area, was busy raising a 30 thousand-man army against the Italians.[103] Other news items stated that one milion pound Sterling was collected in Egypt. Soon after another Islamist paper[104] claimed that **Anwar** Bey had entered Tripoli with an army of 6 thousand men, which he formed at Tunisia. The erroneous content of those news items does not need any comment. But it became obvious that the Muslim public opinion, once satisfied with successful resistance was seeking now some fantastic victories.

A telegram sent by the deputy of **Djebel Gharb**, **Suleiman Barouni,** now a self appointed **"Commander of the Voluntary Forces of Djebel",** and read at the Ottoman parliament gave that opportunity:

"The day before yesterday we arrived at the coast from Djebel with our voluntary forces. After a fierce fight we drew out the enemy from the fortresses destroying them completely. Today we will proceed to Tripoli and with the help of God we will enter there."[105]

The parliament received the message with a big applause. But the effect on the public opinion, due to the way of presentation of the news, attained a tremendous dimension.

Al Ahwal, another Islamist newspaper of Egypt, was the first to declare that Tripoli was taken by the Turco-Arab forces. Italians were driven out after street fights. The news reached Beirut and people were able to hear the street vendors shouting:

"Italians are totally defeated in Tripoli. Turkish-Arab forces took 20 thousand prisoners and 100 guns."[106]

According to **Al-Mahroussa** (Egypt) Italian forces were fully destroyed and having lost all the hope to reach Tripoli again, Italy had decided not to send new forces to the battlefield.

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[102] FO. 371-1258/46185, Kitchener to Grey.
[103] **Reveil,** 14.10.1911.
[104] **Reveil,** 26.10.1911, the name of the newspaper is not indicated.
[105] Sitting of 1.11.1911, OP. p.169.
[106] **Reveil,** 7.11. 1911.

The Italian defeat at **Ain Zara,** near **Trablousgarb** on the 23/26 October 1911 was a reality. But the rest (figures as well as conquest of Tripoli) were all imaginary. Also the defeat, rather then with drawal, had forced the Italians to triple their forces. But nothing could stop the chain reaction. Soon it was rumoured that a formidable army was in formation in Libya:

> "50 thousand volunteers from Central Africa, and 15 thousand from Egypt are marching to join the Turco-Arab forces."[107]

Few days later the number of Egyptian volunteers had reached 35 thousand **"according to the rumours among the people."**[108]

A telegram sent by one of the notables of Egypt, **Ahmad Bey,** to the Prime Minister informed that he was ready with 30 thousand men for the defence of Trablous.[109]

In a letter published by the **Egyptian Gazette**[110] sent by **Suleiman Saleem** from **Sidi Gabes** dated 29.9.1911 it was stated that there were 44,000 soldiers in Tripoli and 200 thousand more could be recruited from Tripoli, and that thousands of volunteers were ready in Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria to join the mujaheeds.

A wealthy Syrian camel owner named **Fayet,** who had settled in Egypt, cabled the Grand vizier to offer his 30 thousand camels, 500 mules and 300 horses to be delivered free of charge either in Cairo or in Alexandria within 30 days.[111]

It is reported that the Navy lieutenant **Samy** and **Djemi** the deputy of **Fezzan** have recruited 20 thousand soldiers from the Tibesti area and that they will arrive in Trablousgarb within six days.[112]

> "The Sheik of the Senussis deposited 700 thousand lira to be used against the Italians in the war. He will participate personally with his 50 thousand warriors in the war. Seven thousand Sudanese volunteer derviches have also joined the Ottoman army."[113]

Thousands of cavalrymen from Chad joined the Sultan's army, after crossing the desert in four months. The whole of Africa is running towards Dar-al-Jehad.[114]

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[107] **Reveil,** 31.10 and 2.11.1911.
[108] **Reveil,** 4.11.1911.
[109] **SM,** VII/161, p. 79-80.
[110] 2.October.1911.
[111] **Egyptian Gazette,** 4.10.1911.
[112] **La Turquie,** 2.10.1911; **SM,** VII/161, p.80.
[113] **SR,** I/9, p.170.
[114] SR, I/10.

The French newspaper **Figaro** of 6. October. 1911 published the news that **Mohammad Pasha,** son of **Abd-ul Kader,** had asked the Sultan for permission to join the war front to incite the whole of Africa against Italians. He added that he could resist Italians at least 50 years.

In reality those so called "voluntary fighters" never showed up in Libya. During his stay in Egypt **Anwar Bey** was informed that four thousand Egyptian cavalrymen were ready to join the battle. After inquiring, as a professional officer, on the capacity of these volunteers, **Anwar** had a very low impression about them. He noted in his diary, on the 15th October, 1911:

> "I understood immediately from the talks of the Pasha [an Egyptian] that these people could not be trusted."

Another rumour of "**recapture of a lost city**" was spread regarding **Derna.** On October the 6th it was announced officially in Istanbul, that Derna was recaptured, on the basis of a telegram by **Anwar Bey.** Even serious European press reported it.[116] But soon after it was clarified that **Derna** was still in Italian hands. The British Military Attaché in Istanbul, **G.E.Tyrrell** made an inquiry into the subject. In his report of 18.11.1911 he state[117] that he was able to procure the original copy of the telegram that Anwar sent and was dated 6 November. There was nothing in it which mentioned the capture of Derna, and he followed:

> "But it was inferred by the military authorities from the context. This inference did not, however, appear to be altogether justified and the telegram seemed rather to report two distinct actions: One being the Arab success at Derna, the othar the bombardment by an Italian gunboat of a small place called Defne. Today the Minister of War himself told me that the Derna victory was entirely baseless. It having been merely an Arab report which had reached Anwar Bey and that the latter should have mentioned this fact in his telegram. He blames Anwar for wording the telegram as he did... [he was sorry that it was officially propagated]... But he did not think it worthwhile to contradict it officially now."

So in the mind of the people Derna was recaptured. And such official statements encouraged, of course, the exaggeration tendencies. Any favorable statement from the front was welcomed by the press and the people with enthusiasm. **Youssef Shetwan,** deputy of **Benghazi,** just back from the fighting area, made a much applauded speech at the parliament:

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[115] **Mudhakkarat Anwar Basha,** p.48.
[116] as **Times** of 7.11.1911.
[117] G.Lowther to FO. 27.11.1911, FO. 371-1258/47170.

> "Gentlemen, I am coming from the war field. The situation of the war is extraordinarily in our favour. The enemy's moral strength is completely defecting..."[118]

Such a statement from a Libyan and a witness of the fight could, of course, only encourage the continuation of of the above said tendency. So nobody was intrigued when telegrams were sent in the name of all the **Druzes** and **Bedouins of Tebouk,** stating that they were ready to join the front;[119] or when papers published that the **Sheikh of Kuwait** was making preparations to raise 60 thousand[120] and **Imam Yahya** 100 thousand[121] warriors for the "**Ottoman Defence.**"

The capture of Derna and **Anwar's** heroism is propagated more than once by different sources. A letter sent by an officier, **Hamdi saleeh,** from **Derna** to the newspaper **Ray al-Am** of **Beirut** portrays a fantastic story:

> "On March 5th 1912, we attacked Derna and captured it, where we found 50 Italian officiers slaughtered. All that confirmed a letter sent by and Italian officier to Anwar Bey, who claimed that all the Italian soldiers will desert soon.... When we entered the city, the Italian fleet shelled us but we were able to counteract with our heavy artillery and obliged the fleet to withdraw. We have now 8 thousand Italian prisoners.... The next day we found Anwar Bey fighting alone against 50 Italians. This hero had a sword in one hand and a pistol in the other; followed by only one soldier, he was cutting the enemy into pieces, and was covered with blood. When he saw us he asked about our state. We immediately joined him and with the help of God we destroyed all the enemy. I had a small wound, Anwar had seven.... He cabled Istanbul to inform about the capture of Derna. We will proceed tomorrow to Benghazi, with the aim of capturing it also. In Derna we had a booty of 300 cannons and ten thousand rifles."

This tendency toward exaggeration reached even India where the news concerning 300 thousand-man strong army[123] and the strength of the Ottoman army which would invade Greece, Bulgaria, Montenegro, Serbia and Roumania in a short while in retaliation to the Italian attack- filled the columns of the newspapers.[124]

Taking into consideration the influence of these news items on some

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[118] Sitting of 9.11.1911, OP. p:257.
[119] **Reveil,** 14.10.1911.
[120] **Reveil,** 5.12.1911.
[121] Djamal Zakariya Kasim, "Mawkif Misr min al harb al treblusiyya" **al madjalla al tarikhiyya al misriyya,** 1967, vol:13, p.313.
[122] **Reveil,** 9.5.1912.
[123] **Hablul Matin,** 9.10.1911.
[124] **Paisa Akhbar** 4.10.1911; **Zamindar,** 5.10.1911.

Italian representatives in Egypt, one can understand very easily why the declaration of two deserters from Turkish frontier post at **Al-Arish (Sinai)** had created such a worry among them. These two men declared to the Egyptian officials that "**they have seen a formidable concentration of Arab tribes and Turkish regular forces coming from Yemen and Syria, they are on three days walk to Akaba, they intend to cross Egypt and reach Tripolitania; if prevented they will force their way...**[125]

On the instigation of the Italians, measures were taken on the **Suez Canal** area to prevent such an attempt. But as I pointed out previously none of those volunteers ever showed up.

D- ACTION BY THE MASS MAN

The unanimity of the administring circles and of the intelligentsia in inciting the public opinions towards a religious response, action had to follow. Instantaneous, improvised reactions appeared all over the Muslim world, among mass men, without any need of impetus by the intellectuals. On the other hand, some externel elements affected their way of expression.

1. OTTOMAN LANDS: CONTROLLED REACTION

In every corner of the Ottoman Empire demonstrations and meetings were held. From **Ipek (Albania)** to **Baghdad, Izmir, Van, Beirut,** all over, people expressed their indignation. There did not exist a single place which was not interested and which did not reject the "**treacherous attack**" by Italy. The first, claimed together 50 thousand[126] persons, was held in **Bursa.** Each meeting ended with a resolution which was communicated to the government and to the press by telegrams. By 1. October, at least hundred cables reached Istanbul.

In general their wording was similar, as the newspaper **Sabah** related it:

> "If necessary we will not hesitate to sacrifice our lives as a single body for the defense of the honour and glory of the sublime Ottoman nation; we the Ottomans have to face with patriotic dignity, the unlawful actions of the Italians in view of attracting the sympathy and the favour of the impartial world public opinion."

In general all the meetings were organized by the local UP branches. The parallelism of this general approach with the first two

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[125] **Messaggero Egiziano,** 13.1.1912; **Stanbul,** 18.1.1912.
[126] **Sabah,** 30.9.1911.

communiqués (issued the 29/30 September and 30 Sept./1. October) proves the existence of a guiding mechanism behind that huge "public-opinion-creating" activities. For example, in one day, telegrams from ten local branches of UP in Istanbul reached the press (**Sabah,** 30 September) two days, later 11 others, again from Istanbul UPs were issued. It means, immediately with the declaration of the war UP put its mark on all the activities on the subject.

The second important organizing factor for the reaction have been the deputies, who mostly were in their home-towns, as the parliament was in summer recess. In Damascus, Basra, Yemen, Erzerum, Skopje and in many other places, we see them as the instigators of the public demonstrations.

As we don't intend to reflect all the reactions of the Ottoman homeland, we will remain confined to some interesting notes.[127]

Salonica, as an intellectual center of Ottomanism combining both Muslim and non-Muslim communities, and as the seat of the UP's **Central Committee** has surely had a place in the foreground. Furthermore events happened just at the moment when the Committee was in its annual meeting.

A crowd headed by **Tahsin Bey** the editor of the **Silah** newspaper -one of the porte-paroles of the Committee- surrounded the Italian consulate. The consul had been warned before of the arrival of the crowd, so no harm on persons was intended. The demonstrations removed only the arms and mast of the consulate. Fiery speeches were delivered by **Yakub Djemil,** a member of the Committee. From the consulate, the crowd went to all Italian establishments and tore down the arms and masts. The same evening a huge crowd composed mostly of the members of the Committee, and officers dressed as civilians, appeared at the consulate to set fire on the upper part of the flag-pole, which still remained attached to the wall of the consulate by iron hoops... **Talat Bey** (The future Prime Minister) was present at this scene in front of the crowd.

The British consul remarks that nothing undesirable happened to the Italian citizens, as well as the other Christians, and adds:

> "The population will do nothing by itself. It relies implicitly on the orders of the committee. If it commits any excess, the blame must be laid absolutely at the door of the committee. Its attitude towards Italy is one of the most extreme intransigence. Not the slightest accession

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[127] this account is based on **Sabah,** 3.10.1911 and the report of the British Consul in Salonica, Morgan to Lowther, dated 3.10.1911 (FO. 371-1254/40526, Lowther to Grey, 8.10.1911).

will be made to Italy. The war against Italy has become a holy war (Jehad) and nightly the various quarters are patrolled by individuals beating the daoul (drum) a sign that evey Muslim of whatever age must rise to fight for religion and country. However, carefully instructed by the committee, this Jehad is directed, solely against Italians, and the strictest orders have been issued that other foreigners must be respected absolutely. Even the Italians here must be treated in a manner befitting the dignity of the Ottoman nation, so that Europe may be shown that Turkey is a civilised and humanitarian nation"

Three days later the consul reports once more that "the Committee has indulged in a series of anti-Italian demonstrations, which all ended without harming anybody or anything and that **"The Committee is more fanatical than the mob."**[128]

The same kind of organized, enthusiastic but carefully controlled meetings were held in every city of the empire. As an eye witness writes from **Baghdad:**

> "The Muslim reaction was very strong. Each day beginning from 6th of October, meetings are held in the afternoon till the evening, at the Bab al Mo'azzam. People go there, grouped according to their mahalla, headed by one or two officials followed by three trumpets called dammam. The crowd follows them with flags and some with spears on which are hung the hand of Fatimah in metal. Some attach coloured handkerchiefs to them. Many of them are armed. This human wave is controlled by young civilian horsemen 40 to 50 in all. Behind follow, crying women who shout with all their forces "Al-din! Ya Mohammad". The second day, the shouting is changed to "Ya Allah, grant victory to the religion and to the government." Each Friday afternoon, shooting exercices are held by the 2000 registered volunteers."[129]

In **Medina,** the people of nearby tribes gathered around the holy tomb of the prophet and took the oath for shedding their blood for their country and for helping the Imperial government with all their means. The heads of the five main tribes declared that they are ready to go to all fronts with their men and arms, which the government proposed.[130]

Some improvised, instantaneous actions by the people itself were also witnessed. The mass prayer in the Ayasofia mosque of Istanbul turned into a show of patriotism when people started donating whatever precious thing they had on themselves, like money, rings, ear-

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[128] Report of Consul Morgan dated 6.10.1911 to Lowther (FO. 371-1254/40532, Lowther to Grey, Istanbul 11.10.1911.

[129] **Revue du Monde Musulman,** Vol.18, February/March 1912, p.217.

[130] **SM,** VII/162, pp. 95-96.

rings, cigarette-cases etc..[131] In a very small coffee house in **Istanbul (Hirka-I Serif),** a handful of local people, after discussion, collected all their immediate belongings (413 piastres and a ring) for the mujaheeds. It is worthwhile mentioning also, the two very interesting telegrams. The first is from the mayor of Mamuret-Ul Aziz proposing the collection of the next five years taxes for equipping the army. The second is signed by **"Salih, the band leader in the mountains of Gemlik"** who after reminding that he has been master of those mountains of two years, proposes to join the war front under the orders of the Government."[132]

As it might be noticed, all those demonstrations, sometimes with the participation of thousands of people, always ended peacefully. Any unorganised or personal actions were supressed immediately. In Istanbul, a person, who wanted to tear down a sign board of an Italian office, was immediately arrested by the Martial Law authorities.

Some of them tented to degenerate into local fights or undesired riots. In Tripoli, a stronghold of Moslems of Syria, **"one excited sheikh cut out the head of the king of Italy from a picture exclaiming: "this is what we will do to all Italians and other Christian dogs.**[133] In Izmir, ten thousand Muslims expelled from Crete by Greeks demonstrated for a boycott of goods from Italy and Greece, which was supporting Italy in this fight. Some demonstrators tried to attack some shops, but it was prevented.[134] By arresting an excited sheikh in Istanbul, police was able to stop a demonstration which could have turned into an attack on all foreigners.[135] Everywhere, governors, police chiefs and administrators were very careful not to let the meetings turn into some undisciplined fanatical riots. Reports of British consuls in Beirut and Syria, Salonica as well as in other places were the proof that whatever was the degree of excitement, no harm was done to any person, be it an Ottoman or a foreigner or a Christian.[136]

2. EGYPT: NERVOUSNESS OF LEVANTINES

The Egyptian Muslim public opinion was already in an excitable mood before the declaration of War, because of Egypt's internal problems.

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[131] Istanbul newspapers of 5.10.1911.
[132] **Ikdam,** 25.10.1911; **Sabah,** 5.10.1911.
[133] G.Lowther to FO, 18.11.1911; FO. 371-1258/47158.
[134] **Times,** 10.11.1911; FO. 371-1258/30691 Report from British consul in Izmir.
[135] **Times,** 6.10.1911.
[136] G.Lowther to FO, 18.11.1911, FO- 371-1258/47158; contains reports by the consuls of Beirut, Tripoli (Syria), Tyre, Lazikiyya and Safed.

"Several young Egyptians have signed a letter which was published in the Mokattam newspaper, in which they declared their preparedness to enlist in the Turkish Army as volunteers in case of war. The signatories stated that they were all above thirty years of age, that many of their compatriots were ready to follow their example and that they were wiring to request the Sublime Porte to instruct the Turkish High Commissioneer in Cairo to facilitate their enlistment... Al Moayyad warned that the bedouin tribes were very excited as they had their relatives in Tripoli, and that they would not fail to help them in case of a war... Mansur Lutaif sent 50 Sterlings to the Al Akhram paper for the Ottoman army and the Al Alam reminded Italy that the Sultan is the Caliph, and the father of all Muslims, so they must think twice before any action."[137]

On the 1st day of October rumours spread among Muslims of **Port Said** that the Turkish Fleet had destroyed the Italian fleet; even the loss of 25 thousand Italian soldiers had been added to the rumours. At the beginning small groups were formed which were discussing the fact with satisfaction, and which later on started demonstrations which soon spread to other parts of the city. Soon all the city was in ferment.

Demonstrators arrived at the Turkish Transport Agent's office - arround 9 o'clock in the evening- and hailed the Sultan and demonstrated against Italy. They intended to go to the Italian Consulate but the police having taken precautions, dispersed them and arrested some forty people.

It is obvious that nothing harmful happened but Italians living in the city were in a panic and many thought immediately to arm themselves for self-defence.[138]

News of the victory from Libya created a big excitement all over Egypt. In Cairo the newspaper distributors and the people filled the trams shouting **"Long live the Caliph, long live Ottomans, death to Italy."**[139]

Whatever be the extent of the frenzy, demonstrations would have ended peacefully, if the "nervousness of the Italians and the Greeks"[140] had not created some riots:

"At a time of considerable depression among Moslems the sudden publication of rather exaggerated statements about Turkish successes emanating from Constantinople produced great excitement. A leaflet was circulated in Alexandria among the native population, calling

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[137] **Egyptian Gazette,** 27.9.1911.
[138] **Messaggero Egiziano,** 2/3.10.1911.
[139] **SM,** VII/167, p.173; **SR** 1/2, pp. 28-30, 42-50.
[140] Kitchener to Grey, Cairo 22.11.1911, FO- 371-1258/46661.

upon them to meet on the quays in order to celebrate the alleged victories of their coreligionists. A large and good natured crowd consisting mainly of boys assembled, but I am convinced that the day would have passed without any actual disturbance of the peace, had not an Italian policeman attempted to remove an Egyptian flag, round which the mob was "mafficking". The man himself seemed for a moment in danger of being roughly handled, but a British Police officer intervened and had him at once removed to a place of safety. Several shots were fired from the balconies of the houses around which took effect on the crowd wounding several Egyptians. These shots were fired by either Italians or Greeks, but certainly not by natives."[141]

Capitulations were authorizing all Europeans to behave as it pleased them, without fear of culpability. After all, in case of prosecution they had the guarantee of being tried by their own consulates and laws. Indeed, two Greeks were arrested in that riot for firing on the crowd and were handed over to the Greek consulate to be dealt with. The Cretan Muslims were very active in Egypt as in Anatolia and the Greek's siding with Italy as well as their immunity from punishment enhanced this activity. Cretans expelled from their country by the Greeks were very keen on fighting both the Italians and the Greeks. This is why many Cretan Muslims tried to cross the Libyan border to join the mujaheeds, but were arrested by the Egyptian authorities and sent back to Alexandria.[142]

Prof. Bono in his research mentioned states the reaction of the students of the school of Commerce and Comptability of Cairo, at the beginning of February 1912, to the introduction of Italian language in the teaching programs. Soon after a big protest arose against the performance of Aida under the Pyramids by Italian artists. The same month a benefaction gala in favour of the bombardment victims of Beirut by Italians, turned to an anti-Italian manifestation, in the very embarrassed presence of some Egyptian ministers.

Palestine was already in turmoil. The municipal council of Jerusalem had days ago protested the Italian attack and behaviour.[143] The news about Alexandria reached Gazza and Jaffa with an exaggerated content; it was rumoured that many Italians and Europeans were killed. This changed naturally the course of the demonstrations in full swing.[144] At Gazza a meeting was organised by the kaimakam, mufti and major, which means that the administration and the people were

[141] Kitchener to Grey, Cairo 25.11.1911, FO- 371-1258/46992.
[142] **Reveil,** 7.3.1912.
[143] **Times,** 25.10.1911.
[144] British Consul Gl. at Jerusalem to FO, 4.11.1911, FO. 371-1258/46203.

acting together. No excesses took place. In Jaffa, instigated by a certain **El-Sahaar** who had just arrived from Egypt with the story of Alexandria **"killing",** the meeting turned out to be an anti-Christian demonstration. Even the director of the police was manhandled when he tried to prevent the crowd from using a dog with a cross attached to its tail, as a symbol of the **"traitor Italians and infidels".**

The same happened in **Ramleh** and **Lydda,** on the 3rd of November. But nowhere, was any attack made on any people or buildings.

3. TUNISIA: PROVOCATION BY ITALIANS

The most bloody of events happened in Tunisia. It was not directly the result of the Libyan War, but the public opinion had reached the climax of excitement by the Italian attack and it had its repercussions on a local problem related with Islam.

The Italian attack created a sympathy for the Ottoman State. Everyday they were praying in the mosques for their success and at each news of victory people were congratulating each other with excitement. Collection of money became a regular practice in the mosques.[145]

There was also a large Italian community, -many times larger than the French, the protecting action- of workers, small businessman and artisans. They had a more direct contacct with the local people and were better informed through the newspaper **l'Unione,** published in Italian. Whenever they received news of victory they were jubilant without caring about the feelings of the Muslims. They did not even fear provoking Muslims by verbal insults as: **"This time we took Tripoli, next it will be the turn of Constantinople and Mecca", "Italians raped the Turkish girl (Tripoli)"** etc.. Many street clashes between Tunisians and Italians ended in the police station.

This tension reached the point of explosion when the municipality of the city of Tunis decided to consecrate the land of a cemetery **(Djellaz)** for industrial construction. People gathered on the 7th of November, 1911, at the cemetery to protect the tombs of their ancestors and religious leaders. French soldiers shot; the result was the death of 14 Tunisians and 3 Frenchmen; 22 Tunisians and 5 Italians were wounded. The fact that it was really a spontaneous reaction by the "people" is

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[145] Concerning Tunisian events we refer to two articles, by C.Sammut in the **Revue d'Histoire Maghrebine;** "La Genese du Nationalisme Tunisien: Le Mouvement Jeunes-Tunisiens" No. 2, July 1974, pp. 164 ff; and "L'Action des Jeunes Tunisiens: Reformisme d'Assimilation ou Nationalisme d'Emancipation?" No. 10/11, January 1978, pp.67 ff.; Ali Mahjoubi, **Les origines du Mouvement National en Tunisie 1904-1934,** Publications de l'Université de Tunis, 1982.
For collect of money: SM, VII/167. p.173.

proven by the list of the condemned people. The five leaders of the riot who all had been condemned to death, were, a merchant of poultry, a merchant of cattle, a waiter, a cart driver, a porter and a vendor of newspapers; all between 21 and 31 years of age. 30 more persons were condemned to different punishments.

It was the first open resistance against the French in thirty years of protectorate. Martial law was immediately declared (which lasted till 1922) and the newspapers were suspended.

But the dislike towards the Italians war kept alive with the continuation of the war and the success of the Turco-Arabe in Libya. When in February 1912 a tram, driven by an Italian, killed a Tunisian child another anti-Italian demonstration followed. Only this time the action came as a peaceful but very effective boycott of the trams where most of the workers and employees were Italians.

The general feeling among Tunisians vis-à-vis the colonialists is reflected in an interesting remark by a Tunisian peasant transmitted by a French jounalist who visited the country during the Libyan War:

> "During the conflict which started in the spring of 1911 in Tunisia between Arabs and Italians, as a result of the Turkish War and which nearly ignited the whole country, an Arab servant, for long in the service of a French colon of Sfax, said to his master those significant words: If Christians have to be killed, I would like to kill you myself rather than having someone else do it."[146]

It is difficult to certify the authenticity of this statement, but surely it reflects the general feeling of the Tunisians, as well as the fear existing in the French minds.

4. INDIA: MASS-MAN'S IMPORTANT IMPACT ON THE GENERAL POLICY

Intense activity was witnessed among Indian Muslims against the Italian attack. Especial branches of the Muslim League organized meetings, sent telegrams of protest, and mass prayers were held in the main mosques of the cities. To list all these events completely is very difficult — if not impossible —. In two documents we found traces of nearly three dozen of such gatherings, wherefrom telegrams were sent to the British Administration in London, between the 1st and 2nd of October.[147] This is surely a very restricted reflection of all the

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[146] André Duboscq, op. cit.

[147] Our research is based on the book, **Italian Warfare in Tripoli and Moslem Feeling in India,** introduction by Frank Mc Cullagh, London, n.d.; and the "File of Moslem Representation" in the India Office, L/p and S/10/196;

meetings. There were nearly two dozen during the first three weeks of November. The important fact is that in many cases Muslims and Hindus together participated in the meetings and expressed jointly their feelings. It most be kept in mind that small meetings and daily prayers by thousands during which the same feeling was expressed, could not be included in our research.

If we have to fix a standard text common to all those telegrams, sent to the British Vice-Roy, British Colonial Office or the Foreign Office, it will come out as follows:

> "Loyal Muslim subjects aggrieved and indignant at Italy's aggression, respectfully pray for intervention by England — the greatest Muslim power in the World. We support our sacred Caliph and the Sultan of Turkey against the most unrighteous and wicked war initiated and declared by Italy. We regret that Britain, champion of justice and liberty remains indifferent to the faith of Muslims and respectfully appeal in the name of humanity to the King-Emperor to interfere."

With the telegram sent to the Ottoman Parliament on the 1st of October 1911 and signed by **Gulam Hussain asaf** and **Suhrawerdy** in the name of the participants at the meeting in Calcutta, it was expressed that Islamic solidarity feelings were on the Ottoman side, and the Ottoman Government was urged to protect and defend the honour of Islam with all its power and will.

All-India Muslim Liague was particularly active during the period before the arrival of the King-Emperor in India for coronation. It supported a decision of boycott against Italy. Even the Persians of Calcutta met at the **Anjuman-i Muzaffari.** More than the attack itself, it was the Italian atrocities which provoked India. **Mr.Suhrawerdy,**the Secretary of the **Indian Red Crescent Society,** informed the British Parliament that "**Muslims with wounded feelings strongly condemn, Italian atrocities on Muslim brethren and respectfully appeal in the name of humanity and Western civilisation to King Emperor, and British Nation to prevent indiscriminate slaughter of wonan and children.**"[148]

The activities of the Indian Muslims in England were not too radical but the immediate effects on the British public opinion magnified its importance, especially as it was just before the King's trip to India.

Messages were sent from: 1.October: Calcutta; 2.Oct. Calcutta (2); Bombay; 4.Oct. Allahabad; 5.Oct. Adoni, Madras, Lahore, Delhi; 6.Oct. Chittagong, Madras, Bareilly, Aligarb; 7.Oct. Lahore, Simla, Lucknow, Amritsar, Lahore, Bombay; 9.Oct. Karachi (3), Nagor Negapatam; 10.Oct. Bombay, Lucknow; 11.Oct. Lucknow, Rangoon; 12.Oct. Port Elizabeth, Simla, Moradabad; 13.Oct. Muzaffergarh, Gorakhpur; 16.Oct. Simla; 18.Oct. Kimberley, Indian Red Crescent etc..

[148] FO. 371-1256/43420, dated 3.11.1911.

"Some Muslims residing in the British Isles, and other sympathizers of Turkey" held a meeting in London (Wilton Crescent) and passed two resolutions which were communicated to the Foreign Offic (4.10.1911):1) We deeply resent the high-handed proceedings of Italy against international law and morality; 2) Relying on the unfailing regard of the British Government for the religious sentiments of its hundred million subjects, we appeal to the British Government to secure peace as early as possible on the basis of status quo and the integrity of the Turkish Empire".[149]

Another mixed meeting of Muslims from various countries was held on the 7th of October at the Caxton Hall (Westminster) in which the leader of the **Egyptian Nationalist Party Mohammad Farid Bey** participated. It had wider repercussions, even in the continental Europe.[150] He warned that the British Government may prevent the Egyptian Government from putting its army at the service of the Ottoman Empire — to which it is obliged — but that it cannot stop Egyptian volunteers from joining and giving help to their brethren in Tripoli. The meeting passed the following resolutions:[151]

> 1)This meeting of Orientals residing in England, professing various creeds, condemns the outrageous action by Italy against the integrity of the Turkish Empire and appeals to Great Britain and the other great powers to prevent such a violation of the principles of justice and humanity.
> 2) This meeting humbly appeals to his Imperial Majesty, the Sultan and Caliph, to uphold the prestige of Islam and the dignity of the East, and in wishing success to the Turkish Army, offers its deepest sympathy and support.
> 3) This meeting calls upon all Orientals to carry out a rigorous boycott of Italian goods, until the dispute is settled in an honourable way, maintaining the integrity of the Sultan's Empire.
> 4) The President be requested to forward copies of these Resolutions to his Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, His High the Grand Vizier, representatives of the various Powers at St.Jameś Court and the Press.

If we consider those meetings of Orientals residing in Britain context, it is because, 1) the Indian Muslim element was prevalent in the organisation, 2) The British phobia of anything dealing with India was making it more effective, 3) Even the British officials classified them in the Indian files.

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149. India Office, L/P and S/10/196.
150 **Figaro,** 8.10.1911.
151 FO- 371-1254, p.340.

Cambridge university's Muslim members passed a resolution against the Italian attack and atrocities[152]; even a clash with Italians was witnessed at the **Memorial Hall meeting,** Farrington Street, which passed the same kind of resolution, inviting Britain to interfere with the slaughter.[153]

Letters of **Amir Ali,** to the **Times** newspaper (10, 11 October and 4th November) had also large repercussions in Britain, India and Turkey. He was Judging the Italian act as an interference in the affairs of Islam which in his opinion had to remain in peace with Christianity for the development of civilization. It is only natural for the millions of Muslims — being British subjects — to follow with interest any event related to Islam. The hate and indignation created by such a barbarous attack will necessarily spread all over the Muslim World. That can induce the nations to a war of race and religion.[154]

The fact that the London Branch of the All-India Muslim League was playing the intermediary between the Indian Muslims and the British Government for the communication of message was increasing its value. Furthermore the cooperation of the Hindus and the Muslims for the creation of the **Khalifate Relief Fund** was forcing the British government to consider the matter seriously.

The British Government was very sensitive to any comment coming from Indian circle. Before the arrival of the King in India, it preferred to calm down the reaction. Thus the only positive decision which came out was to establish a **Red Crescent Fund** to help the sufferers of the war.[155]

When Italy attacked the Aegean Islands and the Dardanelles later on, the Committee of **All-India Muslim League** issued another protest:[156]

> "... the Italian behaviour involves neutral Powers ruling over large Muslim populations in difficulties by placing their policy in conflict with the cherished sentiments of their subjects. ... The spreading of the war by Italy on large areas, coupled with the report that some of the neutral Powers intend to take advantage of Turkey's difficulty to her detriment, will be to impel large bodies of Muslims from India as well as the Frontier to endeavour to reach the seat of war as volunteers, and it would be impossible for His Majesty's government to repress the movement without risk of great impopularity.
> So long as the war was confined to the regions, the conquest of which was undertaken, the Asiatic Muslims were not brought into direct

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[152] **Times,** 8.11.1911.
[153] **Times,** 8.21.1911.
[154] **SM,** VII/161, p.79.
[155] **Times,** 4 and 5.10.1911.
[156] India Office, L/P and S/10/196, dated 10.5.1912.

contact with conflict; and the influence of this league and of other Muslim bodies, in India and elsewhere was directed to allaying th natural excitement among their own people by pointing to the evident desire of H.M's Government to use their good offices at the first favourable opportunity to bring about the termination of the war on equitable terms honorable to Turkey. But the extension of hostilities to the Dardanelles and places within reach of Constantinople, which is regarded by the bulk of the Muslim World as the seat of the Caliphate, is calculated to act as an incentive to the war-like elements alike in the neighbouring States and in India, to organise a system of volunteering for the assistance of Turkey..."

We have to end the section concerning India by pointing out that the solidarity expressed by the Indian Muslims during the Libyan war was so much appreciated by the Ottoman State that Sultan **Mohammed V,** ordered the Prime Minister's Office to despatch a portrait of himself to the **Muslim League of India.**[157]

5. PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATIONS IN DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE WORLD

In Afghanistan a big Durbar was organised (24th November 1911) at Kabul and the Amir himself spoke of helping the Muslims in distress in Libya. His donation of 25 thousand roubles and qualifying the war as a **"matter of life and death for the Islamic World"** had positive repercussions. Some people not finding enough the oral promises, undertook the difficult deed of joining the war front with their own efforts:

> "Afghans living in Egypt, Damascus, Baghdad , Anatolia and Istanbul, who were informed of their Sultan's order to help financially the Tripoli and Benghazi mujuaheeds, have posed the question if our brothers in Afghanistan contribute to this war with their belongings, why must we not contribute personally and join in groups of five or ten the war front via Egypt. I have already spoken with some 150 of them. I noticed especially a young man with the appearance of a British Gentlemen whose face was shining with the light of true faith. After checking I found out that he was an Afghani, who, after ending his studies in London, had arrived in Egypt. After depositing his highly valuable belongings to a trustee he declared I will take them back if I return safe, if I reach the honour of shahadat deliver them to the Hilal-i Akhmar and started for the field of Jehad."[158]

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[167] Nejat Goyunç, "Osmanli Hariciyesinin Trablusgarb Harbi ileilgili Dunya basinindan Raporlari" (= Reports by the Ottoman Foreign Ministry from the World press concerning the War Trablusgarb" paper presented to the Seminar of October 1979 in Tripoli.

[158] Letter by the Egypt Correspondent of **Seradj-ul Akhbar,** Gulam Nakhshibend Han Kehhal Atgani, in **SR,** II/28, p.39.

One of the members of the **Aligarh Islamic University** Administrative Committee, **Eba Said** is also know to have joined the mujaheedeen with his own means.[159]

Turks of **Herzegovina** (Actual Yugoslavia) were in a big excitement and many crossed the borders to join the front as volunteers.[160] We have already mentioned Cretan Muslims arrested in Egypt.

In a letter dated 18.12.1984 sent to us, **Prof.D.Abd ul Hadi Al Tazi** points that the Moroccan people were feeling in favour of Libyan mujaheeds, but were not able to express freely this feeling in front of the colonialist's pressure. The reaction of the mass man remained limited, while the elite found some ways of expressing it. **Al Tazi** gives the example of the qasida by **Al Djazuli,** in which he praises the mujaheeds as lions of Islam who defended the honour of the East. The second action is the joining, of the war front by some pilgrims, instead of going to Hedjaz, when a fatwa was issued emphasizing that **"Jehad is better than pilgrimage."**

Also the **Islamic Solidarity Association of Japan** sent letters to Turkey to organize an expedition of volunteers to the war. They were thanked, and advised not to make it because of the lenght the communication period.[161] Muslims of Japan organised meetings, during which speeches were delivered supporting the Ottoman State and criticising Italian atrocities. The mediation of the Mikodo (the emperor) was asked and collection of money for the warriors and the expedition of a Red Crescent delegation was also decided.[162]

Muislims of Kashgar (Inner China) collected money and sent in two dispatches a thousand liras to the **Iktiham** newspaper of Istanbul which were delivered to the ministry of war. A letter sent from Kashgar by a Turkish traveller, who crossed the land between Istanbul and Kashgar in eight months, depicts how much all the Muslims he met during his trip were concerned with the existence of the Ottomn State and the Caliphate:

> "They are continuously praying for the victory of the Ottoman mujaheeds and for the annihilation of the Italian bandits, and are collecting money to help the mujaheeds."[163]

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[159] **SR,** 1/18, p.351; pictures of the volunteers were circulating in the Muslim World and published by the Ottoman papers with the aim of demonstrating the general interest. See also the **Shaheed** review of the Markaz Jehad al Libyi, No. 2, p.26.

[160] SM, VII/162, pp.95.

[161] Abdurrahim Ibrahim Efendi, Conference of the 27th February 1912 in Istanbul, **SR,** 1/2, pp. 28-30, 42-50.

[162] **Islamic Solidarity** newspaper published in Tokyo in English, quoted by **SR,** 1/4, p.72.

[163] **SR,** 1/11, p.207.

Chinese Muslims also were collecting money under the leadership of **Hayr al-Din Sahib.**[164]

In Singapore, Muslims collected money under the leadership of **Sayyed Abdullah b.Isa al Habaschi.**[165]

Muslims of Holland's colonies in South-East Asia (actual Indonesia) created serious worries for the government.[166]

From Java, money collected for the warriors was sent to Istanbul[167] They were also keen to obtain serious news about the war and were sending letters requesting to be informed by the Turkish sources. Then the Ottoman Foreign Ministry communicated news to the Ottman consul at Batavia concerning the victories.[168]

We notice the same kind of desire for genuine news from all the Islamic communities in Asia and Africa. A note sent by the governor of Nigeria to the British Colonial service shows the uneasiness in the Black Africa. He reminds that the Muslims, being worried with events at Benghazi and Tripoli, were asking information and he urges to be supplied regularly.[169]

The desire for sending volunteers to the war was also felt among the Muslims of South Africa, particularly in Johannesbourg.[170]

In a meeting on the 11th November, at the main mosque of Natal, prayers were said for the victory of the Ottoman forces. The president of the Hilal-i Akhmar, **Dalud Mohammad,** condemned the atrocities perpetrated on the defenseless women and children. His speech was followed by those of **Abdullah Hadj Adem, Adem Mohammad, Sayyid Mohammad Siddik b.Abdullah from Mecca, and Abd-ul Kadir Edrusi** from India. They all condemned Italy in strong words, and a decision was taken to collect money to help the warriors.

Osman Ahmad, the secretary of the **Durban Hilal-i Akhmar** Association also condemned Italy strongly in his speech and asked the British government to intervene. He informed that 1600 lira was collected and already delivered to the Ottoman General Consul in

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[164] **SR,** I/4, p.72.
[165] **SR,** I/5, p.91.
[166] Salvatore Bono, "Solidarietà di Musulmani d'Asia Per La Resistenza Anticoloniale In Libia (1911-1912)", **Materiali di Storia** 9, Annali della Facoltà di Sciemze Politiche a.a. 1983-1984, 20, pp.31-38.
[167] Abdurrahim Ibrahim Efendi's conference.
[168] **Liberté** (Istanbul), 7.12.1911.
[169] Colonial Service to the Foreign Office dated 3.11.1911, FO- 371/1256/43579.
[170] Nejat Goyunç, art. cit. Their pictures appeared in the review **Shehhal.**

Johannesbourg, and he asked for the extension of the efforts. Telegrams were also sent to the Ottoman and British governments.[171]

Soliderity meetings were held in **Ethiopia, Nicosia**[172] , and even in such a remote place as **Port Louis (Maurice Işland),** where three thousand people gathered to condemn the Italian act and to invite all Muslims to offer their lives and wealth for the defence of their religion so that their sublime Caliph be respected as much as the Muslims respect the British flag.[173]

Posters calling for a demonstration opposite Italian consulate for boycotting Italian business and inviting the people to collect material to help the Turkish government "were fixed on the walls of Algeria.[174] At **Zanzibar "owing to the hostility of Muslims Italian mail boats have ceased calling.**[175]

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[171] **SM,** VII/167 and 171.

[172] Governor of Cyprus to the Colonial Office, 10.10.1911, FO- 371-1254/40895.

[173] **Stamboul,** 4.1.1912.

[174] André Nouschi, **La Naissance du Nationalisme Algérien 1914-1915,** Ed. de Minuit, Paris 1962, p.23; Times, 14.11.1911.

[175] **Civil and Military Gazette,** 19.12.1911; The American consul at Zanzibab points out that the workers refused on loading the Italian ships, with its message of the 20th December 1911, article by Akil Barbir, "Al wasaik al Amerikaniyya an al Gazw al Itali..", Al Shaheed, 5, (1984), p.209).

III- IMPACT OF THE WESTERN MEDIA

A- CONFLICT OF RATIONALISM AND IMPERIALISM

1. ROLE OF THE NEWSPAPERS AND NEWS AGENCIES OF EUROPE

Western media had a direct and important role in the formation of the Islamic public opinion since the second quarter of the 19th Century. First the press (newspapers, magazines etc...) and the news agencies later on, were the tools of that influence. After four centuries of experience the press reached perfection in every field (technical, commercial, public opinion forming and guiding, etc...) and became the "4th Estate" in the Western structure; an institution which had an undisputed place in the daily life of communities.

Newspapers were the children of the capitalist mode of production. They flourished parallel to the advance of capitalism and the development of the bourgeoisie, and became their main tools. At the same time they played a very important role in the secularization of the daily life, thus in the submission of the religious structures to rationalisation.

At the turn of the 20th century the majority of the media was totally under the control of the big capital and the business circles. Yet a certain impartiality could be felt as the age of reason, which formed the Western civilization, had its effects by the expression of different views from different classes and sections of the society. Especially in the second half of the 19th Century, liberalism of the media was such that, a regime of the free difusion of information — including news about the areas bordering the war fronts — was tolerated even by the belligerant governments.

That pluralism, that power of auto — criticism, the freedom of expressing contradictory ideas — even sometimes in favour of the East — without being punished or banned, formed in the eyes of Easterners, the objectivity of the Western media, and the trust in their judgements. In general, the chain of centuries — long process which ended with the industrial revolution was ignored, and only the "idealistic side" of the happening was considered. In that period, when they felt the need to

propose some solutions to their problems, it became customary to the Eastern intellectuals to advance examples from Europe and show as target the French Revolution with its motto **"Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité."**

In brief, unconscious of the particularities of the capitalist structures and it's tools, Easterners with precapitalist structure were using the weapons of their rivals; thus deepening even more the existing contradictions.

Eastern rulers — believing in the continuance of their past superiority — were still trying to hide their backwardness, failures and misdeeds; but their way of incorporating new institutions borrowed and adapted from the West was not always satisfying their society. To learn the formulas of the West directly from the original, become a more convenient way. All the vernacular press was full of Western news and subjects — many times more than local news and were publishing serials translated from Western languages.

The number of Eastern intellectuals who mastered perfectly the Western culture being very few, and the possibility of providing materials for reading difficult, the main source of information and culture was newspapers more than books. The simplified, easy style and polemic-wise rich content of the newspapers was more appreciated by them, often they were used as reference to confirm that views; even governments followed that line. This is how Western concepts borrowed from the Western media have been continuously transplanted on the Eastern societies. The concept of Nationalism was one of them.

Besides, the widening of the world's horizons through the Western media was such that even the most conservative circles were unable to find an alternative to replace it. In less than a century, West had sped up its communication system, thus public opinion formation techniques, so immensely (from three months for a trip around the world, to a day by telegram, and to nine minutes in 1901 by Marconi's wireless) that East was well aware of the impossibility of competing with them.

Traditionalist -i.e. with the belief in the superiority of Islamic values and institutions — Easterners and traditionally formed public opinions, incapable of finding any alternative were in some cases proposing the complete refusal of the borrowings from the West. In reality these groups were in minority. But as they were still controlling the traditional mechanism of the public opinion formation and as it was still the dominant tool in that field, they were able to electrify the crowds. Moreover they had the advantage of having on their side the

common desire — although with an unformulated solution — of all the Muslims, of not loosing their Islamic personality.

The economic liberalism was not creating any problem as all the Muslim communities were in favour of it. Complaints on the subject started only during the first years of the 20th Century.

The circulation of Western newspapers in the Eastern countries was sufficiently high to have a direct impact on the formation of the public opinion. In the Ottoman Empire 1/10 of the newspapers sold were Western. With the local Western language papers combined they could form 1/5 of the total papers. In the countries under Western colonialists rule the percentage was even higher in the advantage of the colonialists. For Example, in 1911 there existed in Algeria only eight indigenous — but not a single nationalist — newspapers, against 93 French publications.

The remark by an independent Persian newspaper concerning the Persian press is significant in that regard:

> "We regret that Persian newspapers have no opinions of their own, and merely translate articles from the European press.
> ... The main policy of the European papers is to humiliate Eastern countries and do not deal with their affairs honestly. Muslims should disabuse their mind of the idea that they command the sympathy of those powers. Do they not know that the English Government proclaimed neutrality immediately after the outbreak of the war, and papers which condemned Italy's action violently in the beginning, turned round and began to find fault with Turkey?"[1]

Concerning the news agencies, when the war broke out only one genuine Eastern Agency existed: **Osmanli Telgraf Ajansi** (Ottoman Telegraphic Agency). It was created shortly before the war with the help of the Ottoman Government, but had no proper organization, correspondents etc... It received telegrams from the European Agencies and all it did was to translate and transmit them. It propagated also official texts of the Ottoman Government. But the real sources were always the Western sources. In that regard, to claim that it was only Ottoman by name, would not be an exaggeration, as much as the Ottoman Bank was Ottoman (i.e. all its capital was European).

In 1911 the division of the Eastern World among European News Agencies was still in vigour. The agreement of 1807 between **Havas** (French) and **Reuters** (British) agencies for dividing the world in zones of interest was still continuing. The war waged by the Triple Alliance

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[1] **Habul Matin,** 22.1.1912.

agencies (German **Wolff,** Italian **Stefani,** Astrian **Korrespondenz Bureau**) against **Havas** for the domination of Middle East, Balkans and Mediterranean, ended with a complete victory of the latter. **Reuters** always kept its control on Egypt and India, and the British colonial rules in those countries used **Reuters** for the transmission of official views. Furthermore **Reuters** had allowed its foreign correspondents since 1890 to add polictical comments to their news, thus ending the last remains of "impartial reporting of the events."[2]

When we check out the sources used by the Ottoman media during the war, by order of importance according to the columns filled by them, we find that:

1— European newspapers (French, German, British, Austrian, Russian, Italian).

2— European news agencies (**Reuters, Havas,** and even **Stefani,** the Italian agency).

3— Local agencies (**Ottoman Agency,** and lesser degree other small local agencies like **Agence de Constantinople, Agence Oriental, Agence Fournier,** Mainly they were working for commercial concerns.)

A short notice published in the early days of the war by an Istanbul paper proves how much people were dependent on the Western sources:

> "According to the messages received in Istanbul from the local directors of the Ottoman Bank it is understood that the people of the provinces who can not get the war news day by day, are applying every day to the branches of the Ottoman Bank."[3]

The interruption of telegraphic lines with Tripoli and Benghazi by the Italians, and their destruction of the recently built Derna wireless station, had forced the Ottoman government and the public opinion, to become a real prisoner of the Western sources.

2. ROLE OF THE LOCAL WESTERN AND LEVANTINE PAPERS

They first appeared when the economic liberalism and even the "Capitulations" became insufficient for Europe, and the race started for owning directly the sources of raw materials -Imperialism-. This coincided in the Middle- East to the turn of the 19th century.[4]

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[2] On Havas newsagency we refer to Pierre Frédérix, **Un Siècle de Chasse Aux Nouvelles,** Flammarion, Paris 1959; on the Reuters we refer to, **Reuter's Century 1851-1951** by Graham Storey (Max Parish, London 1951).

[3] **Sabah,** 7.10.1911.

[4] Vittorio Briani, in his book **La Stampa Italianna All'Estero dalle Origini Ai Nostri Giorni,**

In opposition to the European press, they did not aim to be the mouthpiece of a certain class -Bourgeoisie- but simply served the interests of their intermediaries and especially of stock-brokers (= sarraf) as banks did not exist. It means that they did not have a local social structure problem. Their customers were Western businessman and colonies settled in the ports of Levant, ethnic groups which were in business relations with them and who were ready to accept the European social order without discussion (mainly Christians), and some Easterners with the knowlege of Western languages. Local governments cared seriously to keep them in their own service with subsidies.

Their chance of survival depended on the interest of those businessmen and on compliance with the line followed on the international politics by the local government. Both conditions being in conformity with the development of the liberal economy, there was no contradiction for their survival between internal politics. In a colony or in an independent Moslem state they preferred to keep out of the social problems as their aim was simply the continuation of the established structure for their profit. In that field the only subject they were interested in and which was in parallel with the policy of the European governments was the defence of Oriental Christians.

As the status of the Ottoman Christians and Jerusalem became an international problem the role of the newspapers increased. After 1881 their importance was enhanced when "**Ottoman Debt**" was organised in a way to place Ottoman Finances fully under Western control", and sometimes they reached circulations larger than the vernacular press. The same is valid for Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia etc...

These papers had also a close contact with missionary schools in the Eastern world, thus they had an important influence in the formation of the administering and leading circles of the future.[5] As nationalist currents spread in the Islamic world through Eastern Christians these papers were helping the slow evolution of the nationalism. That role was saving their face regarding their defecting personality: the imperialism of the Western civilization camouflaged by radicalism.

(Istituto Poligrafico della Stato, Roma 1977) gives ample details on the creation of the Italin newspaper in North Africa. They begin in the second half of the 19th century. The most interesting part is about the fight in Tunisia between French and Italian papers for the dominance (cultural and public opinion). p.167.

[5] For ex., according to French claims, before 1914, the number of Syrian students attending French schools amounted to 50 thousand while the total number of students attending the schools of all other nationalities was 23 thousand (Camille Fidel, **La Paix Coloniale Française**, Paris 1918, p.129, cited by J. Nevakivi, **Britain, France and the Arab Middle East 1914-1920**, p.5.

During the war the impact of the conduct of those papers on the local public opinions was not negligible. They were openly fighting the local Islamic- Nationalist papers with full freedom, condemning Islam and Islamic solidarity, in a sense, everything which was not Western-like. **Al Manar** could not stop from criticising the **"Taassub (= fanaticism) of French and English newspapers published in Egypt, which are criticizing the "taassub" of Islam."**[6]

Below, we are presenting some real representatives of the local Western and Levantine papers:

a) ENGLISH PAPERS: EGYPTIAN GAZETTE; CIVIL AND MILITARY GAZETTE (LAHORE); LEVANT HERALD (ISTANBUL)

The British porte-parole in Egypt, the **Egyptian Gazette,** have already been busy, before the declaration of war, with spreading the ideas that **"Turkish-Arabic alliance can not materialize."**[7] Relating an article by **Al Akhbar** it was propagating the necessity of the election of an Arab Caliph at Hedjaz at a meeting of the representatives from all over the Muslim world.[8]

It is only after 21st September that the newspaper approached seriously the Libyan problem and reflected the uneasiness in Istanbul. Still it was a distorted version of the facts. The **Egyptian Gazette** was dealing with the **"anti-war feelings in Italy".** With the declaration of the war, it become very active politically in emphasising the neutrality of Egypt:

> "Egypt has nothing to do with the present quarrel and in spite of the alarmist statements quoted by Reuters Agency from the Daily Telegraph, it is incredible that the Turkish government should venture to claim the right of moving troops through Egypt to the seat of war... Such a demand, could only cause annoyance to a neutral power (England) which has done so much for Turkey in the past."[9]

In the next day's leading article it opposes the religious aspect of the war, as emphasised by **Al Alam,** and charactarizes it as a dangerous game. It points out that the slogan **"Islam is in danger"** may provoke illiterates, but recommends that such a fanatic anti-Christian feeling should not be allowed to spread over the country.

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[6] XIV/11, p. 836; and 845.
[7] 13 and 16.9.1911.
[8] 16. 9. 1911.
[9] 2.10.1911.

It stresses the danger for Egypt of participateing in the war, then deals with the query of the local Egyptian papers on why the Italian ambassador was still in Egypt and why the Italian flag had not been pulled down, since these were Turkish lands. The article then goes on to answer the questions with a cynical reminder that the Ottoman High Commissionner had not officially notified the Government of Egypt that it was at war: **"Egypt is officially unaware of the fact that any war is or has been in progress between Turkey and Italy."**[10]

Then follows warnings and threats; had they done so this would have put Egypt in a very difficult position. Turkey could ask for soldiers from Egypt, but this would evidently officially entitle Italy to bombard Egypt. **The Egyptian Gazette** frequently expounds on the danger that would be entailed were Egypt to be officially informed of the war; and to take but one instance of the effects, points out that the harbour of Alexandria remains lit up whereas Turkey's Red Sea and Mediterranean coasts are blacked out.

E.Gazette insists on the non-religious aspect of the war and indicates proudly that, because of E.Gazette's warning against the **Misr al-Fatat** which was claiming an **"Islam versus Christianity war"**; the newspaper was suspended.

In its leading article of the 6th of October it states: **"It is for money that they are fighting, happily religion has nothing to do with the war."** The early cessation of the hostilities is its main aim and it proposes that, Turkey being weak and penniless, Italy might make some payments for Tripoli and everything will be settled.[11] If a quick solution can not be reached, it is the localisation of the war that **Egyptian Gazette** aims at, in conformity with the British Government's views. **"If not"**, it concludes, **"the greatest danger would have been in the Red Sea and the Balkan countries."** It then goes on to point out that since Egypt is geographically positioned midway between the points of danger, it is moreover imperative that in the interest of European peace, Egypt maintains an attitude of strictest impartiality.

But in general, apart from the atrocities, there is no condemnation of the Italian attack on Libya, or any mention of the human rights for the Libyan people.

From among the numerous English local newspapers of India we present as an example **The Civil and Military Gazette** of Lahore. The non-religious aspect of the war is specified on every occasion. The visit

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[10] 4.10.1911.
[11] ibid.

of the King-Emperor being always in mind, it tries continuously to cool down the excitement. Because of that aim the **"Turkish"** failures, **"Young Turk's misdeeds"**, defections from the "Turkish" camp, **"Ottoman concessions"** for peace, severe losses by **"Arabs"**, **"Italian atrocities"** are magnified. The illegality of the Italian attack or the breach of the international aggreements or laws is never mentioned.

The necessity of Neutrality for Britain and India is stressed and some notes and messages by unimportant British sympathizers with Libya are published. In November the events of Iran gradually replace the Libyan war. Very rarely and with only a few lines, Tripoli affairs are reflected in a way to create the feeling that the war is on the brink of disappearance; funnily, one of them describes in five lines the autumn rains in Tripoli, as if armies amounting to hundred thousand were not fighting there.[12]

A letter by a certain **Ahad Shah,** summarizes what was expected from Indian Muslims in relation to the Libyan War:

> "... the agitation of the Indian Muslims is useless. Their clamour is of no use whatever to the Turkish Government and in the long run they will be looked upon as a body of bigoted people... Bodily assistance being impossible, the best form seems to be financial. But even they collect 10 or 20 lakhs — which seems impossible — it is not enough for one day's expenditure of the war... The verbal help of which only the Indian Muslims are capable is absolutely useless, as it can have no permanent effect. The best is to influence the government to concentrate on the materialization of the Turco-Italian war. As far as I see Muslims are avoiding to lend this kind of help. I should say that some of the newspapers write such inflammatory articles only with a view to the financial improvement of their business. But by this act of theirs they are certainly dragging their co-religionists in to the abyss of degradation... Even if they can not get an answer for their efforts, is there anything else to do. Who can oblige the government?... Under these circumstances I see no reason why discontent and dissatisfaction is being spread among the faithful subjects of the Turkish Italian war."[13]

After the end of the King-Emperor's visit to India the mood of the newspaper changed. More attacks on Italians without magnifying Turco-Arab resistance took place.

The contents of the Levant Herald, the only English newspaper of Istanbul, was not different from those two examples. It was proud of

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[12] 21.11.1911.
[13] 8.11.1911.

playing the role of a watch-dog against any **Pan Islamist** tendency.[14]

b) FRENCH PAPERS: ISLAM (ALGIERS); LE REVEIL (BEIRUT); LA TURQUIE (ISTANBUL)

The local French language press in Algeria and Tunisia were absolutely controlled by the French colonial administration. A very illustrating example of their approach to the Libyan war can be found in an article of the **Islam** newspaper of Algeria — the porteparole of **Young Algerians** and a defender of the French assimilionist current— as a serious reaction to the war after four months, on the occasion of the capture of French ships, **Carthage** and **Manouba** by the Italians.

> "Loyal to our program based solely on the social longings of the Algerian Muslims and respectful before everthing to the managing principles of the foreign policy of France; we imposed on ourselves till today, an absolute reserve on the problem of the brutal aggression of Italy on Tripolitania. The world press has qualified, better than we could, the unjustifiable plunder of the last Turkish colony in Africa. The correspondents of the big press of Europe, in spite of a rigorous censorship, have not dissimulated their indignation, and our Muslim hearts bled at the suffer in consequence of a war of extermination to the last. Women, children and aged were not spared."[15]

The article end with a deeper indignation towards the capture by the Italians of the two French ships and with thanks for the efforts of France for helping the release of the 29 members of the Turkish **hilal-l Akhmar** delegation who were in one of the ships:

> "How comforting it is for us, Muslims, sincerely attached to France, of that revolted conscience (which is supporting Turkey?"

But only the praise and loyalty to France, a passive approach, does not constitute the policy of **"Islam"** newspaper. A very active policy is followed to prevent the spread of Pan Islamism. The article of warning in the French newspaper **l'Action** by **Emile Brou,** a deputy and the President of the **General Council of Algeria,** on the spread of Panislamism form Turkey and Egypt, towards French North-Africa is carried also by **Islam.**[16] An article with heading **"The Italo-Turkish War**

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[14] 18.1.1912, quoted by A. Hadi Hairi, art. cit. p.380.

[15] **Islam,** 28.1.1912; the best information on Islam newspaper can be found in the book of Ihaddaden Zahir, op.cit.,: "In the name of Islam, men tried often to depoliticise the indigenous problems which the "indigenous press struggled to expose. The evolution of the indigenous press in this field was so evident that the development of a maraboutic press, encouraged and supported by the colonizevs, became noticeable. On the other hand it is significant to see a newspaper to assume the name of Islam, but never write on the subject of religion..." (p. 17)

[16] 11.2.1912.

and the sentiments of the Algerian Muslims"[17] signed **"Moslim"** attacks anybody who claims that the war was the result of the fight between the Cross and the Crescent, and qualifies as **"bad intentioned"** anybody talking in favour of Pan Islam. It condemns the **Carthage-Manouba** accident as a political event which unexpectedly dragged France and Algeria in to the affair. So to say, if the French ship had not been attacked the "French-Algerian muslims" would not have sympathised with the fighters in Libya.

And the paper organises a subscription for the benefit of the wounded of Tripolitania.[18] The large contribution by the people (150 thousand francs in Algeria and more than that in Tunisia by the first week of March)[19] must have caused an anxiety with the organizers so that simultaneously a collection for giving a plane as a present to the French Army **"exclusively with the contribution of the Algerian Muslims"** is organised by **Islam.** It claims also that another Algerian newspaper **Democratie de Tehessa** organises another collection for another plan.

The worries of France on the Tunisian effervescence is reflected in that context. In the article "Proscription of the Young Tunisians"[20] all the blame of what had happened in Tunisia is put on the behaviour of the **"Italian colony and its newspapers on one side, and the Arab reactionary press on the other".** And it is stressed that Tunisians are not anti-French as they joined the French army in its campaign of Morocco.

Everything shows that if Tunisians were very much affected with what happened in Libya, Algerians in their turn were affected with reaction of the Tunisians. The French Colonial newspapers from Istanbul and Lebanon to Algeria and Tunisia, among them **Al Balagh.**[21]

The French newspaper of Beirut, **Le Reveil,** the porte-parole of the Lebanese autonomists, backed by France, joined the common theme of anti-pan Islamism without reserve.

> "The pan Islamism has enough friends and help to be considered an important force. Doubtless, all who contribute to the subscription for the war are not disposed to rise against the authorities which govern them. For peace and equality, Europe will not permit any insurrectional behaviour."[22]

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[17] 10.3.1912.
[18] 18.2.1912.
[19] 10.3.1912; 25 thousand francs in one day, in the city of Algier.
[20] 5.4.1912.
[21] **Reveil,** 23, 12.1911; The book of Ihaddaden Zahir contains many examples of prohibitions.
[22] 16.11.1911.

On the 9th of December, the leading article, a letter from Paris worries about panislamist tone of many religious and nationalist papers of Istanbul, Syria and Egypt which indisposed a lot of Frenchmen appeared. In another part of the same paper, the advance of the Russian Army — an ally of France in the Entente Cordial — in Iran is presented as a very normal event, with olny a few lines.

On another occasion **Le Reveil** condemns religious and nationalist minded newspapers which propagate fanaticism and remarks that the expulsion of the Italians from Izmir has produced a deep impression.[23] It does not hesitate to reproduce news coming from Italian sources which condemn "**Arabo-Turkish atrocities on Italians in Libya reminding those horrors on Armenians of Cilicia,**" and defend Italians by saying that "**Italians acted violently in some rare and isolated cases and benaved in general as civilised belligerents.**" It ends with the happy remark that "**Tripoli is completely cleaned from the Arabo-Turks.**"[24]

Le Reveil endorses the decision of the French Government to prohibit the import of Islamist newspapers to Algeria and Tunisia.[25] On the other hand the editor of **Reveil** announces that the newspaper entering its 5th year of publication will renew its structure and content **"to contribute to the diffusion of healthy and patriotic ideas in Syria."**[26]

For a paper, which condemns the local religious and nationalist ideas as "not healthy and patriotic" what could be the suitable solution?.. The later career of **Reveil,** after 1918, proves that it meant subservience to the French Colonialism as in Algeria and Tunisia and this is why it was not against the colonisation of Libya by the Italians. This idea is clearly expressed in a leading article by a Christian Arab:

> "What use do we expect from the continuation of the war? Is it the expulsion of the Italians from Tripoli?!. With which aim are we letting our poor Arab brothers to be killed heroically on the African soil, for nothing but glory?.. And to what good will it do to us if the thirst of the desert is satisfied with the blood of the enemy? Maybe to permit to appropriate more rights to the conquest of a soil turned red with the blood of its children?!... It is time to stop that frightful disaster."[27]

It is easy to feel that the article insinuates a critic towards the Young Turks for supporting the continuation of the war. In another news again from Italian sources it is remarked that "**Arabs are complaining**

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[23] 14.12.1911.
[24] 12.12.1911.
[25] 25.12.1911.
[26] 30.12.1911.
[27] 25.1.1912; Articles signed by the lawyer Alph.Zénié.

that the Turks are letting on them all the burden of the fight"[28], which confirms that view. So the dilemma is formed: If the fight continues it is the Turkish regime which will be responsible for the useless shedding of Arab blood, but if Turkey asks for peace, it will be easier to condemn it for having deserted the Arabs.

There is also a striking resemblance to the Algerian **Islam, as Le Reveil** started a subscription for collection of money for buying military aeroplanes for the French army, during April 1912.

The case of another French newspaper published by an Italian, and having the name of **La Turquie** is also very interesting. The owner and director of the newspaper, **Mr.Bondini** was from a family established for nearly forty years in Istanbul and had family ties with the finance and business circles in Istanbul and Europe. In 1908 and 1909 the newspaper appeared with half of it in Italian, with the title **La Turchia.** But it was serving more the French interests, as the Italian economical interests in the Ottoman Empire were very limited. Already in the leading article of 26th of September, 1911 entitled **"Vive la France"** the editor, **Le Goff** was declaring that he was proud of being a Frenchman.

In general **La Turquie** avoided showing any interest in the Italian claims on Libya and was even very careful in reporting the case of the Italian girl who embraced Islam. It used to give extensive coverage to the Italian news, to the visit of the Ottoman heir to Italy, the donation of **Banco di Roma** to the victims of Istanbul fire, the ceremonies of the 50th anniversary of Rome becoming the Capital of Italy, etc... Concerning the prewar events, it limited itself to publish only the official communique's of the Italian government denying any relation of the military preparations with Libya.[29]

With the declaration of war **la Turquie** started a peculiar neutrality according an old-fashioned conception: publishing what the agencies and other newspapers are reporting, not commenting on the events, but not condemning also with a single word the Italian attack. Till the 10th of October **Bondini** had its name as the owner of the paper. On that day it was suspended for publication against the rules of the martial law. It is more probable that it was suspended for being owned by an Italian subject.[30] It was a natural decision because of the growing reaction to the free continuation of Italian activities in the country and in a moment when a heavy censorship was imposed on Italy because of the possibility

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[28] 9.11.1911.
[29] 20.9.1911.
[30] Lowther to Grey, 18.10.1911, FO 371-1255/41656.

of the existence of Turkish spies other Italian journalists resident or in passage from Istanbul, to leave the country within 24 hours.[32]

The mentality of all the Westerners was such that Bondini, thought of an injustice towards him and when arrived at Rome felt free of criticising the expulsion decision:[33]

> "I was extremely surprised because I know that my newspaper has never transgressed the prohibition of publishing specific news concerning the mobilization and preparation of the authorities."

So he was expecting to have his business protected and flourishing while his country would attack, destroy and put economic difficulties on the Ottoman Empire.

On 12th of October **La Turquie** changed its name to **La Constitution** and on 30th of October to **La Liberté,** thus becoming a real French newspaper under the ownership of a Frenchman, **P.Le Goff.** Its programme was declared as follows:

> "This is a French newspaper. It is absolutely **independence,** with no vassalage to any political party, and is subjected to no foreign influence of whatever kind."

The contradiction between being a French newspaper and at the same time absolutely independent, manifested itself clearly in the same issue, in an article by **P.Le Goff,** where he follows the official French line of condemning Germany for having pushed Italy towards this expendition. During all of November we see nothing but condemnation of the German international policy from different angles and more news and comments about Morocco and French-German conflict than Libya. The Libyan problem being used not to condemn the Italian act and defend the rights of the people, but as an excuse to condemn Germany.

c) ITALIAN PAPER OF EGYPT: MESSAGGERO EGIZIANO

We like to end this section with a detailed analysis of the contents during the war of a full Italian newspaper published in Egypt: **Messaggero Egiziano.**

During the spring and summer of 1911 the paper had no idea of the Italian aims on Libya. When the Moroccan affair put in evidence the

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[31] Statement of the Italian ambassador Garroni, **Messaggero Egiziano** 4.10.1911.
[32] **Constitution,** 14.10.1911.
[33] **Messaggero Egiziano,** 30/31.10.1911.

European imperialistic aims, it attacked Europeans for having created a mistrust in the Muslim is mind:

> "The expanisonist policy of France has revolved on Europe. We are not the only judges. That Islamic world which is so adverse to our interventions, so compact and united: This Islamic world which has simply witnessed stupid pretexts and brutal insolence in every act of Europe, even when it is the case of the most holy defence of the rights of the people, cannot stop from accusing this agreement: the civilizing work which Europe pretends to contribute, is itself a pretext."[34]

But soon after, in Augest the tone changed with the publication of articles entitled **"La Nostra Terra Promessa = Our Promised Land"**[35] the rumors concerning the internal politics of Libya. By the end of August, it is the politics of compensation, Tripoli against Morocco[36], and even remarks like **"Tripolitania in the hands of another power means the suicide of Italy"**[37] which prevails. The rights of Italy on Libya became gradually more often. A leading article analyses **"the prospects of a new imperialism"**[38] and on the 30th of September an article entitled **"The Italian historical rights** in Libya" contains references even to Ibn Khaldun.

From then on, and during all of October, it publishes only the Italian victories and praises:

> "Tripoli forts demolished by Italian bombs... Turkey expelled with its Guzman's with its governments, with its killer gendarme's" which is completed with a leading article: "Europe applauds Italy".[39]

The Arabs of Tripoli submitted to Italy (8.X). The duty of civilization in Tripolitania (9/10.X). The Italian army's excursion towards Tripoli (9/10.X). The Arab notables presented their homage to the Italian governor (12.X). The salute of a population: 150 thousand people bid farewell at the station of Florence to the soldiers leaving for Tripoli (14.X). Arab tribes of Tripoli attack Turks (16/17.X). Italian Tripoli and its future (20.X). There is no possibility for the Turks to resist because: 1) they are weaker than the Italian army, 2) Arabs prefer us (21.X). Turks and Arabd defeated and have heavy loses (26.X). Turco-Arab plot defeated by Italian arms, the traitors executed, 2000 prisoners (27.X). A big fight in Tripoli, Italian victory, Turks defeated and lost 3000 men, their flag and artillery captured (29.X).

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[34] 7.7.1911.
[35] 17.8.1911.
[36] 27.8.1911.
[37] 14.9.1911.
[38] 18/19.9.1911.
[39] 6.10.1911.

All these news items were presented in the biggest letters possible, covering all the six cloumns of the paper. During November we have out of the 26 issues of the newspaper, 17 carrying such large headlines with declarations of Italian victories. But already by the beginning of November it is accepted that the fight will not end very soon. An article in the 6/7 November issue, "**Arab solidarity**" states:

> "Obstinacy of the Turks and Arabs must not be interpreted in an erroneous way. The enemy which we have in front of us in Tripolitania is the most mobile, very agile, and the Turks who guide them have all the interest to maintain them in continuous excitement, to persuade them to act even after a defeat in the hope of a success. We have to add that the Turkish tactics insist on creating even in the movement of large masses, small nucleus of regular units to support and guide Arabs. No need to be surprised with the religious fanaticism, that they materialize partial attacks in short time even after defeats with the dimension of the one of 26th of October."

Next day it repeats in the article titled "**the incorrigibles**" the same views and condemns the Arabs as traitors.[40] On the 10th of November with a headline covering the whole page declares "**The Italo-Turkish war may prolong even for a year.**" And on the 22nd November summarizes: "**Turkey is the enemy of everybody.**"

It is striking that **Messaggero Egiziano** felt authorised to carry on such a provoking campaign in a country where it did not have any rights of a colonialist, and where the population was religiously and ethnically the same as those which its armies were attacking. Forgetting all its arrogance, **Messaggero Egiziano** attacked even the local Muslim press: "**The Italian colony of Egypt protests energetieally the local vernacular press.**"[41] After qualifying as a joke, the **Al Lawa's** article on the effectiveness of Arabo-Turkish resistance in Tripoli, it attacks even the British Administration of Egypt:

> **"You have to take the necessary measures to calm down the excitement of the Egyptians for the sake of the Europeans."**[42]

It proclaims also that the "**Islamic fire is burned in Egypt and in Tunisia and that Islam tries to conduct a war againot the West: Europeans are in danger.**"[43]

Messaggero Egiziano was doing nothing but to repeat the policy of the Italian authorities in Egypt. Professor Bono remarks:

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[40] 9.11.1911.
[41] 13.10.1911.
[42] 20.10.1911.
[43] 24.11.1911.

"From the Italian side, frequent reproaches were had been directed towards the authorities in Cairo, which were accused of staying inactive vis-à-vis the attacks of the press towards Italy, which constituted a violation of the neutrality; on the other hand the government of Rome tried to modify or at least to alleviate the anti-Italian line, by a secret allotment of money to different press organs."[44]

3. CREATION OF DUAL SYSTEM OF VALUES

a) INTOLERANCE, TOWARDS MUSLIMS AND OF THE PRESS REGIMES APPLIED TO MUSLIMS

Pluralist in their own countries, Westerners were becoming more and more monopolist in the East. Meddling in a pot, nationalism, radicalism, Christianism, liberalism. etc.. bewiddered especially the Easterners who had a progressist and clear image of the West. In reality that was an unavoidable compromise of the rationalism with the implications of imperialism. Even radical and anti-clerical governments of the West, under the influence of this impulse became defenders of the religion in the East and were even competing among themselves for the leadergip of it. Those countries with a secular education system were the most fervent protectors of the missionary schools in the East; and they never ceased to combat Islam as a religion. So, a system of dual values was created in which radicals and anti-clericals were acting opposingly in the West, while they were united in the East.

During the last two decades of the 19th and the first decade of the 20th century, on the general framework of the economic liberalism, the rise of nationalism reached its peak. Once the world was apportioned among colonialist powers, the attention was focused on the preservation of what was grasped. This evolution lead the Western media (following the governing circles) to a lesser tolerance towards Islam. While during the 19th century an Ottoman State was tolerated - for the sake of European balance- as a European (i, e. civilized) state, now the right of existence was no more concedad to any Moslem community.

Any interference in the affairs of the press by the Ottoman Governments was criticised sharply by the Western circles: the concept of a free press was a sine que non condition of civilisation.

When, non-Muslim papers of Salonica were warned not to excite the public opinion, the British Consul criticised it:

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[44] Salvatore Bono, "Solideriéta Islamica..."

> "The Committee [of UP] is responsible for threatening non -Muslim papers with the severest penalties if they publish news calculated to excite the population, while allowing at the same time the Turkish papers to work on the passions of the Muslim mob by indulging in the wildest threats against, and the grossest abuse towards Italy."[45]

That very funny concept of freedom of press, based on not criticising a country which attacks one's homeland was contradicted directly by the behaviour of the same circles, in the Muslim countries which they ruled.

From French controlled areas, full censorship -existing already in Algeria- was imposed also on Tunisia immediately after the Djellaz Affair. **"The Reasons of the Tunisian Rising"** according to the French official sources was:

> "The highest placed and the most qualified Tunisian personality who can appreciate the importance of the Tunisian quarrel, has declared to one of our Parisian comrades that [...] since the start of the Tripolitanian expedition, an unusual effervescence manifested among the ordinarily tranquil population of the city of Tunis. Frequent gatherings were formed in the streets particularly before the offices of the newspaper **Dépêche Tunisienne,** and were not hiding their hostility towards Italians. Press polemics have arisen, and we had the means to moderate the tone of the indigenous press, we were unfortunately disarmed vis-à-vis the Italian press.."[46]

So even if the guilt was considered equal, it was accepted that any measure could be taken to silence the Muslim press, while the same administration was feeling powerless vis-à-vis the Italians.

Another serious, observer confirms the same: Guilt of the Muslim press:

> **"In Tunisia under the placid eyes of the authorities, Al Moshir published with big letters "The Great victory! Perilous defeat and crash of the Italian fleet. We must not insist further on a certain Tunisian press; it gave... so much proof of a very fine agreement of the Panislamist interests and European dissensions that its actual organisation authorises every anxiety."**[47]

Tzarist Russia had always a strong censorship system for all the press, Russian and the others. The minority papers had always been under heavy control of the Governors. But in 1911, a particular decision of closing down some leading Turkish papers with the aim of **Russification** was taken, furthermore the entry of even moderate

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[45] Consul Gl. Morgan to Lowther, Salonica 6.10.1911, annexed to the letter by Lowther to Grey, 11.10.1911, FO.371-1254/40532.

[46] **La Liberté** (Istanbul) 13.11.1911.

[47] **Revue du Monde Musulman,** February/March 1912, Vol.18, P.215/216.

Turkish papers from Istanbul was prohibited.[48]

In Egypt,the return from a more liberal application of the law on press to a harsher application happened in 1909. It resulted in the disappearance of the Hizb al Watani's three dailies after March 1910. So when the Libyan war started the Egyptian vernacular press was already struggling with those restrictions.[49] **Lord Kitchener,** the British Agent appointed in 1911, was determined to put down the Egyptian nationalistic movement at any cost. He Vigourously enforced the very stringent laws which regulated the newspapers press of Egypt.[50] The escape of many Egyptian nationalists to Turkey and Europe during that period proves the determination of Kitchener.

Another Kind of censorship was applied in the British controlled areas of Iran. As **Abdul Hadi Hairi** points out, during the Libyan war, telegrams criticising Britain were delayed or eliminated and many times declarations or resolutions were permitted to reach the public opinion only if they attacked Russians and Italians without any reference to Britain.[51]

The Italian Government, which applied the heaviest censorship in Italy and Libya, had the most controversial approach to the problem. The tactic of the Italian press since the first days of 1911 had been to drag the Turkish press to polemics on the Libyan issue. The Italian government until the midst of September remained out of polemics and denied any expansionist objectives. Until the declaration of War, Istanbul press tried to avoid polemics. If the big press of Istanbul had entered the discussion that would give Italy bigger opportunities of reflecting the problem to the European public opinion and condemning the Ottoman State more easily. European press -as a law of Imperialism- was used to discredit the Turks on any occasion and on any subject, be it genuine or not. When news was not sufficient an "ugly-Turk" was always an element to fill the gap. As long as no reaction was expressed by the Istanbul press (The main news center for the European agencies) Europe kept quiet on the subject, and it was the nervousness of Italy which filled the columns of the Western press.

When in the second half of September, the Istanbul press reacted with strong worded articles, they were immediately transmitted to

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[48] **Paisa Akhbar,** 17.7.1911; Concerning the ceusorship in Russia: Effie Ambler, **Russian Journalism and Politics, the Career of Aleksei S. Suvorin,** Wayne State University Press, Detroit 1972; W.J, Nagradow, **Moderne Russische Censur und Presse vor und hinter den Coulissen,** Berlin, 1894; **Messaggero Egiziano** "Come Lavora La Censura Russa", 5.8.1911.

[49] Yunan Labib Rizk, ar. cit., p.259.

[50] **Tribune** (Lahore), 7.9.1911.

[51] Abdul Hadi Hairi, ar. cit., p.380.

Europe with remarks like **"Turkish newspapers are indignant and are using threatening language vis-à-vis Italy."**[52] A remark which gave the papers the opportunity for making comments, columns long.

One must never forget that since 1870 (Franco-Prussian war) and later 1878 (Turco-Russian War) Europe lived in a permanent phobia of a general war. Any move was immediately evaluated as the start of the fright fully expected European War. In that regard the calm and moderate approach of the Istanbul press was a positive contribution to the peace, and the blame remained only with Italy. On the other hand, circulation-wise tiny, but polemic-wise highly eloquent Tripolitanian papers did not lose a single occasion to denounce and refute the Italian aims on Libya. That was the most natural duty of any nationalist press; they were simply defending their rights.

Out of a handful of foreigners -some Italian- nobody was aware of this discussion. It never had an international repercussion. But the Italians have done the utmost to internationalise it. The Istanbul press was well aware of that tactic; by mid-August one of them was commenting on it:

> "A telegram dated 15th of August from Rome claims that because of the insulting publications of a Tripolitanian newspaper against the Italian institutions, the Italian community in Tripoli presented a petition to the Italian Counsul [...] The press can make mistakes, that can also happen in Italy; but the main thing is the freedom of press... During the Abd-ul Hamid regime we were attacked because of the lack of freedom of press. When Abd-ul Hamid complained to the ambassadors, he was always given the same response: that the press is free in Europe and that governments cannot interfere with it. And he was recommended to sue the newspapers... Now the press is free, but we are again condemned by Europe. If a paper commits an offence, Italian authorities have the right to sue it in the tribunal. But to ask for solutions from the government stepping over the laws, is puzzling. Italians are free to present petitions and to sue as much as they like. But we are bewildered that such a simple fact is transferred by a telegram of the Italian news agency to Istanbul."[53]

So a dual standard was very clearly applied.

Everybody felt free to discredit, to insult and declare the end of the **"Sick Man"**, and was denying even the right of defense of his own life. For example the aim of crowning a Christian King in **Santa Sophia** was a very common theme of the European press.[54]

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[52] **Egyptian Gazette,** 26.9.1911.
[53] **Sabah,** 17.8.1911.
[54] **Outlook,** 13.4.1912, p.536-7.

This intolerance had particularly shocked the Indian Muslims and we find more examples and remarks about this dual standard, in that press:

> "Turkey is in a dilemma, if she asks peace she is treated as a beggar. If she expels the Italians from her soil the rights of the Christians are searched. The fact is that all European friends of Turkey are watching the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire with complacence and evident satisfaction."[55]
>
> "Al of Europe is recommending to Turkey that it give up Tripoli. There is no respect for Turkey's rights. This is the morality of Westerners."[56]
>
> "One effect of the Italian-Turkish war on Asiatics in general, and on Muslims in particular, will be that they will in future retain no confidence in the words, promises, agreements and treaties of European powers..."[57]
>
> "Italy is perpetrating the meanest barbarities in Tripoli. It went there as a highway robber, and is now engaged in wholesale massacres of the resisting Arabs, who, if they were Europeans, would be called patriots. It is barbarism."[58]
>
> "Might is right and weadness is wrong. The proof of civilization of a nation is its power and tyranny exercised over the weak, and the sign of barbarity of a people is their weakness and non-interference with the rights of others."[59]
>
> "Will Europe ever permit a non-Christian state to do what has been done by Italy."[60]
>
> "Whenever Turks assassinated Christians in the name of religion, Europe waged wars against them; under these circumstances they cannot be expected to make exception to the Italian aggression under the pretext of civilization."[61]
>
> "The Turcophobe **Statesman** newspaper attacks the alleged barbarities and brutality of Muslim soldiers... It has only antipathy to wards Turkey but no mention of the inhuman slaughter of the Muslims. Have you forgotten the civilised conduct of your Lord Kitchener in Sudan? Have the atrocities committed there been erased from the pages of history?"[62]
>
> "European conscience is always shocked when there is any garbled report of alleged Turkish atrocities in Armenia or Albania, but the European powers can afford to be supremely indifferent when one of

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[55] **Amrita Bazar Patrika** (Bengal) 12.10.1911; also in **Paisa Akhbar** (Lahore) 4.10.1911 and **Panjabee** (Lahore), 26.10.1911.

[56] **Gujarat,** (Bombay), 15.10.1911.

[57] **Urdu-i Mualla** (Aligarh) November 1911; **Saddharma Prachrak** (Kangri Bijnor) 10.1.1912.

[58] **Leader** (Allahabad), October 1911.

[59] **Hablul Matin** (Calcutta) 9.10.1911; also **Ananda Bazar Patrika** (Calcutta) 20.10.1911; **Swadeshabhimani** (Madras) 27.10.1911.

[60] **Oudh Akhbar,** (Lucknow), 17.10.1911.

[61] **Abhyudaya** (Allahabad) 12.11.1911; **Parsi** (Rajkot) 5.11.1911; **Oudh Akhbar,** 8.3.1912.

[62] **Muhammadi** (Calcutta) 3.11.1911.

them perpetrates indescribable atrocities upon Muslim women and children. Can hypocrisy go further?"[63]

The feeling of being betrayed in their trust of the Western Civilization became a more important factor in the thinking of the Westernophile Muslim Intellectuals. Ahmad Riza, Speaker of the Ottoman Parliament and one of the most prominent, Young Turks, expressed his indigntion vis-à-vis that dualism in very bitter words in a letter published in the **l'Humanité** of the 4th of Nov. 1911. In his opinion, Orientals remained more faithful to the Western ideals:

> "Europeans propose to us to accept, first the occupation as a fait accompli, and then they claim they would help us to solve the problem. This inconceivable attitude of Europe affects us as much as the loss of Tripolitania, which, if we have to lose it, will create in the Orient the suspicion, hopelessness and disgust; Orient will have no more trust in the civilization of Europe, in the honour of its parole, and in the agreements which it is signing. This contradiction between the parole and the action constitutes in the eyes of the Easterners a crime of lèse-morale. The Young Turk party, which aimed so loyally to incite his people to love Europe, to adopt the way of progress and to extend a bridge between the West and the Islamic World, will fail in its efforts because of Europe's mistakes. With a moral sense, which will be hardly understood in Europe, Turkey does not expel anybody from its territory, although that is its natural right. Forty thousand Italian workers who are dying of hunger in their home-towns, came to beg hospitality from us and have found among us means for living. What would happen to them, to their wives and children if we retaliated."

This deception became one of the most important reactions to Europe, and its roots nourished all the extremist-religious currents which are still existing (nowadays).

b) DISTORTION OF THE "ISLAMIC SOLIDARITY"(-ITTI-HAD AL ISLAM, RABITAT AL ISLAM) CONCEPT AS PANISLAMISM

This intolerance was especially focused on the concept of Islamic Solidarity.[64]

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[63] **Mussalman** (Bengal) 1.12.1911.

[64] The concept of "nation" in the Western secular sense was alien to Islam. Nation and Islam were a single and the same thing. In the Ottoman Empire the concept Millet (= Nation) used for the non-Muslim communitiès denotes a religious approach. The feeling of being member of the same Nation (Islam) and a common watan (a land owned by Muslims to be defended against non-Muslims -(as defined by A. Demeersemen, "Formulation de l'Idée de Patrie en Tunisie de 1837 à 1872", in I.B.C.A., Tunis Nos. 114 and 115, 2/3 Trimestre 1966, p.134; cited by C.Sammut, article cited, RHM. No. 10/11, p.129)- was creating an Islamic solidarity. To overcome their difficulties in colonizing Islamic countries, Western powers had to fight particularly that concept.

Since the Tinzimat, the Ottoman State had introduced a system of equality to all subjects of the Empire without any consideration concerning their religion, nationality or race. That revlutionary chage, for a state in which the basic philosophy was the superiority of Islam, met great difficulties and resistance. It was no more the Islamic State fighting for the victory of the religion, but a state struggling to create a place of dignity for its reformed religion, inside and outside the country; although the state religion continued to be Islam.

There was a direct relation between the rise of Imperialism and the tendency towards an **Islamic-defensive-solidarity;** it was an active cooperation but just a demonstration of sympathy among losing groups.

For more than 150 years, Ottoman Empire, the last champion of Islam was on the defensive. **Dynamic Islam** (Islam of propagation by jehad) had died out since long; a peaceful coexistance (a **passive** concept of **Islamic solidarity**) was accepted, which in reality was the acceptance of Western superiority. That one sided deal could not survive, as the irresistible advance of the West made them the master of the world. Then voices from individuals and groups -from Islamic public opinion- were heard to organise at least in an **active-defensive-solidarity,** and during the 19th and 20th centuries, there appeared not a single example of success. One by one Muslim communities had fallen to the European colonialism. In the year 1911 only 10% of the Muslims were independent and 90% (about 270 millions) had accepted the rule of alien powers.

But even the shadow of such a possibility was considered a danger. In the colonialist's mind anyone claiming Islamic faith was a fanatic and was aiming "to surrender to the infidels as long as they are stronger, till the day when God will enable them to preach the Holy War and restore to the believers, their freedom, with a victory."[65]

Because of such a belief, this solidarity, although simply defensive, was named by the West, by resemblance to the aggressive nationalist/racist currents **(Panslavism, pangermanism, panhellenism)** in fashion, **Panislamism.**

That expression was used to create in the Western public opinions the belief of the existence of a dangerous **"religious fanaticism"** in Islam, and for apologizing in advance for excesses when the West will suppress it. So by definition a Muslim was a fanatic and a fanatic could not be authorized to practice political rights, unless he gave up his beliefs.[66]

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[65] **Le Colon Français,** 23.5.1914, cit. C. Sammut, RHM, 10/11, p.133.
[66] C. Sammut, RHM, 10/11, p.133.

Through both European and Western language local media, this idea was inculcated even in the Muslim minds; and in colonies applied for the selection of state employees. A good Muslim (not hostile to colonialists = civilized) had to prove his good faith by declaring his refusal of Panislamism, an act absolutely foreign to a Muslim and the refusal of which was like refusing Islam.[67]

The contradiction was too obvious. While the right of criticising and condemning Islam was granted to Westerners, and especially to colonialist administrators who were ruling them, no criticism of Christianity and no defense of Islam was accepted for Muslims.[68] That was even leading to the refusal of the formation of local limited Islamic public opinion on any subject, independent from the Western approach -or not permitted by the West. Even the right, the innate capacity of reacting to any event was refused. The role of the Western media was clearly discriminatory in that case. Two scales and two measures were applied, which was contradictory with the philosophy of human equality preached by the West in the West. That affected especially the reformist minded Easterners who, for a while, had sided with the colonialists because of their "civilizing role."

How much the idea of a revolt of the whole Muslim world against Christianity existed in the minds of the leading people on the Turco-Arab side?

Farhat Al Zaoui, one of the Libyan deputies in the Ottoman Parliament, and active organiser of the resistance in the Tripoli area, warned a French journalist:

> "Holy War!. Please don't write it, you may render us suspect in France. We are not religious fanatics, but shabbily dressed and barefooted patriots like your soldiers of the Revolution."[69]

The interview given by the Ottoman Foreign Minister to a British journalist also contains clear references to the problem:[70]

> "Returning to the question of Pan-Islamism, Assim Bey [The Foreign Minister] said: ... I will say quite plainly that the idea of Panslamism is an impossibility. It could never be materialised, nor could any

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[67] Abd al Latif Hamza, "Al tawr al sahafi min atwar al haraka al wataniyya, **Al madjalla al kulliyya al adab,** Djamiat al Kahira, Vol: 20, No.1, P.6; **Al Hakika,** 1.9.1907, Open letter to the Bey of Tunisia, cit. C. Sammut, RHM, 10/11, p.132.

[68] The book of Cromer, British Representative to Egypt, **Modern Egypt,** had wide spread repercussions in Egypt, see: Abd al Latif Hamza, art. cited: also Jacques Berque, **L'Egypte - Imperialisme et Revolution,** Gallimard, Paris 1967, p.263.; J. Berque mention also another officiously propagated article of Milner in his book, p.260; there are many more examples.

[69] G. Rémond, op. cit., pp. 66-67.

[70] **Cutlook,** 6.4.1912, p.509.

endeavour materialize such an idea be brought with anything but the greatest danger not only to Europe, but to the Turks themselves-indeed to the whole world. You would be surprised, if you knew how much we have done to prevent any general expression of indignation from this quarter in connection with the campaign in Tripoli. You doubtless know, for your king has some seventy million Muslim subjects, that the Muslims all over the world are as united as the Arabs in Tripoli against the action of Italy, but the idea of a general up rising of these people is too awful to contemplate. Think of the appalling effect in India, in Algeria, in Arabia, to say nothing of other parts of the world. Such a disaster would throw civilisation centuries back. Now, it has been said that we have excited the Muslims against the Italians and against the attitude taken by the powers towards their action in Tripoli. We have however really done exactly what they say we have not done, and there is of course an abundant proof of this. Islamism is generally not understood. You see, the question of nationality has to be considered in connection with this subject. But by nationality I do not mean, what you would probably call nationality. To an Englishman, the word implies that which is English, that which originates in England or is confined by the English coastline. Now, in speaking of Islamism, the question of nationality, in the sense I have just referred to, does not enter. A man may be a Chinese, an Indian, or an Englishman, but if he is a Muslim, he is of our nationality. The idea of Pan-Islamism implies the desire to convert all to Islam; and it is maintained by some that we are secretly engaged in this work, and that we are gradually inculcating among the Muslims a feeling that they have no right to submit to the rule of Christians. I repeat what I have already said, namely, that the whole idea is ridiculous, and I give you my word for it, we are not engaged in any such work at all. Besides, Turkey could not benefit from the propagation of such a doctrine. You only need to have a glance at the map for a moment, and you will see that all our shores are in your hands, and any attempt to cause difficulties in any British dependencies or colonies of any other country, would simply incur the anger of those countries, with disastrous results to Turkey.

You see, then, that whilst the Ottoman is a Muslim by religion, the Muslim may belong politically to any form of government."

The statement of the Ottoman Foreign Minister had wide repercussions. One of the Indian papers, while transmitting it added ideas which the Foreign Minister had not said, but implied, and which many believed as being true:

> "The opinion expressed by the Turkish Foreign Minister about Panislamism to the representative of the Outlook, was to the effect that Panislamism did not contemplate political union between the Muslims of different countries and that it was only intended to create a religious union. The expression Panislamism has been invented in

order to prejudice Europeans against Muslims and to justify their aggression on Muslim countries.

If Europeans insist on giving this interpretation to Panislamism, Muslims may begin to accept the position and the European dream of Panislamism might become a reality in Africa or in some other country. Europeans would only have themselves to thank, if any such union did take effect amongst the Muslims of any country, with the result that they might rise against the Christians, because by their misinterpretation of the expression Panislamism they had created the desire amongst the Muslims for a general rising against Christians. At the present time there is no movement for political union amongst the Muslims of the world and there is no likelihood of such a union being effected."[71]

The approach of **Al Manar,** the most influential Arabic magazine of the period, to the problem of Jehad did not differ too much from the Ottoman Government's stand. **Al Manar** at the turn of 1912 (vol. 15/1; pp. 34-36) criticised an article of **Sayyid Ahmad Lutfi** in the **Djarida** as **"it could be, the Manar remarked, understood as an invitation to the extermination of all Christians."** After long comments on the roots of the word Jehad (= efforts and struggle to resist an opponent or an enemy) **Manar** remarked that it never meant to kill, but only to oppose.

An interesting remark on the subject was advanced by an Istanbul paper when Russia tried to limit the local education of the Muslims under the pretext of intending to spread the **Panislamism.**

"... even the Russians... know that the idea of the Ittihad-al Islam is impossible to materialize. Then we are obliged to evaluate this claim as an excuse to prevent the progress of those people, rather than to point out a danger."[72]

The **Panjabee** of Lahore in its issue of 1st of October 1912 evaluated that kind of approach as a game of imperialism:

"The recent articles in **The Times** on the Pan-Islamic menace in India has excited a good deal of public attention. The first impression is that there is no menace and the anticipation of troubles is exaggerated... The reality is that it is used by Britain to "divide and rule".

The fear of all the colonialist empires of Europe was forcing them to inform each other on the prospects of Panislamism.

By Ocotober 1911, when the excitement on Libya was at the zenith, the Russian government criticised the British ambassador for helping the Panislamism activities of the Young Turks in Central Asia, by sending Turkish officials there. It was inconceivable for them to accept

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[71] **The Muslim Gazette** (Lucknow) 15.5.1912.
[72] **Sabah,** 5.8.1911.

that Turks or Muslims could be sent to other Muslim countries, as experts as if there was a law obliging all the experts to be Christians and Europeans.

London informed its agencies in Istanbul and India for enquiries. Both replies came out negative, there were only rumours.[73]

Still without any proof Western Media was continuing to spread that general idea of the existence of such a current particularly because of the indignation created by the Libyan war. In those days a French writer wrote in **Asie Française:**

> "The Islamic patriotism is an incontestable fact; it was unknown some 15 years ago, or its manifestations remained isolated, unnoticed. The Panislamist theories propagated through the press and conferences have given to the Islamic belief an improvised vigour of expression, nearly returning that irresistible power of expansion which during the Middle Ages had pushed the armies of Caliphs against Christianity and the Orient... The Islamic world is revealed today as an impressioning force which reacts against all attacks on any one of its parts."[74]

That was the fear of the Westerners which as in the case of Russia and France instigated the prohibition of the pilgrimage to Mekka and which pushed the British to impede it by spreading the news of war in the Red Sea and the bombing of **Kaaba.**

We witness heated discussions on the meaning of "Jehad, Holy War, Panislamism etc..'' perpetrated by non-Muslim papers especially with the aim of forcing Islamic papers to clarify their stand vis-à-vis colonial powers. Immediately after the declaration of war, the polemic which started in the Lahore press, is an instructing example.[75]

The English paper **Tribune** of Lahore, was against any boycott of Italy because **"India is importing only 355 thousand pounds of materials while she exports 3,3 million pounds to Italy."** For the same reason, it resisted any attempt against Italy. **Paisa Akhbar** proposed a Jehad which it explained as **"a big effort"** against Italy. **Tribune** corrected it: **"Jehad means religious war, they are trying to dissimulate their aims". Paisa Akhbar** was bewildered: **"Our explanation was very clear, why does Tribune murder honesty? Does journalism consist of bidding good-by to honesty and fair-mindedness and cause misunderstanding." Tribune** was more specific that time:

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[73] India Office, L/p and S/10/196 notes and letters dated 14.10.1911 (Hirtzel to Ritchie), 24.10.1911 (Letter to Fo), 16.11.1911 (India Office reply), 16.1.1912 (Lowther reply).

[74] Mars 1912, article of H. Marchand, quoted by Salvatore Bono in his article "Soliderieta blanico..."

[75] Lahore papers of October 1911 particularly issues of 7, 21, 25, 28 October.

"Some Muslim papers have tried to explain that the Jehad which is being preached is directed against Italy alone. It is of course, not a holy war but only a boycott. Actually the real feeling that is being inflamed is that of Islam versus Christianity and as a matter of fact Christianity has been openly derided and scorned from this state of mind to the growth of bitterness against a Christian Government like British it is only a step and that is why appeals to the passions of the multitude must be condemned as dangerous. Sympathy for Turkey is universal but how that sympathy is to be translated is a question of expediency."

Another Lahore paper, **Observer,** joins the discussion:

"We are amazed, we must confess, at the persistent attempts made by the Lahore **Tribune** to grossly misrepresent the attitude of the Indian Muslims towards Turco-Italian war."

Nothing changed the mind of Tribune. By 22 November, 1911, it was still insisting on that **"The Panislamism cults is making very extensive headway in this country and there is a danger, unless the movement is rigidly brought under proper control and discipline."**

Also the expressions **"Ittihad-al Islam, and Rabitat-al Islam"** have always been traslated -as we have noticed in the press files of the **Indian Office-** as Panislamism and repoerted to London as such. So, by the contribution of the translators the attitude of the Indian Muslims was continuously misrepresented. And whenever the respect and affection of a Muslim for his religion was mentioned it was always translated as **"fanaticism".** The word **"Taassub"** (to be from one side, to side with a group) was also translated as **"fanaticism = to have extreme ideas".**

But the same was not applied to any Christian attitude. If a Cardinal reminded one of the victory at **Lepanto** (1571)against the enemies of Christianity (Ottomans), or recalled the memory of **J. Sobieski** (1683) near the walls of **Vienna,** it was not fanaticism but the glory of Christianism. When another Cardinal mentioned in his speech the old glory of Italy by showing the old flags captured from Saracens it was not fanaticism. And when militant papers propagated the story that the Pope has backed and blessed the expedition, that was not either described as fanaticism.[76]

The prejudice was such that when the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem, **Monsignor Camassei,** donated 50 Napoleon to the Ottoman Government for the war sufferers, it created a big indignation in Italy.[77]

[76] Francis Mc Cullagh, Italy's War for a Desert, London 1913, p.388; **The Outlook,** "Vatican Views and War in Tripoli", 18.5.1912 p.724.

[77] **Messaggero Egiziano,** 17.11.1911.

the same happened, when Syrians living in **Brazil** (Mostly Christian-Ottoman citizens, called **Turco** in South America) donated 20 thousand francs to the Ottoman War Ministry for the warriors of Tripoli.[78] **"The actual awakening of the Panislam is so strong that even the Christian Syrians joined it."**[79]

Another striking example is the remark by **G. Bonacci** in his book (p. 64) concerning the traffic of arms to the mujaheeds. This Italian journalist, a fervent defenser of the Italian attack's legality to Libya, criticised the furnishing of arms to the Muslim warriors, because **"the traffic of arms is against international agreements."**

The dual system of evaluation was prevalent during the Libyan war and in every judgement. Nothing could be saved from being impregnated with Panislamism. In one case when again a self-defensive act was judged as Panislamism, the **Jeune Turc** newspaper remarked in April 1912:

"The one who wants to kill his dog, always finds that it has rabies."

An important effect of combating Panislamism was to direct the rising dynamism towards a new and more suitable -to the interests of colonialists- channel. Instead of Islamic solidarity an Arab nationalism would be more suitable for those interests.

The financial contribution of some Christian Arabs of Beirut to the warriors, and the press campaign by some Christian Arab newspapers (As **Al Sabatt,** the Arabic edition of **Le Reveil**) inviting **"young Christians to imitate the Young Ottomans"** have to be judged from that angle.[80] A serious observer remarked:

> "Limitations of **Panislamism** movement, have made it possible to think of an Arab renaissance. The dream of Arab nationalism is vague and nebulous enough, though some Arabs are prepared to enunciate a program; but it will lead in due course, one may be sure, to the formation of a Young Arab Party."[81]

B- NEUTRALITY = ANTI-PANISLAMISM

The excitement created in the Islamic public opinion by the Italian declaration of war could have had two results:

1- Direct involvement in the war by Islamic solidarity.

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[78] **Reveil,** 4.5.1912.
[79] **Revue du Monde Musulman,** February/March 1912 Vol.18, p.214.
[80] **Reveil,** 3.10.1911.
[81] W.K.Mc Clure, **Italy in North Africa,** London 1913, p.282.

2- Provide European support to the Ottoman Empire:

a) to stop Italian attack and to bring pressure on Italy for an equitable solution.

b) to provide passage through Egypt and Tunisia for supplying the mujaheeds with arms, ammunition, food and even with military forces.

Western media -each one in parallel with its own government- was very much concerned and worried with the first aim. By taking a freezing-neutralizing step on it, they were able to avoid completely the second. The policy of the Western powers was to isolate the fight as much as possible. They all knew that if the partition of the Ottoman heritage was brought on the table it could ignite a major general clash. This is why Britain, France, Russia etc. declared their neutrality as early as possible. British neutrality meant the neutrality of Egypt and that of France, the neutrality of Tunisia.

Italy was very anxious to secure the neutrality of European governments. British Foreign Office files are full of Italian notes reminding continuously to the British and Egyptian governments, that they are breaking the rule of neutrality. The Ottoman government expected for a period British help against Italy, and tolerance for the aid to the mujaheeds by passage through Egypt. Neither materialized and the moderate policy of the first weeks was abandoned and even the passage of the Turkish officers was forbidden.[82]

Of course neutrality meant also non interference -even with sympathy or solidarity demonstrations- of the other Muslim communities in the affair. It must never turn to a Panislamist action, and it must never be described as the attack of Christianity against Islam. France in Algeria, Tunisia and Black Africa; Britain in Egypt, India and Black Africa; Holland in South-East Asia; Russia in Caucasus, Crimea and Central Asia were worried from such a tendency.

This is why, the Italian propaganda stating that **"our enemies attack shouting Allah! and we reply them with the scream of Savoia"**[83] was very much appreciated by European media. So parallel to the Western press, both the Ottoman and Egyptian Western language newspapers were condemning any inference to the Holy War:

"Fanatics have preached Holy War; they called all the Muslims of the

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[82] In his diary (op. cit.) Enver Pasha praises the British for their tolerance (p.48) and points out the reason "to have our sympathy." Four months later at the end of February, 1912, he writes: "I am concerned with the Egyptian border more than the Italian front, British are annoying me very much." (p.68).

[83] **Messaggero Egiziano,** 4.1.1912.

world to fight against the cross. That was the last attempt to complicate the situation to the extreme, to alienate the powers and to reject the Ottoman Christians from their military and patriotic duties."[84]

Governments having declared their neutrality that press was reminding that **"the anger towards Italians is well understood, but must not be expressed against other Europeans."**[85]

Even a one sided neutrality was propsed:

"Many European publicists have spread the opnion that the powers must not stay neutral in the actual conflict and will do well by showing their teeth to prevent Panislamism creating difficulties for them"[86]

In India, a strong tendency to criticize the neutrality of Britain found its way in the Islamic press. As the discussions on the subject will be dealt in more detail in another part of this book we will just summarize it.

The fact that **"British and European neutrality serves only Italy and is against the interest of Muslims"** was expressed often.[87] There were even warnings on the possible long range effects of the neutrality:

"England has to defend the cause of Islam. The policy of non-interference on the part of England will not only hurt the feelings of her Muslim subjects, but it will ultimately prove injurious to herself as there is danger of her interests in the Near East being undermined..."[88]

The British fought with those feelings both with the British media and the local "British-sided" Anglo-Indian papers. The **"idea of the futility of carrying anti-Italian agitation in India, and the meddling of the Muslims with the foreign politics"** was expressed even by Muslims.[89] It had its repercussions on different organs. Particularly the proposal to keep away from the foreign politics was meant to prevent any Islamic Solidarity or Panislamist move.

The argument for the defense of the neutrality lay in the belief in the civilising effect of any western action in the "un-civilised world."

Le Journal du Caire was condemning strongly the Egyptian newspapers which were trying **"to excite the hatred in the Turco-Italian**

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[84] **Reveil,** 10.10.1911; One has to remark that the claim on patriotism and military duties of the Ottoman Christians was a phantasy, as the law on the obligatory military service was blocked in the parliament through the manoeuvres and votes by the Christian deputies.

[85] **Reveil,** 19.10.1911.

[86] **Reveil,** 16.10.1911.

[87] **Gujaratee** (Bombay) on its October, 2, 4, 7 issues; **Urdu-i Mualla** (Aligarh) January 1912; **Sind Gazette** (Bombay) 13.11.1911.

[88] **Zulqarnain** (Budaun), 7.10.1911.

[89] **Oudh Akhbar** (Lucknow) 29.10.1911; also **Musafir** (Agra) 10.11.1911 and **Ittihad** (Moradabad) 8-16. November 1911.

misunderstanding''. According to that newspaper **''the interest of Egypt was to remain completely neutral".**[90] **Egyptian Gazette,** the official porte-parole of the British occupation was absolutely on the same line and was continuously repeating the necessity of neutrality for Egypt.

Le Reveil, representative of French interests in Beirut, was repeating the summary of the British press: **"with unanimity they express their wish for the victory of the civilising action of Italy in Tripoli". La Reforme** of Alexandria believed in the necessity of **"saluting Italy for the decision and courage it showed for the victory of the civilisation"** and was praising the Latin genious. There was surely no difference of tone between these lines and **"the enlightening march of Italy"** a theme defended by **Messaggera Egiziano** newspaper published in Italian for the defence of Italian interests in Egypt.[91]

With such an approach it was normal for this press to ask the Turkish side to make concessions for a quick solution:

> "In France the public opinion regrets that Turkey has not yielded to the Italian demands concerning the young girl of Adana and certain vexations which it is claimed she suffered in Tripoli."[92]

In Tunisia, both French and Italian language newspapers created widespread indignation among the people:

> "Whatever is my indignation against Italy, bigger is my indignation against some French newspapers of Tunisia which feigned in the past a sympathy for us; because those newspapers, forgetting that they are published in a Muslim country, began to direct against the Turks the fire of the abominable fanaticism, without thinking that they are Muslims like us, and they did not hesitate to manifest their bias for the Italians."[93]

C. Kairallah gives interesting information about the very peculiar activities of those papers.[94] **La Dépêche Tunisienne** placed in one of its windows an immense map of Tripoli on which the moves of the armies were indicated by small Turkish and Italian flags. Coloured post cards representing the Italian victories were displayed in bookshops and attracted large crowds. Often fights followed. He points out also that the day before **Djellaz** cemetary events the Italian newspaper **L'Unione** had printed in Arabic and displayed as a poster, the decree by the king of Italy on the annexation of Libya to Italy.

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[90] **Reveil,** 10.10.1911.
[91] **Messaggero Egiziano,** 1-3.1.1912; **Reforme,** cit. Reveil, 10.10.1911.
[92] **Reveil,** 5.10.1911.
[93] **Ittihad al Islami,** 19.10.1911, cit. C.Sammut, 10/11. p.125.
[94] C. Kirallah, Le Mouvement Evolutioniste Tunisien, Tunis, Ed. de l'Imp. de Tunis, Tome I, 1934, p. 49-50, quotedi C. Sammut, 10/11 p.125.

L'Union Islamique after denouncing **"the most treacherous and the most insulting attacks against Islam and the Muslims"** of **L'Union,** warned it to consider:

> "That in this country which is theirs, and under this government which is theirs, Muslims will never suffer that the freedom of expression of their Islamic feelings remain to be less than the patriotic demonstrations of the Italians... (they) have to modify their behaviour, if not, they will force us to boycott them for centuries to come."[95]

This was surely a serious warning not only to Italians but also to the French; and the effects have been seen immediately the next day with the cemetary events.

The discussion on Panislamism had another important aspect. It brought on the table the problem for the colonialists on how to incorporate Islamic communities into their own nationalistic structure, in short the problem of assimilation. Each one was trying, through different methods, to create an Islam faithful only to itself. It was no more an invitation to the superiority of the Western civilization, but to a specific nationalistic structure. Surely that was one of the main reasons behind the increase in the Islamic reaction to the West.

Italy also statted the same application at the moment of entering in confrontration with Islam, Italian propaganda machinery begin to spread the message that it was by God's will that Tripoli would infallibly fall into the Italian hands. It was claimed that a famous Muslim holy man -a prophet, they say- from Tripoli predicted it in a gathering, as it was disclesed to him through inspiration by God.[96]

Turkish Army flags (with inscription from Qoran on it) captured by Italians, were photographed in the hands of an Italian military group in ceremonial dress, kept high with respect as if they were their own flag. It was represented as the **"flag of the prophet".** That photo was distributed widely and published repeatedly. That was giving them the power of declaring that **"Muslims of Scidle honour Italian flag".**[97]

Photos and statements of prominent Libyans in cooperation with Italians (Specially **Hassune Pasha,** mayor of Tripoli) were distributed all over. Their hope on the **"power and justice of Italians"** and their trust in the **"civilizing role"** of Italy was repeated continuously; and at last, the participation of local forces in the war on the side of Italians is publicized with full -six- column -head- lines.[98]

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[95] 6.11.1911.

[96] **TCAI,** p.16; this prophecy continues by declaring that after two years a disaster will occur which will be the end of the world.

[97] **Messaggero Egiziano,** 23.3.1912.

[98] **Messaggero Egiziano,** 22.6.1912; **TCAI,** pp. 34, 38, 155 etc..

Exposing to such an extent Italian-Arab fraternity was preparing the ground for eliminationg any reason based on religious dislike.

The clash between Italians and Arabs was explained as an unfortunate game of the fatality. Italians and Arabs were common enemies of the Turks as they both were fighting the Istanbul Caliphate.[99] It was a favourite subject not only in the local Western Language press but also in the Italian press. **La Tribuna** repeated the existence of a common front against the usurpers of the Arab Caliphate and advanced that **"this is why Muslim Eritrean soldiers are fighting in our ranks, and this is why Yemenis also will fight next to us."**[100]

One million francs claimed to be sent by the Eritreen Muslims to help the **"Italian brothers expelled from Turkey"** was also an occasion to exalt Italo-Muslim solidarity. Then, example of Italian tolerance was disclosed: Although in war with the Ottoman state which controlled the Holy Cities of Islam, Italy declared its will of letting free all Muslims to carry out the **"pilgrimage to the tomb of the Prophet."**[101]

In this way Italy was making its first step to the club of the colonialists, protectors of Muslims. The illegality of the Turkish Caliphate was a theme used against Islamic solidarity since three decades mainly by Britain and France. Now it was adopted also by Italy. Its particularity was that while the first two were avoiding any official confrontation on the subject and were using unofficial intermediairies like the media and possibly Muslim intellectuals, Italy, by the sudden forcing of conditions had exposed the problem in a more direct way. Its future complications can not be minimised if we consider the declaration of the Holy War during the First World War and the presentation of **Mussolini** in the 30's with the **Sayf al Islam (=Sword of Islam).**

Also the immediate effect of that propaganda cannot be minimised as, coupled with the propaganda of atheism and Freemasonry of the **Young Turks,** it convinced many believers that they could come to terms with Italy.[102]

C- OBJECTIVITY = ECONOMIC CONCERNS

From the professional journalistic angle this "political neutrality" was balanced by a certain objectivity. Here the objectivity has to be taken in the sense of being free in publishing criticism.

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[99] **Messaggero Egiziano,** 8.2.1912, article of Prof. Vincenzo Fago.
[100] **La Tribuna,** 6.3.1912; **Messaggero Egiziano,** 15.3.1912.
[101] **Messaggero Egiziano,** 16.6.1912.
[102] That was a common subject in all the European, and local papers.

The Italian attack rarely, but Italian atrocities generally, were criticised strongly by the Western press. The reason behind was not necessarily humanitarian but the desire by the other colonialist powers to prove to the Muslim world that Muslims were happier and respected under their rule. The fact that Britain and France occupied the first rank in that campaign was not a coincidence. They both preferred an Ottoman Libya, or even a buffer state than a European power as neighbour.[103]

It was not also a coincidence that the atrocities were spread for the first time through Mr. Alvarez, the British Consul in Tripoli, an experienced and for many years an established diplomat in Tripoli, who was attacked heavily by the Italian officials.

The role of the **Reuters Agency** in this game of objectivity is worth mentioning. By the end of September 1911, before the declaration of war, it spread the news that **"Turkey is arming herself against Italy"** and that **"Turkish newspapers are indignant and are using threatening language vis-à-vis Italy."** On the contrary, as we have seen earlier, the Turkish press had a quiet and calming tone, which is maintained until the declaration of war. Mobilization or arming herself was out of the question.

It is again a news item of **Reuters** which claimed the massacre of all the Italians working in **Hedjaz,**[104] on the basis of which the Italian press carried on a strong campain till the day when it was understood that the news was absolutely false.

In November, the leaking of the Italian atrocities in Tripoli area by the Reuters Agency, created a kind of balance, which some circles could name as "the objectivity". Italian executions had been photographed by some British journalists and the correspondent of **Daily Mirror** had been expelled by the military authorities. Reuters correspondent, Tayar was a Levantine Jewish and British subject, settled in Tripoli, working also with the British Consul. Three British journalists, **Bartlett, Grant and Davis** learned the facts from **Tayar.**[105]

When the atrocities were disclosed to the European public opinion, Italian press started a strong campaign against this "plot" Tayar was

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[103] Young, Egypt, pp. 192-93, quoted by Djamal Zakariya Kasim, art. cit., p.316.
[104] Egyptian Gazette 13.10.1911.
[105] For the complete story see FO. 371-1254/46350 (of 14.11.1911) /46377 (of. 18.11), /48277 (of. 20.11), /46354 (of. 20.11) and **La Stampa** 17.11.1911, **Il Messaggero** 19.11.1911; The report of the American consul (30.10.1911) names five journalists: Francis Mc Cullagh (New World), Bartlett (Reuters and Daily Telegraph), Baron Gettberg (German newspapers), Davis (Daily Express), Grant (Daily Mirror), art. cit. by Akil Barbir, Shaheed, No. 5, 1984, p.208.

presented as the **"former agent of governor Ibrahim Pasha in his anti-Italian campaign and a member of the Committee of Union and Progress, although a British subject."** Italian journalists **(Castellino, De Frenzi, Piazza)** in Tripoli visited the consul **Alvarez** and had a 45 minutes talk with him, after which they published a compte-rendu. They insisted that Tayar not knowing sufficient English, it was the Consul: who helped him to write the story. The other journalists also were infomed by Tayar.

The Italian press published that document and began to attack the British policy, in the person of the consul **"the author of the infamous report".** The British ambassador in Rome was alarmed and informed London on the negative effect of the event. Foreign Office enquired **Alvarez,** who refused any connection with the affair and qualified the insinuations as **"thundering lies",** although his cooperation was beyond doubt.

The striking point is that, while the discussion had to concentrate on the authenticity of the news -which was absolutely true- it was focused on the "why and how" of its disclosure." Especially the Italian press and Foreign Ministry at the same time threatened Britain, which was trying to dissociate Italy from Germany. The game was not new. Already by the end of September, when Italy was declaring its rights on Libya, Britain, through its press was continuously warning Italy against any adventure, but through its Foreign Office was pushing it in an underhand way. That double game had even struck the Italian press:

> "We don't understand how that hostility of the British Press came suddenly against Italy!.... Reuters makes the echo of it and we must confess that we are shocked."[106]

This objectivity "was in reality the result of a kind of very professional division of labour among Western newspapers." Some papers were defending Italy or more specifically the **"Imperialist, colonialist move of Italy towards backward Africans and Turks"** to whom they would bring civilization: while some others were defending the Arabo-Turks. So, for every current there was a favorable French, British, German or Austrian publicist. Any complaint from an adverse journalist could be balanced by a favourable commentator.

There is no doubt that Italian authorities used all their financial "convincing" power to create an Italophile current. **Jean Carrére,** correspondent of various French newspapers insisted on the Turkish atrocities. On the night of 1st of December 1911, he was attacked in a

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[106] **Messaggero Egiziano,** 30.9.1911.

street of Tripoli by a **"riding a bicycle and carrying a European cap"** and received three knife wounds Italians immediately declared that it was organised by the Young Turks.[107] We can also name **Martin H. Donovan,** the correspondent of the **Daily Chronicle,** as another Italophile journalist.

When **Georges Rémond** started his articles in the French **l'Illustration,** Istanbul papers published notes to encourage Turks to subscribe to the review, as it was claimed to be a Turcophile publication.

Thus a balance was created by the Westerners themselves in favour of Turco-Arabs. The weakness of Ottoman propaganda machinery was compensated in that way. Of course that balance was giving the right to publish any critics against the Ottoman Empire. Not only critics, but under the name of objectivity, news which could affect the fighting spirit of the community was circulating freely.

Reporting a message of Havas agency from Rome, **Reveil** was able to write that Turks and Arabs were fighting in the Tripoli area and that according to military critics highest praise had to be given to the Italian forces landing at Tripoli **"which were very well conducted and superior even to that of Japanese in Korea."**[108] Interesting examples can also be taken from every headline of the **Messaggero Egiziano,** each one being an insult or an exciting element in a Muslim country.

But real criticism to Italy came unanimously from the whole of the Western press, when commercial sea routes were endangered because of the war.

Austria-Hungary was not concerned directly with Italian activities in Libya, as long as it kept out of Balkans.[109] But when Italy attacked Turkish warships in the Albanian waters, one of the official mouthpieces of the government, **Budapesti Hirlap,** threatened Italy: **"Out of the Albanian Waters."**[110] When Italy started operations in the Aegean, it is another semi-official newspaper, **Pesti Hirlap,** which headlines its article: **"Out of the Aegean Sea."**[111]

In its leading article of 14.11.1911 **Budapesti Hirlap** disclosed the reason behind that warning:

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[107] **TCAI,** 10.12.1911, No. 22.
[108] **Reveil,** 24.10.1911.
[109] Our main source of information concerning the Hungarian reaction is the article "La Guerre Italo-Turque en Tripolitaine vue par la Presse Hongroise" by J. Laszlo Nagy, **RHM,** No. 23/24, November 1981, pp. 243-248.
[110] 4.10.1911.
[111] 14.11.1911.

> "We are an ally of Italy and particularly for that reason our position is the following: 1-Neutrality, 2-Warning to Italy that it is running on a dangerous road.
> What are the interests existing at the base of that position? In Turkey we have commercial and financial interests which are more important than the value of the exchanges between Italy and Turkey. We must not sacrifice that situation for a war of the Italians.."

The arrest of French ships by Italians with the claim of arms or mujaheed traffic, caused an unbridling of the French press. The bombardment of Beirut also created a heavy tension as the French considered it a damage to their interests for they were the largest contributions to the commerce of the area, and furthermore it was conceived as an intervention to their share in the heritage of the Sick Man.

When the straits of **Dardanelles** was bombed by the Italian navy and the passage of the ships from Black Sea to the Mediterranean was halted by the Ottoman authorities, a bigger reaction happened. That meant the stopping of commerce which was run nearly totally by foreigners. Diplomatically and through pressure of the public opinion Italy was forced to withdraw from Dardanelles and the Aegean sea routes.

In such a case, even a smooth-lined newspaper as **Stamboul** attacked Italy heavily. The polemic between this paper and the **"Superiore dei Dominicani"** in Istanbul is worthwile quoting, to show how much Western circles were feeling offended in the East, when they were criticised even "objectively". **R.P. Moriondo** sent a letter to the editor of the newspaper criticising his way of handling the Italian attack in an article, and ended his letter in an insulting tone by saying **"it can be seen that we are in Turkey and you are working for the Turks."** Another striking example of that mentality is the invitation to a duel by **Renato La Valle,** the Istanbul correspondent of the **Giornale d'Italia,** of the General **Keçecizade Izzat Fuat Pasha,** for having insulted the Italian army in one of his articles, only few days after the declaration of war by Italy.[112]

According to that mentality, whatever happened the press had to side with the "civilised" part and play the role of a moderator. It is the same recommendation which the **Messaggero Egiziano** reminded to the Egyptian nationalist press: **"it has to be your mission to throw water on the fire when sparks of exalted fantasy threaten to provoke a fire."**[113]

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[112] **Stamboul,** 22.4.1912; **Sabah,** 7.10.1911.
[113] **Messaggero Egiziano,** 4.1.1912.

That was an invitation to pull the nationalist press to the discussion ground of the "European view" and to propose them to forget about the real reason of the problem: the attack on Tripoli-Benghazi and the sufferings of the people there. So the war could go on forever as long as it was not interfering with the normal development of the business. That was shown also by the reaction to a war tax to be paid by the foreigners who had businesses in Ottoman lands:

> "It is learnt that foreign subjects owning properties in Turkey, are planning to apply through their embassies for their exemption from this tax increase, which they claim is a national tax and cannot be applied to the foreigners."[114]

This clearly means that they wanted to have another advantage, more profit from their businesses, as the local competition would be more heavily taxed.

D- INFLUENCE ON EASTERN INSTITUTIONS

1. EASY IRRITABILITY OF THE MUSLIM GOVERNMENTS

Since its taking office the **Said Pasha Government** avoided carefully to alienate Eruopean governments and public opinion. In his various talks in the parliament, he insisted on repeating that it was an Ottoman-Italian affair; that his government needs the help of the other European powers to find a solution; that even criticism levelled at the government on other subjects has to cease because it is affecting this solution.

Some deputies insisted that **"the enemy is not Italy but Europe as a whole. The European powers guaranteed the existence of the Ottoman Empire. if Europe does not react to Italian action it means that they sanction the breaking of the international laws."**[115]

The government's reply was very short and sharp. **Said Pasha** said that he was aware of the possible relation between Libyan affair and the whole of the **"Eastern Question",** but he did not desire to revive this problem. The truly experienced Prime Minister -it was his 8th office since 1879- knew that in the last decades Bosia, Eastern Roumelia and Crete were lost in similer discussions. He even resisted the demands of expulsion of Italians from Ottoman lands, which in his opinion could irritate European public opinion.

Western governments were aware of the sensitivity of Muslim administrators vis-à-vis Western Media. So they used it often to

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[114] **Stamboul,** 14.6.1912, from the newspaper **Iktiham.**

[115] Sitting of 22.11.1911, Karelidi, deputy of Istambul and Riza Tevfik deputy of Edirne, OP. p. 402-3.

influence their politics. In general they succeeded; sometimes they got a resistence from the Islamic public opinion and they arranged their own policy accordingly. For example, in the early days of the war, an agreement between **Prince Fouad,** uncle of the Khedive, and Italy was leaked out to the Egyptian press, according to which he could accept to be the ruler of Libya under Italian protectorate.[116] A very strong reaction ended the attempt by an official denial. Later, it was rumoured that an Italian-British agreement would give Britain the control on some Ottoman territories (as Benghazi or Aeagean Islands) on the condition of siding with Italy. That also did not materialize. But in each case they had an effect on the Ottoman policy.[117]

The Perte being conscious that he had no power to face Europe by force, chose to play the rightful and oppressed. Martial Law Command also helped the government in its policy by preventing the publication of exciting news and especially those which could create trouble between different nationalities and fanaticism against Christians, Ottomans (i.e. Christian Ottomans) or Europeans.

This line of action was not the result of the Western Media's publications, but was in concord with the line drawn by them.

Ottoman governments were not unaware of the dangers of sticking to only a pacifist policy and were trying to imitate the methods of the Western govenments. Those methods differed according to the area and the colonialist State involved. For example W.I. Shorrock points out the existence of numerous documents in the French Foreign Ministry archives, on the anti-French opinion creating activities of the Young Turks in Syria during 1910-1911, and adds that "they were successful in delaying any overt anti-Turkish activity among the Syrians."[118]

Egypt was under direct pressure from Britain. The government joined the policy of neutrality and was forced also to warn the Arabic and western language papers:

> "Some newspapers are publishing articles on the subject of the Turco-Italian war, news to excite and create clashes between the local people and foreigners living in Egypt. This behaviour can result with the destruction of the public order, therefore I have to warn you against

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[116] The Affair Prince Fouad was disclosed by **Al Muayyad** during October 1911; a secret Italo-British aggreement was advanced by the Greek newspaper **Ta Nea** of Istanbul, based on Austrian sources (**Reveil,** 10 and 18. May. 1912).

[117] **Reveil,** 10 and 21. 10.1911; **Lissan al Hal** 19.10.1911. They claimed preparations in the Balkans for the invasion of Greece by a 600 thousand strong Turkish army, "according to a special source from Alexandria."

[118] William I. Shorrock, **French Imperialism in the Middle-East- The Failure of Policy in Syria and Lebanon 1900-1914,** Un. Wisconsin Press, London 1976, p.77.

anything which can incite people towards disorder, and it is necessary to guarantee the truth of the news and the moderation of the commentaries, prior to publication."[119]

Even the entry of illustrated magazines and newspapers (as **Petit Journal** and **Petit Parisien**) which printed photos of Italian occupation of Tripoli into Egypt was forbidden.[120] The same precaution was taken also in Tunisia where the printing of photographs on the war was forbidden.[121]

2. PEACEFUL WAYS OF PROTESTATION

The Western influence was particularly felt in the field of pacifist campaigns which were supported whole-heartedly by the Eastern media.

Articles of the Socialist papers in Italy and in other European countries, and activities **of the International Peace Bureau in Bern** had a positive effect on the Ottoman public opinion.

The **International Peace Bureau** after its General Assembly meeting of 29.9.1911 issued a communiqué inviting Italy to a peaceful solution: mediation, arbitration or international conference.[122] Its representative, Mr **W.T. Stead,** was sent to Istanbul to try to find some means of bringing the war to a conclusion-possibly by the arbitration of **The Hague Tribunal.**

"Mr. Stead is of course aware that Italy is practically precluded by her own action in declaring war from agreeing to any such invitaion. But his proposals have nevertheless been eagerly welcomed by all sections of the press."[123]

Indeed, Ottoman press supported that activity. Articles of the Italian socialist papers had even given the hope of a disunity in Italy which could bring an early solution to the conflict. But the Italian left gave up its struggle too quickly. The campaign of the Socialist Press of the other countries of Europe which called the Italian act as "brigandage and pricacy"[124] had limited effects, but when the **Socialist International** decided to hold big demonstrations in every big city of Europe on the 5th November 1911 to protest **"the shameful conflict engaged in**

[119] O. Kologlu, **Mudhakkarat..,** op. cit, p.114.
[120] ibid.
[121] **Times,** 20.11.1911.
[122] **Le Figaro,** 1.10.1911.
[123] Lowther to Grey, Therapia 18.10.1911, FO. 371-1255/47658.
[124] **L'Humanité** 1.10.1911.

Tripolitan is by the brutal appetite of the Capitalists and the Italian government"[125] that gave an impetus to the Ottoman Intellectuals.

Already a large meeting against the war in which 60 thousand men participated was held in Paris successfully.[126] That gave hopes for new actions. Demonstrations were expected to be held in **Brussels, Berlin, Amsterdam, London, Paris, Inssbruck, Prague, Pilsen, Belgrad, Bucharest, Budapest, Sofia, Stockholm, Lisbon, Salonica** etc.. **Ahmed Riza's** (Speaker of the Ottoman Parliament) letter to the **Socialist International** found its way into the papers of most of the Socialist parties[127] which reflected the disillusion of the Eastern and Islamic societies from the Western civilization. He sent also a letter of protest to the Positivist **Frederic Harrison,** containing griefances from the "silence of Europe", which proves according to **Ahmed Riza,** that **"Europe (i.e., civilization) does not exist anymore."**

Demonstrations were held, Italy was blamed, but soon the enthusiasm to combat the Italian aggression died out and the socialists became more concerned with the local politics.

Activities of the **International Peace Bureau** ended also with a communiqué.[128] The appeal by the **Ottoman Parliaments Peace Commission** to all the European Parliaments, and the resolution of the **Inter-Parliamentary Peace Union Council** ended also with replies of sorrow from **London, Vienna, Berlin** and **The Hague,** which were read in the Ottoman Parliament, but which brought no a single inch of progress for a peaceful issue of the conflict.

The same happened with the large meeting of Muslims in the **Ayasofia Mosque** in Istanbul (4.10.1911) where it was decided to dispatch telegrams to the following institutions to remind the humanitarian obligations of the Western civilization:[128]

All the parliaments, British Asiatic Society, British Humanitarian Society, all the peace associations, all press, all heads of universities, all socialist parties, the Association of the Human Rights in Paris, International Tribunal in the Hague etc..

Another kind of peaceful propaganda was organised also with the distribution of postcards, having on one side photographs of Italian

[125] **L'Humanité,** 4.11.1911.
[126] **L'Humanité,** 29.9.1911.
[127] As in **Vorwaerts** (German), **L'Humanité** (French), **Nepszave** (Hungarian); In the Xth International Historical Conference of the Turkish Historical Association Dr. Ali Ihsan Bagis presented a paper entitled "the protest pf Ahmad Riza auprès the positivist Frederic Harrison on the subject of the Italian attack to Trablousgharb" (Ankara, Sept. 1986).
[128] **Times,** 26.10.1911.
[129] **SM,** VII/162, pp. 84-95; **SM,** VII/166, pp. 151-152.

atrocities. The name of the printer was omitted from the card but some indicated that they were taken from Daily Mirror. A caption in French warned the buyer:

> "All the foreign countries do not accept the correspondance in recto - photography of the atrocities- please inquire about it at the post office."[130]

This kind of protest by sending telegrams became very fashionable in the Muslim World. In these days, we witness one more campaign, when another European power (Russia) threatened to invade another Muslim country. The message send by the Iranian parliament to the Ottoman parliament and read during the session on 13th of December 1911, stated that they refused the Russian ultimatum which threatened their independence, and that if refused, the Russian Government wanted to impose its will, by military action. It continued by lamenting:

> "... Our only fault is to be conscious of the obligations of the new way of administration [I.e., constitutional] and the desire to enter in the way of renovation and reform... By appealing to the humanitarian feelings of the Ottoman parliament, we are asking if you want to see the fall of a nation... We seek your help for a solution suitable to the dignity and independence of Iran."[131]

The resemblance of the above petition with the Ottoman complaints related to the Italian attack was striking. On different occasions it was stated that **"While the Ottoman empire aimed to be an element of peace in the world,** to materealise its reforms and progress in civilisation through its new constitutional way, the existence of war would destroy these efforts."[132]

Telegrams from **Calcutta, Bombay, Tabriz** poured to the Ottoman Parliament. They were holding meetings and were blaming the Russian attack on Persian constitution and were asking for help.

The peaceful solution advanced by the Ottoman government contained nothing but concessions to be paid by Iran, for it alos was afraid of irritating Russia.[133]

The Muslim public opinion, unable, to find any solution to the more

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[130] There were also attempts to profit from the war with commercial aims. Kodak company had organised an exhibition of war photographs to prove its material's perfection (**Times,** 7.12.1911). We found also a ticket of a "Lichtbilder-Vortrag" a kind of film or slide show in Berlin, by a certain Otto Cesar Artbaver on the subject of the "War of Tripoli" the 11.3.1912. (See Annexe Ib).

[131] Sitting of 13.12.1911, OP. P.518.

[132] This approach is expressed in the opening speech of the Sultan, in the government's program and in different talks by deputies.

[133] Sitting of 16.12.1911, OP. pp. 544-5.

serious Libyan war, was startled with this new affair and could do nothing better than using the peaceful protestation-telegram method:

> "Calcuta, 21 November
> Muslims deeply stirred details of Italian atrocities view with grave apprehension further humiliation of Islam in Persia appeal to prevent unjust Russian demands and not to wound Muslim feelings unduly when King approaching Indian shores. Signed: Suhrawerdy."[134]

3. DEPENDENCE ON SOURCES OF INFORMATION

The influence of the Western media (polemic and content-wise) on the Eastern media was complete. They were able to drag the Eastern newspapers to any direction they chose, in this manner the Eastern, and in our case Islamic public opinions were easily directed to wherever West wanted it.

The way the big Istanbul-Turkish-press was pushed to a polemic by the Italian press is a very significant example of it. The Turkish press was very cautious on the Libyan problem as it is indicated in the first polemical article of **Tanin** on the subject:[135]

> "If a calm exists, it is because of the Ottoman press not translating articles of the Italian press, and not getting into an argumentation with foreign publications."

But the Italian aggressiveness and nervousness increased and dragged along the Ottoman public opinion, although the Ottoman press was unwilling to participate in the polemics as **Tanin** accepted it five days before the war:

> "The long articles of the Italian papers, and the news spread by the telegraphic agencies have excited and put in turmoil the Ottoman public opinion and has imposed a problem of Trablousgarb on the conscience of the Ottoman Nation."

The spreading of this Italian war-mania through the press and agencies became such that Ottoman press could not prevent falling into the trap. One day before the war **Tanin** condemned "**al those official communications which are creating more doubt, suspicion and uncertainty.**" Those were the communiqués of the Italian side, denying any war plans.

The dependence of the Ottoman press on foreign sources contributed also to that confusion. Five days before the war, news originating from

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[134] FO. 371-1258/46550.

[135] Orhan Kologlu, **Al Maaraka al Sahafi**,..., art. cit. contains extensive information on the subject; **Tanin,** 5.9.1911.

Port Said, reached Istanbul via London.It claimed that two Italian ships were seized at Mersin port by the Turkish authorities. Although it was denied two days later, its contribution to the tension through the Ottoman press could not be neutralised completely.

Another news, concerning the cooperation of the Libyan Sheiks with Italians was also denied two days before the declaration of war. A group of Tripolitanian notables who met in Istanbul under the chairmanship of the ex-Kadi of Trablousgarb, **Sheikh Saleem bin Yacoub Feytouri** sent a telegram of denial to the Sultan, but doubts could not be erased completely.

The Government was even obliged to diffuse a communication through the Ottoman Agency:

> "We are entitled to clarify that the views of some newspapers erroneously considered as official organs, do not represent the views of the Imperial government. As wrong, contradictory and bad intentioned news which is spread through some unserious correspondents cannot always be rectified, the Ottoman Agency invites the readers, to judge such news with care."[136]

The same semi-official **Ottoman Agency** itself, was distributing news coming from the Italian **Stefani Agency,** especially concerning the Libyan war, as the one below:

> "Rome 12 October -Stefani Agency transmits from Tobruk that an Arab Chief arrived at the Pisa warship to submit himself. He promised to make all the efforts to bring the other chiefs to recognise the Italian rule."

How much could the Eastern media save itself from the influence of the Western sources? Or how much were they conscious of their captivity? The problem was posed particularly by the Indian press.

Doubts about the veracity of the news distributed by the **Reuters Agency** was often challenged.

> "No authoritative account of the war is being receive since Italy is suppressing the number of casualties... concerning the treachery of the Arabs we can just characterise it "a thief taking the police officer to task."[137]
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> "We want to question the authenticity of the facts wired regarding Italo-Turkish war as they are emanating from Italian sources while the Turkish government is silent or has given no clue to her real intentions."[138]

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[136] **Levant Herald,** 28.9.1911.
[137] **Bharat Mitra** (Calcutta) 30.10.1911.
[138] **Hablul Matin** (Calcutta) 30.10.1911.

"The fact that Reuters refers to the Turks as enemies is misleading."[139]
"Facts regarding Italian atrocities have also been published in English papers in England, but in India we are countenancing a remarkably silent attitude; of course the same colour prejudice is predominant and so even a copy of these is denied to Indians. The famous couplet of Kipling is being actually fulfilled. The East and West do not see us to meet even in contending against injustice, usurpation, and brigandage."[140]
"The news of 12th January by Reuters has to be controlled from some Arabic sources or papers."[141]
"Reuters news items are untrustable. Messages coming from Rome are always misleading. When 2000 Italians are killed they give out only two."[142]
"Reuters telegram about an attack on a Christian Monastery by a band of Turks seems to be untrue. Those who call themselves civilized, protest against an unjust action only when it concerns the interests of a Christian and that when the interests of Muslims are at stake they never raise any remonstrance."[143]
"Reuters news items are misleading and untrue."[144]
"Reuters reports continuously false news. The object of cabling false news appears to be to dishearten the Muslims throughout the world, so that they should not encourage their coreligionists in Tripoli by congragulating them on their success."[145]

"According to news from Rome, *Anwar* is dead. We don't believe it, as it is not confirmed by Cairo of Istanbul."[146]

The mistrust towards the only quick source of information of India created for the first time the need for a local organiation, an organistaion proper to the Easterners serving the needs of Muslims.

"... it is regretful that no proper arrangements have been made by the Urdu newspapers to publish authentic and the latest accounts of the Italo-Turkish war. We suggest that the proprietors of the papers should form an agency and appoint reporters and correspondents to every part of the world who will send reliable reports concerning affairs in Muslim countries."[147]

The mistrust and refusal of the Western sources ended by recourse to the Eastern sources very late or trusting even the exaggerations they

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[139] **Bharat Mitra** 30.12.1911.
[140] **Muhammedan,** (Madras) 20.11.1911.
[141] **Durbar Gazette** (Bengal) 14.1.1912.
[142] **Durbar Gazette,** 28.12.1911.
[143] **Union Gazette** (Bareilly), 7.2.1912.
[144] **Rohilkhand Gazette** (Bareilly) 16.3.1912.
[145] ibid., 8.5.1912.
[146] **Observer** (Lahore), 27.4.1912; **Bashir,** 30.4.1912.
[147] **Naiyari Azam,** 19.3.1912; article by Mizra Abdullah Beg of Hydarabad.

enjoyed to invent. The news about the total defeat and withdrawl of the Italians from Tripoli, at the beginning of November 1911 is one of them. It was presented with big jubilations:

> "Muslims your heartfelt prayers have at last ascended the heavens. The war has come to an end at last. The Italian warships have left Tripoli and fled away. The proud has had a fall at last."[148]

In spite of all those criticisms the Indian press could not stop falling into the traps tented by the Western media. For example any article by **the Times** was immediately commented upon seriously and propagated throughout India while polemicizing with it.

In February 1912, under the effect of the Italian bombing of Beirut and the Red Sea ports, a news spread all over India concerning the itentions of Italy to bomb and destroy by aeroplanes the Holy Citied of **Mekka** and **Medina** as well as the **Kaaba,** and the bomb of the Prophet. The source of the rumour was a letter of **Nawab Mushtaq Hussain (Nawab Vicar-ul Mulk)** published by the **Aligarh Institute Gazette,**[149] claiming having seen it in **the Times.** Then a discussion started on the veracity of the news. Islamist papers profited from the opportunity to attack the **Times,** the most authoritative newspaper of the Western objectivity:

> "Times [has] the habit of insulting, ridiculing and humiliating orientals. It is ever read to oppose Turkey; while fearless of God it pens inimical nonsense regarding the Shah's dominions... Not long ago, it published the "poisonous" assertion that one drop of the blood of a while soldier was more valuable than the independence of Persia. It has now made even a filthier statement, viz., that if Turkey does not quietly make over Tripoli to Italy, the last named will raze the Kaaba and the Prophet's tomb to the ground."[150]

The discussion took alarming dimensions in the way of criticism towards the British institutions (Administration as well as press).[151] But soon was directed towards an Italian enmity very cleverly. The difficulties which might arise from an attack on Holy Cities and the blockade of the Red Sea became an excuse for propagating the dangers of pilgrimage.[152] It was recommended to renounce it for the time being. Of course it was advantageous for the British Administration to

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[148] **Durbar Gazette,** 4.11.1911; **Nayak** (Bengal) 6.11.1911.

[149] 21.2.1912.

[150] **Zamindar,** 7.3.1912.

[151] **Al Bashir** (Etawah) 2.3.1912; Zulqarnain (Budaun) 28.2.1912; **Al Mushir,** 4.3; **Sahifa** (Bijnor) 5.3; **Agra Akhbar** 7.3; **Muslim Hitaishi** (Bengal) 8.3, **Naiyari Azam** 19.3; **Zamindar,** 28.3.

[152] **Mussalman** 23.2.1912; **Al Bashir,** 27.2 and 9.4; **Mashriq,** 16.4.

diminish the number of pilgrims. Usually this highest yearly meeting of the Muslims was considered by the Western circles as the source of fanaticism against Christianity and Imperialism.

Papers did not suffice by condemning a possible criminal act of Italy, they turned towards the British government as **"The only Muslim power"** for intervention.[153] So the aim was reached: whatever be the source or reason of that discussion, it had ended with the praise and demand of help in the name of the Muslims, from the British government.

An Anti-German campaign based on a false notice by **Reuters** is another interesting example of guided public opinion.,

On the 31st October 1911 **Reuters** reported from Berlin that the German Emperor had given a speech to the missionaries from East Africa, in which he had asked them that **"they must energetically combat Islam, which might be a danger to the colonies."** This news was reported in the 2nd of November issues of Indian **(Civil and Military Gazette)** and Egyptian **(Messaggero Egiziano)** newspapers. On the 3rd November **Civil and Military Gazette** reported again on the basis of a dispatch from London dated 1st November, under the heading **"A Correction"** that the **Kaiser** did not say **"destroy Islam"** but that he **"expressed his conviction that German Missions would not fail to perform their work with similar energy and concord."**

As usual the correction was not noticed -or was not distributed- properly, and a large part of the Islamist media made anti-German comments based on the Reuters report of 31st October.

> "In the event of a war breaking out between Christianity and Islam, the Kaiser will be held responsible for it... Turks must take a lesson from Kaiser's pronouncement and not to regard him as a friend."[154]
> "Islam can not expect anything else from the Christian Kaiser, **no other friend of Islam exists, but England."**[155]

The most interesting of the proposals put forward on this occasion, with the aim of exalting the British friendship, came from an Islamist paper, **Zamindar.** In its issue of 2nd November it reminds that the proposal of giving a warship to Britain as a present had been refused. Pointing out the ambition of the Kaiser to subjugate Islam and knowing the reinforcement of the German navy for that aim, it proposes the presentation of not one but three dreadnoughts to Britain.

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[153] **Mashriq** 27.2.1912; **Observer** (Lahore) 12.3; **Mashriq** 16.4.
[154] **Mashriq,** 7.11.1911; **Civil and Military Gazette,** 2.11; **Durbar Gazette** 1.12.
[155] **Oudh Akhbar** 10.11.1911.

Islamic World was dependent on the Western sources of information not only for receiving news but also for spreading them.

Surely the fatwa issued by a sheikh from the group of Moroccan pilgrims, with the intention of encouraging the candidates to prefer the fighting to the pilgrimage, was an important act. But what we understand from the letter of **Prof. Al Tazi** is that it did not have a very large coverage even in the Islamic world.

4. IMPACT OF THE ORIENTALISTS AND WESTERN MUSLIMS

Another way of influencing the Eastern public opinion used by the Western Circles was the publication of open letters by some prominent Orientalists, or Westerners who embraced Islam. That was one of the trickiest inventions of the Western "**Machinery of Creating Public Opinion.**"

The Islamic mind, which was under the influence of the continuous losses vis-à-vis the West, for more than a century, had always received any news of embracement of Islam by a Christian with a feeling of victory. When an Orientalist made a declaration even on partial perfection or rights of Islam, it was always presented to the Muslim public opinion with the most favourable comments.

The Libyan war gave again the opportunity for such a practice. A letter by a certain **Ernest Yek,** writer at the **Neckar** newspaper of Stuttgart, titled "**Open letter to the Ottoman Muslims**" was published by the **Sirati Mustakim:**[156]

> "The German public opinion is in favour of Turkey, here the Italians and the Roman catholics are called hangmen... Germany is, the only friend of Turkey for long... We know that your soldiers are the best in the world... The wind of Tripoli has swept away all the bad rumours. Even in our churches the Roman catholics are blamed as hangmen. Berlin knew nothing about the attack, it is the British and the French who supported it. All that Germany and Austria are trying to do is to allay the Balkans, while British oppressed 150 and Russia 30 million of Muslims... If Turkey had commissioned the construction of its navy to Germany instead of Britain, it would have had its navy to combat Italy by now... Britain and Italy believe that the Crescent is setting while we Germans we believe that it will soon become full moon."

The **Ikdam** newspaper published in its issue of 25th October 1911, a

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[156] SM, VII/168, pp. 179-180.

letter sent from London by Henry Walpole, who qualified himself as a man who indulged in the Egyptian problem for 25 years:

> "The unfavourable press campaign concerning Egypt is carried on by agents who are working for the interests of Germany and Austria, and they aim to make profits through this means. Some opportunist agents and journalists spread lately the rumour that Britain will incorporate Egypt among its colonies. There is no truth in this. The British state will never deny the rights of the Islamic Caliphate and the Ottoman Sultanate on Egypt, and it is not in favour of violating the rights of the 11 million Egyptians living in the Valley of Nile."

And the **Sabah** publishes on the 5.10.1911 a letter from Christian Cherfils (?) who **"as a friend of Muslims"** communicates his happiness on the decision of the construction of a mosque in Paris, and adds that the victory will be with the Muslims. We can add to that an article by **Jerome et Jean Tharaud** in the **Le Figaro** titled **"Soyons Musulmans!= Let's be Muslims."**

IV- ACHIEVEMENTS

A- IN SPIRITUAL FIELD: TURKISH - ARABIC SOLIDARITY IN LIBYA

1. ITALIAN PRE-WAR ACTIVITIES

Italy's activities to have the Libyan people sympathise with Italians did not have a long past. A detailed survey shows that, in the enthusiasm of a possible success -as the French and British were disliked in the area- every Italian emissary or agent reported that the expectations of the Arabs were directed only towards Italy. The narrow mindedness of those reports and the fact that they dealt mainly with some "sheiks" was the cause of the Italian failure.

A secret Italian report on the Senussis[1] contains detailed information on the activities of Italy to gain the support of the sect. A report of 1906 states that the French and German attempts had failed and that Italy is the only power which enjoys the sympathy of the Senussis. It was claimed that Arabs -and generally all orientals- were accepting Italians as the most civilized nation. Their refusal of the invitation of the Mahdi to participate in its expedition against Italians in **Cassala,** in 1894, was considered as their Italophily.[2]

The enquiry of the Senussi Sheikh in 1902 from the Italian diplomatic agent in Egypt, concerning the particularities of the Italian colonial regime, the dispatch to **Ahmad Shariff** of rich presents from Rome encouraged this feeling. The three letters which **Ahmad Shariff** sent to the Italian King, Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs during summer of 1911 reinforced the belief that Senussis would remain neutral in case of Italo-Turkish conflict.[3] Although they did not mention the Turkish Administration, nor had they any reference to a cooperation with Italy and dealt simply with the reaction of the Senussis to the French aggressiveness, they were taken as a guarantee of siding with Italy. These letters were amply publicised by the Italian media in August 1911.[4]

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[1] Ministero dell Africa Italiana, **La Senussia** (segreto), Rema (1949).
[2] Ibid., p.2.
[3] Ibid., P.9-10.
[4] **Giornale d'Italia,** 6.8.1911; **Messaggero Egiziano** 12.8.1911, Bourbon del Monte Santa

The fact which misguided Italians must have been the reports of their agent in Egypt, **Mohammad Ali Elvi Bey,** who simply transferred the wishes of Ahmad Shariff (nothing but demand of arms, harnesses and books) to Italy and informed him of the considerations on the future regime in Libya (Administration according the Shari'a and Sunna, continuation of the wakufs, respect to religion and mosque etc..). But, to be informed did not mean approval.

On the Tripolitanian area, **Georges Rémond** gives some information on the Italian prewar activities:

> "Italians had worked on the Tripolitanian opinion as skilfully as on the European opinion and profited from both at the favourable moment. The affair was never conducted better and more skilfully. They had 12 chiefs in their service who went to the country side or sent their emissaries praising Italians, criticising the Turks. That was not too difficult since they were handing out money."[5]

Refleeting the statement of an officer, **Youssef Djemal,** who was in Tripoli during the bombardment, he adds that the Italians had bought ten notables of Tripoli to work for the occupation of the city by the Italian army without fighting.

There are even proofs that the Italians had won the support of some Azharite ulema. Abdurrahim Ibrahim Efendi, a Turkish alim who travelled to the Benghazi area through Egypt and spent four months in the war front was witness to such an event;

> "We have to admit that we also have bad people among us. I have seen an alim of Al Azhar who is from the sheikhs of Nakshibandia and was serving the Italian aims and was making the Italian propaganda even within the holy mosque. I have seen and heard him personally. He received his humiliating reply from our loyal brothers. Still these accursed people continue their damned activities."[6]

The Italian press must have been informed by their responsible circles, who were aware of those activities, of the imminence of the Italian success. Barzini wrote from Tripoli:

> "The military situation does not give any preoccupation... We arrive

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Maria, **L'Islamismo e la Confraternita dei Senussi,** Roma 1912, pp. 227-231. The letter contains clear passages of respect for the Ottoman State: "Our sect preach the orders of the Koran... without ever stopping to recommend obedience to the Sublime Porte, for which we are praying day and night by submitting under the protection of its banner.... We are careful towards the French [who are burning and destroying our lands] because of the respect towards the Turkish Government, for not complicating the situation... We expressed this reality to the Sublime Porte [with the aim] that it protest France."

[5] G. Rémond, op. cit., p.47.

[6] SR. I/2, pp. 28-30, 42-50.

here as friends long expected and invited. It can be said that Tripoli has always remained secretly Italian and that Italy has had a place in each heart... It seems that the Turkish regime is as far away as a reminiscene."[7]

Another journalist adds:

"There was a kind of certainty that the expedition will progress very smoothly: few cannonade of the navy, a handful of proclamations, a prayer (Te Deum), some hundred decorations and another colony."[8]

A. De Bosdari, the Italian diplomatic representative in Sofia, trusting his Military Attachés evaluation, believed that the war would last 15 days or 2-3 months at the most.[9]

That was the belief on the **"military promenade".**

2. TACTIC TO SEPARATE ARABS FROM TURKS

Italian tactics for a quick success was based especially on the hope of dividing the Turks and Arabs. By gaining the Arabs on their side they could very easily expel the Turks, who could become a nucleus of resistance.

To name the Ottoman Empire "Turkey" and the rulers "Turks" and not Ottoman, was customary for the Western media for centuries. The Ottoman empire which tried to melt in the "Ottomanism pot" the multi-national structure, was always denied that particularity. Especially during the Libyan war the Western media insisted on the Italian-Turkish" character of the war. Until that time all the wars were aimed at detaching a Christian community from the Ottoman Empire. In the case of Algier, Tunisia and Egypt the temporary character of the occupations had been accentuated. Even discussions on the continuation of the Ottoman sovereignty on those lands had continued.

The Official stand of Italy on this problem is exposed by the publications of the Italian Ministry of War:

"Our preliminary acts have to be decisive: We have to offer immediately the tangible proof of our best intentions and before anything else it is neccessary to make it well understood that we want to keep separte the cause of the natives from that of the Turks, whom we intend to fight only"[10]

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[7] **Corriera Della Sera;** 11.10.1911.

[8] Renato Simoni, 30.10.1911.

[9] A. De Bosdari, **Delle Guerre Balcaniche, della Grande Guerra e di alcuni fatti precedenti ad esse,** Mondadori, Milano 1928, p.70, quoted by P. Maltese, La Terra Promessa..., P.288.

[10] Ministero della Guerra Stato Maggiore del Regio Esercito Ufficio Storico, **Campagna di Libia,** vola 1922, Vol.I, p.67.

Instructions given to **General Trombi** by the end of 1911 include similar considerations:

> "We must not recognise any other enemy but the Turk. The hostilities have been declared against the Turks... That does not mean not to combat with the maximum energy also the Arabs who eventually will fight us together with the Turks; but the Arabs generally must be considered as friends and their cause separated clearly from that of the Turks, whom we consider their oppressors."[11]

For the Italian politics the main target was **"to find means to loosen the union between Arabs and Turks."**[12] Then everything depended on the capacity of convincing the Arabs to that propaganda. In order to achieve this aim Italy had to explain first the reason of her action.

Italian ultimatum to the Ottoman government spoke about the **"exigencies of civiliztion."**[13] General Caneva in his statement to the officers and soldiers who conquered Tripoli reminded that **"they are carrying the Italian civilization."**[14] This theme was repeated on every occasion.[15]

In its article of 2.11.1911 in the **Corriera Della Sera, La Torre** expressed his amazement in front of the European and Austro-German (Italy's allies) press for defending **"Turkish uncivility (= inciviltà) against Italian civilization."**

Caneva himself, when named civil and military commander of Tripoli, issued a declaration in Arabic pointing out that they had not come **"to submit and make slaves the Tripoli and Benghazi people, but to end the reign of Turks."**[16]

The Turks had to go out because **"they in the east, and Berbers in the West, are the destroyers of the Arabic civilization and power"**[13] was the explanation. **"The barbarian rule of Turks"** was a too often used slogan.

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[11] Ibid., Roma 1925, Vol.V, p.100.

[12] Ibid., p.101.

[13] The full text is in the **TCAI,** No. 1, Nov. 1911, P.1.

[14] **TCAI,** pp. 58-59.

[15] The Italian soldiers were called "Carabinieri della Civilta" (**TCAI,** p.49); Djamal Zakariya Kasim, art. cit., p.309 gives details on the propaganda of the humanitarian aims of the Italian action.

[16] TCAI, pp. 59-60; E.E. Evans Pritchard remarks: "Italian propaganda that they were entering Cyrenaica to free the Arabs from the Turkish yoke in the event convinced no one. The Arabs did not feel themselves to be under a yoke. Urban Arab and Sanussi Bedouins might view the Turkish administration with irritation and suspicion, but before the storm, wider loyalties to Islam and the Sultan held them. The Urban Arabs sided with the Turks as soon as news of hostilities reached the interior, the shaikhs of Senusiya lodges and the shaikhs of the tribes flocked amid general enthusiasm to the Turkish standard." (**The Sanussi of Cyrenaica,** Oxford Clarendon Press, 1949, p.172).

[17] **Messaggero Egiziano,** 22/23.1.1912.

Gradually they began to spread news about clashes between Turks and Arabs and even threw Arabic leaflets on the Arab concentration centers by aeroplanes with the title "**Turks, the real killers of the Arabs.**"[18]

The Italian propaganda had its effect less by conviction and more by allocations. **G. Rémond** who was living at the Turkish military camp at **Azizian** was robbed of its notes and purse by an Italian-Arab spy, who delivered it to the correspondent of **la Stampa** in Tripoli and the story was published there. That was surely a very effective show which could influence the European public opinion on how much Arabs were siding with Italians.[19]

Another way of proving the Italo-Arabic cooperation was communications by the local notables. **A. Hairi** gives an illustrating example:

> "One may come accross some pro-Italian literature in which the Turkish rule in Libya was attacked. A good example of this type of writing is a long manifesto, signed by 108 men who were supposed to be Libyan citizens; it was published some time after the Italian invasion. In this manifesto both the Turks and the Italians were equally considered foreigners. However foreigners, the British and the French, who were then ruling Egypt and Tunisia respectively, were praised and the Italians, who were, in their opinion, better than the British and French, were portrayed as having been sent by God."[20]

Details and scope of the Arab participation in the Italian regime is out of our research. We will state only the main lines of it. It is not a secret that as in any occupied country, Italy found voluntary or forced cooperators. In the pages of the official review "**Tripoli e Cirenaica e l'Azione Italiana**" one can find lots of names of the cooperators. Even, before the end of the war by the **Ouchy (Lausanne)** peace treaty, an Arab military battalion was formed out of the local volunteers by Italy, who participated in the attacks of the Italian army against Arabo-Turkish forces.[21] But even the Italians have accepted that this cooperation remained very limited and was only the result of the presence of the Italian army:

> "Those who subjected in Tripoli were those Arab chiefs who could not take refuge in the inside of the country. Efforts to persuade chiefs living in the country by the intermediary of Tripolitanian chiefs did

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[18] **Messaggero Egiziano,** 13.1.1912.

[19] G. Rémond, op. cit., p.55.

[20] Abdul Hadi Hairi, ar. cit., p.375-6, "Min Jama'at al-Tarablusiyin al-Muqimin fil-Madinah Trabulus wa Hawaliha ila Umum ikhwanihim Sakanat al-Watan al-Tarabulusi min al-Bawadi wa-l-Hadar."

[21] Rodolfo Corselli, **La Guerra in Colonia,** Roma 1914, p.683.

not bring any tangible result, but one person. Most of the chiefs did not reply to the letters or verbal invitations sent to them. The others replied in an evasive way... It is only by the death blow of a powerful military or political action that the prestige which the Turks still enjoys could be destroyed."[22]

3. REASONS FOR ITALIAN PROPAGANDA'S EARLY SUCCESSES

The intensive Italian propaganda had its effect in the very early days of the war. The first reason of its success was that it was based on an anti-Turkish propaganda which was already existing all over the Muslim world for decades. **Abd ul Hamid** had been criticised for his Panislamist tendency. But criticism became even sharper when UP rose to power. This time it was their atheism free masonry and nationalism which were exposed with exaggeration.

A Turkish religious man who travelled through Egypt and the Libyan desert during the war, was shocked with the absence of trust by the desert bedouins in Turk's Islamic faith:

> We were not able to convince them of the strength of our Islamic faith even now. The Arab mujaheeds repeat it freely to our face in the military camp: If we knew that you were Muslims we would unite with you long ago and achieve a big success in Africa. Today we have nothing to consider but, union and alliance."[23]

This man was kept for a week in an oasis to check up his faith, and how true a Muslim he was.

The second reason of Italian propaganda's success in short term is the indecision of Istanbul and local administrations as to what to do vis-à-vis the war. That created a real panic among the local people as well as the Ottoman officials. Rumours spread by the Italian mechanism that **"Turkey has sold Libya to Italians."** As we indicated earlier, the communiqué issued by **Anwar Bey** was a reply particularly to that point, and he was trying to convince the mujaheeds that the Ottoman State and the Caliph did not abandon either the Arabs or the Muslims.

Even Italians noticed in a very short time that this propaganda was not to survive for long. Remarks of an Italian eyewitness of the surrender of Benghazi, **G.Gonacci,** the correspondent of **Corriera Della Sera,** proves the sincerity of the feelings of most Turkish officials: (p.137):

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[22] **Campagna di Libia,** Vol.V, pp. 268-9, 275-6.
[23] **SR,** I/2, pp. 28-30, 42-50.

> "On the 20th October soldiers landed and hoisted the Italian flag. The Turkish policemen (Zaptiés) deposited their arms to their superior saying watan is lost and most of them were crying."

On the other hand the choice of some others, especially doctors in Tripoli, to surrender to Italians for being shipped to Istanbul, instead of joining the army at **Aziziah**, could have reinforced that mistrust.

As it is out of our scope to make a search on the particularities of the Libyan people's mentality of that period, we will suffice by relating general observations by a third party:

> "The situation of the Turks for fifteen days was terrible. Arabs were prentending that they had sold Tripolitania to Italians and were refusing not only any help, but also to furnish food and camels. Then as the Ottoman officers organised the first counter attacks. Arabs were convinced that Turks were not traitors and began to cooperate with them. The deputy Sulaiman Baruni and some more religious chiefs started to preach resistance and to enroll volunteers."[24]

The panic and the plunder in Tripoli immediately after the departure of the Turkish forces from the city was encouraged surely by the feeling of being left alone. The indecision of the military commander in not distributing the arms and ammunitions to the people, until he received an order to do so from Istanbul, was too much a disciplinary approach. On the 20th of September 50 notables of Tripoli sent a telegram to Istanbul in which they stated that "**even if the govenment does not have the power to resist, we can protect our country by our own means, if naval and land armaments and food enough for a year are dispatched quickly.**"[25]

It is out of the question that the commander was not aware of this telegram as well as the fact that the people had unloaded ammunitions from the Edirne ship with an exceptional zeal. The strict conformity to the rules — the character of a serious officer who proved his devotion to his profession during the whole year of the war — was possibly intensified by the rumours that they could be used against the Turkish forces. The plunder of mainly the Ottoman official building — but not **Banco di Roma** which had in its safe plenty of money which Italians used after their landing to buy old or newly acquired armaments-proves the existence of an organising mind behind this event, which seems to be rather Italian.

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[24] G. Rémond, op. cit., p.28.

[25] **Sabah,** 21.9.1911; Message of the American consul to the Secretary of State, dated 22.9.1911 contain the mention of "the decision of resisting till the last drop of blood", quoted by Akil Barbir, art. cit., p.204.

A serious military organization could only come from the Turkish officers and soldiers used to such practice. The dislike of the local people and particularly the independent-feeling bedouins towards the disciplinary military applications had in the past created serious difficulties of cooperation. The deputy, **Farhat Bey** was shocked when he saw at **Aziziah** people hoisting the white flag, ready to surrenddr. They were now aware of the past mistakes but were feeling choiceless:

> "They told me: what could be done against a big nation, which is so superior to ours in power. When last year you wanted to establish the military service here, did you not say that in order to resist a regular army, it was necessary to have a regular army? And now we don't have that army."[26]

Furthermore the internal political situation in Istanbul, the change in the government, and the military plans prepared a long time ago were imposing a defence in the country and not on the coast — in conformity with the capacity of the Ottoman army — which could not be exposed to the people, all had helped that atmosphere of panic.

That period of confusion and the stuggle between Arabs and Turkish officers for the organisation of a regular army gave the opportunity to the claim that the Turks were pushing the Arabs to the front line while preserving the lives of the Turkish soldiers. It was amply explected by the Italian propaganda.

4. RE-CREATION OF THE TURKISH-ARABIC SOLIDARITY

This dispute vanished completely with the arrival of Anwar Bey and some more volunteer young officers mostly members of UP. The search for a compromise between the regular army practices and the traditional fighting rules of the tribes started; it was never completed during the war year, but an understanding was created. The role of Anwar Bey could not be denied in that outcome.

> "Amazing Qasides were composed by Arab poets for Anwar Pasha, and nearly every day we received many more... I call him Anwar Pasha and not Bey. That can surprise you, but this is the name given to him by the Arabs and he really merits it because he reached the place in the most puzzled and alarmed period, like Hizir Aleyh-al-salam. His and Fethi's arrivals were miracles. It was a time when nobody knew what was happening. They took up arms there was no

[26] G. Rémond, op. cit., p.47; concerning the reaction and interest of the Libyan people towards "regular military service" see: Al Hashimi Mohammed, "Al hiss al shaabi bi-ahammiya wa-zarura al isti'bad al oskari kabl al gazw al-Itali", Al Shaheed, No.4, 1983, pp. 43-45; also, Ali Mustafa Misarati, "Al Madrasa al-askariyya bi Misarata ayyam al-Jehad", Al Shaheed, No.4, 1983, pp. 73-82.

one to guide them; It was a time when some of our employees were in the mood to leave the country at the mercy of Italians... At such a moment Anwar arrived and succeeded in explaining to them why he had arrived. It is a problem to be able to explain yourself to the Arabs. I myself, although I am an alim, and I know Arabic, took a week to explain to them that I am a Muslim. While he was able to take the command after explaining in two or three hours his faith in Islam... It is a real miracle to convince them in a few hours... He created an army from nothing, and saved the honour and loyalty of our nation in front of the world."[27]

Thus the real role played by Anwar and his young Turk friends has been to recreate the trust between Turks and Arabs on the basis of Islamic solidarity. He mainly, as the gendre of the Caliph, his young officer friends, the deputy's and all those who run from far away lands to Libya, became the tools which created in the minds of the Libyans the feeling that they were not left alone. The fact which contributed most to this trust had been undoubtedly the creation of an economic life, an independent economic entity in the countryside, without depending on the coasts and the ports. A phenomenon which happened assurely very rarely in the history of Libya and which gave the bedouins and the tribes the power of free action.

The number of Arabs killed in the Italian controlled area for having resisted the alien rule or for having **"spied for the Turks"** proves the extent of the Turco-Arab cooperation not only in the univaded areas but also in the directly dangerous area. Disguised and guided by the local people Turkish officers were entering freely in the cities like Tripoli, Benghazi, etc.. American consul and the Times correspondent were witnesses of such exploits.[28]

Nearly two weeks after the start of the real military operations Italian officials accepted the existence of a close cooperation between the Arabs and the Turkish regulars and that they were fighting with determination. Italians began to complain from the disdain with which their **"war of liberation"** was received. After the 25th of October the writer **Bevione** started to confess openly:

> "... Some of the Arabs are against us. Possibly we invited it. We came here without the slightest superficial work on the natives... It is

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[27] **SR,** I/2, pp. 28-30, 42-50.

[28] **Italian Warfare in Tripoli and Moslem Feeling in India,** int. by Frank Mc Cullagh, London, p.16; Italian Ministry of Interior sends continuously messages of warning to the administrators of the cities along the Adriatic coast, and South-Italy against Turkish syp activities. Copies of documents existing at the archives of the Jehad Center in Tripoli, proves the existence of a strong "spionnite" (search of spies everywhere) in the Italian circles.

necessary from now on to be like steel here and in Italy, like the British have been in India, Sudan and Transvaal."[29]

It is a reality that there had been some defections from the Turco-Arab front but it is also a fact that thus formed solidarity could not be destroyed till the end of the First World War, till the final and complete destruction of the Ottoman State. It can even be said that the Jehad declaration of the Senoussis came only, after the real proof of this solidarity was demonstrated on the war front.

This proclamation (January 1912) had a very important impact on the fate of the war and more forces joined the Turco-Arabic side.

The period of confusion which lasted two weeks was followed by the first serious resistance and the joint-actions by the Arabo-Turks in the second half of October. After the arrival of the Young Turkish officers (**Anwar, Fethi, Mustafa Kemal, Halil** etc...) the move for the organisation of a regular army changed the partial cooperation to a solidarity. During this period, Senoussis were in the expectation and in contact with both sides, as a confidant of Ahmad al Shariff expressed it to **al Moayyad:**

"The holyness Sheikh Senoussi is not a man of war. He submits himself to God with all his Ikhwan, and is busy teaching and preaching. All the efforts of the Italian spies in Egypt and Tripoli and Benghazi, to deviate his holyness from his determination and purpose and to incline him towards Italy, will not have any effect on him."[30]

Even by mid-December 1911 the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was hopeful of the neutrality of Ahmad Shariff and sent a letter with proposals of Italian material help. "But the mission failed" according to Italian sources, **"because he was surrounded by Turkish and Egyptian agents, and he decided on the war."**[31]

During that period a very intense discussion was carried in all the Eastern and Western press. Everbody was conscious of the influence it might bring to the problem of Libyan war particularly, and to the Islamic solidarity world over, in general.[32]

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[29] FO. 371-1255/42008, Rodd to Grey, Rome 22.10.1911, reflects the views of the Italian Foreign Ministry; Bevione's statement quoted by P. Maltese, **Terra Promessa...,** P. 152, 183.

[30] **SR,** 1/7, p.128, statement of Sayyed Salikh bin Yunus.

[31] **La Senussia,** Ministero dell'Africa Italiana, p.10.

[32] Bourbon del Monte Santa Maria, **L'Islamismo...,** p.194 ff. contains detailed information on the subject. We can name **Corriera Della Sera** (4.12.1911, 2.1 and 20.1.1912), **Die Zeit, Bourse Egyptienne, Al Ahram** in favor of neutrality; **Echo de Paris** (24.10.1911), **Evening Standard, Al Manar** (XIV/927-929 and XV/109-111), **Al Moayyad, and many German papers on the contrary opinion.**

On the 14th of January 1912, the correspondent of the Ottoman Agency for Tripolitania, informed by a short telegram from Alexandria, that **Ahmad Shariff** has issued a declaration **"to order all Muslims, to be ready for the Jehad al Mokaddas against the enemies of the Sublime Caliphate al Islami, for the sake of the solidarity relation and union in the Islamic World."**

It is striking that **Ahmad Sharif's** declaration mentions only a Jehad against Italy in Africa, while the news indicates all the enemies of the Caliphate.[33]

The fact that the Jehad declaration, which the Ottoman and Caliphal government avoided to declare, was officially declared by the Senoussia sect, had later serious implications; but for the moment it meant the victory of the Islamic solidarist's. In one part of the declaration, the necessity to **"withdraw oneself from the worldly goods and direct one's efforts towards the strength of the Caliphate"** was mentioned with the aim of fighting in the way of God and it emphasises categorically: **"To give up the Jehad means undoubtedly to give up the religion."**

Anwar Pasha in his memoirs mentions how enthusiastic the Arabs got when the declaration reached their camp.[34] It was clear that the failure to divide Arabs and Turks was a deadly blow to the Italian propaganda.

The most striking denial to the Italian charges — above mentioned leaflets stating that Turks being killers and oppressors of Arabs — came out directely from the war front, from two Libyan Arab mujaheeds, who were both deputies in the Ottoman parliament with their telegram of 11th January 1912 from Dehiat, adressed to the Ottoman Press Association and distributed by them to the press, **Suleiman Barouni** deputy of **Djebel Gharbi** and **Farhat**, drputy of **Tripoli** stated:[35]

> "Arabs and their Turkish brothers have read the leaflets. Arabs do not remember atrocities or any bad treatment by the turks and no massacres by them. On the contrary, Italians, who claim to be civilized and humanist, have put to death Arab women and children and destroyed mosques. Arab patriots, who with the help of the Ottoman instructors were able to combat according the rules of the warfare, will continue with their Ottoman brethren to fight against the invaders till their last drop of blood. That behaviour of the local

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[33] **The full text of the declaration in Al Manar** XV/2 pp. 109-111; text in English, Abdul Hadi Hairi, art. cit.

[34] Notes of the 27.1.1912.

[35] **Stamboul,** 15.1.1912.

people, far from being blamed will surely create admiration and approval of the entire world, as it has no other aim but to defent the watan.

Italians repeated the same procedure by distributing leaflets by plane later on. This time their demand of not opposing Italians was supported by some Surah of the Qoran. The reply came again as a refusel on the base of the Surah's from the Holy Qoran.[36]

The result of that propaganda fight was to create an Islamic solidarity not only between Turks and Arabs, but also to fortify the feeling of the Indian Muslims towards the Turks, Arabs and towards the other Muslims in general. It was customary during that period, for the non-Muslim Indian papers to refer jokingly to the Muslim's praying and begging the help of God for the Jujaheeds of Libya, **Bengalee** of the 8th October 1911 remarked:

> "Indian Muslims are feeling sympathy for Turkey and everyday prayers are being offered in mosques for their success, but Providence however is on the side of the big battalion."

Amrita Bazar Patrike was even more harsh in its issue of the 12th October 1911:

> "Europe is watching the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire with complacence and evident satisfaction. Muslims are praying to God, but Allah apparently is in the midst of a long and deep slumber."

On the other hand, the remark of the Islamist paper Zamindar in its issue of the 19th May 1912 summarised the achievement realised by that action in the best way:

> "Some made fun of the Muslims prayers for the mujaheeds, but they forget that they united the Turks and Arabs, and now Muslims are no more influenced by the European and non-Muslim Indian papers."

B- IN MATERIAL FIELD: LIMITED FINANCIAL AID

> "The calls of the Pan Islamists in favour of a Holy war were not totally useless; and, if many foreign Muslims [meaning Muslims under Western rule] did not think necessary to back or take part in the fight, other believers of Islam felt the necessity to come out from their reserve and from that neutrality. So from all the Africa, Dutch and British India and even from China help has been sent to Istanbul and to Tripoli.[37]

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[36] **Al Mu'ayyad,** quoted by **Stamboul,** 27.5.1912.
[37] **Reveil,** 16.11.1911, article by Robert Le Dornois.

The help mentioned here is the financial aid to the expenses of the war. The Ottoman Minister of Finance declared in the parliament, two months after the battle started:

> "The war declared by Italy forces us to some extraordinary expenses. But donations are being sent to us because of the excitement created by this unjust war. This is helping us to such a degree that our expenses resulting from the war is no more a burden to our treasury."[38]

Were these words true and were the donations enough to cover all the war expenses?

Concerning the Egyptian aid, while some praises it in an exaggerated way **(Kusçubasi, Bulca) Anwar Bey** complains from its insufficiency. He indicates cases such as his supposed by monthly allowance was cut suddenly, forcing him to issue paper money signed by him, to cure the scarcity.

Egypt was one of the main sources of financial aid. Immediately with the declaration of war, a campaign to collect money was started. Various newspapers, instigated by groups or famous people, started to collect. At the same time committees were formed in different cities. The enthusiasm of the people was so great that in Mansura "**six thousand golds and hundred thousand guineas were collected in half an hour.**" But the target of 200 thousand lira could not be reached, as it was claimed.[39] After a campaign of three months the "Fund Ottoman" had reached only 78.879 Turkish Lira.[40] After a year **Al Alam** declared that the collection had reached 105.428 Egyptian Liras.[41]

The Egyptian government encouraged donations to neutralize and tranquilize the public opinion and lead the extremists to a peaceful behaviour. On the 14th of October 1911, a leading member of the Khedivial family became the president of the campaign. **Emine Sultan,** the Khedive's mother, was so much active in that campaign that she was called "**Umm al-Muhsinin.**"[42] But all those did not satisfy the needs of the warriors as "**the funds contributed to assist Tripoli have been used only for food, for poor and hospital stores, and that arms and ammunition were strictly prohibited by the committee.**"[43] It is clear that the large part of the collection was used for the organization of the three

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[38] Sitting of 27.11.1911, OP. p.455.
[39] Djamal Zakariya Kasim, art. cit., p.326; O. Kologlu, **Mudhakkarat** pp. 111-112.
[40] **Stamboul,** 5.1.1912; **Messaggero Egiziano,** 10.1.1912.
[41] **SR,** II/36, p.196.
[42] **SR,** I/4, p.70.
[43] FO. 371/1254, Kitchener to Grey, Cairo, 16.10.1911.

Red Crescent missions, and not any big sum reached the warriors directly.[44]

A positive effect of the collection in Egypt was the formation for the first time of women's committees which became very active and which later played an important role in the political of the country. That had been their first experience.

The same eagerness existed also among the Indian Moslems during my stay (1965-6) in Pakistan and the actual Bangladesh. I spoke with old people who recounted how in such collections people were competing to donate — by tearing away — rings, watches, bracelets without caring about the value. The fact that Muslims, unable to participate physically in the fight, were finding that kind of help religiously satisfying and comforting, was stated very clearly in the letters of some prominent Indian people.

El Sheikh Kassem Ben Mohammad of Bombay expressed the satisfaction with which the Muslim businessmen of Bombay noticed the emphasis put by the Islamic world to come to the help of Tripoli fighters and adds that, acting with a religious sentiment he also formed a commission under his own chairman ship, and that the first open subscription had collected 47,676,50 Rupees, which was sent to Istanbul. The second letter signed by **Al Sayed Mahzar,** from Vintigh, states that Muslims of that area regretted not being able to take part personally in the defence of Tripoli. But, it followed, that they would like to despatch for the moment 49.870 Frencs to mujaheeds while praying at the same time in the mosques for the victory of Islam.[45]

The Indian Muslim press of the period is also full of lists of collections in every part of India. In each prayer, in each meeting such exhibitions of solidarity were expressed. That gave the impetus for finding new ways to collect. For example the students of the **Aligarh Muhammedan Anglo-Oriental College,** collected 3800 Rupies by deciding to give up luxurious materials like tea and spices.[46] In Calcutta **"5000 mill hands gave their one week's wages by way of subscription to Red Crescent."**[47] Usually high placed officials, religious leaders or princes became presidents of the commissions. Basically the collection was aiming — as in Egypt — at the **"relief of widows and children of the killed and wounded"** or for organising Red Crescent missions.

Donations for Tripoli warriors reached Istanbul even after October

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[44] **Times,** 22.12.1911.
[45] **Stamboul,** 18.5.1912, from **Al Alam** of Cairo.
[46] **Jadu** (Jaunpur), 23.1.1912.
[47] **Civil and Military Gazette,** 22.11.1911.

1912.[48] But as it was remarked by some publicists, the collected amount never reached high sums.[49] Enthusiasm died out in 1912.

In India and Egypt the collection of money was supported by the colonialists as a "security valve" against an explosion of the public opinion, while in french colonies, every effort was made to discourage it; still that could not stop the enthusiasm of the masses. [concerning Tunisia and Algeria:] [One French Journalist remarks.]

> "Money arrived at the Turco-Arabic camp not only from Turkey but from the whole of Islam. I learned at Kairouan for example, that Muslims of that city have sent considerable quantities of money."[50]

Concerning Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria, **Tuwayr** gives interesting examples of how donations helped the formation of caravans (sometimes of 1500 camels) to reach the warriors from the most difficult roads of the desert. They were very important for the food supply. Quoting an article of the review **Al Afkar** of Tripoli, he describes the activities of **Dr.Ben Jalul, Ali** and **Ahmad Ben Jabbara,** who donated their belongings in Algier to the mujaheedin and thus influenced all the Muslims to donate their jewelry, rings, money, in short whatever they had valuable on them.[51] But they also did not have a follow up.

Sums from every part of the Islamic World reached Istanbul to help the mujaheedins of Tripoli. Mainly, they were the result of one meeting, one collection or one donation and did not have any following. We can name:

Amir of Kuwait (3.000 lira), **Muslims of Porte-Louis** (10.000 Rupies), **Muslims of Rangoon** (3.500 Sterlings) **Abyssinian Muslims** (230 Réaux) **People of Medina** (3.045 Lira), etc...

What is the percentage of these donations in the general war expenses?.. Were they enough to cover all, as it was claimed by the Minister of Finance?

In our opinion the above mentioned declaration may be an appeal for incitement for further donations; but it can not be denied that it does not represent the reality. In the second month of the conflict neither the Ottoman army nor the navy was involved and the existing budget of the Ministry of War was momentarily enough to cover the expenses of individual volunteers. Documents published by **H.Sahillioglu**[52] proves

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[48] Halil Sahilli, art. cit. has many examples.

[49] **Muslim Gazette** (Lucknow) 20.1.1912; **Naiyari Azam** (Moradabad) 9.2.1912.

[50] André Duboscq, op. cit., p.84.

[51] A. Al Tuwayr, art. cit., p.323; Al Afkar, May 1956.

[52] Halil Sahilli, "Wamadat min al wasaik al-Othmaniya havl al fatrat al-ula min al-Jehad al-Libiy, Al-Shaheed", No.3, 1982, p.237-326.

the existence of correspondence between **Anwar** and the Ottoman Ministry of War on the insufficiency of the funds. A document dated 23.8.1328 (No.1) contains the question **"if it is necessary to feed a 100 thousand poor to defend Tripolitania"** and the answer is "Yes" and that the Council of Ministers has allocated 50.000 liras for the needy.[53]

Expenses for the students sent to Turkey and the Libyan immigrants who settled in different parts of the Ottoman State (Beirut, Haifa, Mersin..) also created problems. The first enthusiasm dying, the burden on the Ottoman State grew and the budget of 1912 had some extra taxes for the war expenses. In a research on the subject[54] **M.Al Tuwayr** precises that the Ottoman Government never stopped sending money (and particularly gold coins) to Libya, even at the moment when the Lausanne talks were nearing an accord in September 1912, hundred thirty five thousand liras were allotted for the expenses of the mujaheeds.

He calculates as thousand liras the expenses covered daily by Istanbul, which seems to be a meagre estimate. Mohammad al-Usta, basing his estimation on the documents of the Turkish Archives (Basbakanlik Arsivi) claims a daily expenditure of 4.500 Turkish liras (monthly 135.000) by the Ottoman Government. Half of it was spent at Tripoli front and the other half at Benghazi.

The fact that the expenses of a fighting force of tens of thousands (including their families) had to be very much higher, that the donations — outside the official contribution from Istanbul were representing only a limited part of those expenses is proven also by an interesting remark of **Al Tuwayr,** which confirms our view; he stresses that more than the external contributions, it was by capturing Italian arms and food that mujaheeds were able to satisfy their needs. Many examples of it exist in **Anwar's** and other Turkish officers, diaries.[55]

Cavid Bey Minister of Finance, exposed in a most detailed way, the financial side of the war, in his budget speech of 1914:[56]

> "Although our financial situation was very weak [at the start of the Italian War] the government persisted in fulfilling its duties and we continued the war for a year. And it considered all the precautions

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[53] Ibid., p.239.

[54] Mohammad A. Al Twayr, "Al Awamil al Musaada fi Haraka al Jehad al Libiy 1911-1912", **Buhus wa Dirasat fi al Tarikh al Libiy 1911-1943,** eds. S. Al Suri, H. al Hasnawi, Markaz Dirasat Jehad al Libiy, Tripoli, 1984, Vol. II, pp. 319-320.

[55] Anwar Pasha, **Mudhakkarat,..,** op. cit., and Orhan Kologlu, **Mudhakkarat al Dubbat...,** op. cit.; Tuwayr, art. cit., p.326.

[56] 25th Sitting of the Parliament, 18. June. 1330 (1914), OP. p. 430 Declaration of the Ministre of Finance.

and financial measures for continuing the war for some more years. Short term credits of the early days were not enough. The creation of a War Tax as a permanent income permitted us to continue the war for the years to come.

The results proved that our estimate on the War Tax was really on the minimum collection. The 1.3 million liras in taxes is what we collect even today, after having lost the Balkan provinces. Not only the war, but also the internal clashes (like the Albanian uprising) drag our finances to the bankruptcy.

It was at the beginning of the third month of the war that my predecessor, Nail Bey, unable to contract a general loan, was forced to seek short term credits. The agreement with **Milli Banka** for a year of 1.5 million Sterling Pounds with 7% interest, could not be reimbursed within the time limit, as the Balkan War broke out in that period. The interest was increased to 9%. For the local expenditures of Trablousgharb and Benghazi 130-140 thousand liras were sent monthly. The expenses brought about internally because of the war are not included in that amount. The deal with the Milli Banka was enough only to cover the expenses of the state for a few months. By the end of this period, the need for a new loan was felt. A selective loan agreement was contracted with the Ottoman Bank, amounting to 7 millions liras. But it never became definitive. The amount, which the government would get hold of, was received in different dates, as Treasury Bond's. To cover the loan, a financial accord for 25 million francs and 400 Sterling pounds was contrated by Nail Bey. A month later I myself contracted again with the Ottoman Bank, a second credit for 22 million francs and 272 thousand sterling pounds. For the refunding in one or two years, the main amount and the interests, we were obliged to produce funds of very high quantities. The yearly equivalent of the two financail accords reached nearly a million liras. Soon we were in need of a third credit. Our government fell down, at the moment when all its formalities were completed. The new Government of Muhtar Pasha finalised it. The amount of the deal reached 1 million 250 thousand liras... If we add to those loans concluded to cover the war expenses the other credits and loans, one may understand in what state our finances were. Just at that moment, we were attacked by the Balkan States."

"The loan of 22 million liras concluded in 1914, was meant to consolidate the floating debt reaching 33 million liras, the result of the loan and credits received from some local and foreign banks and foreign companies, to cover expenses of the wars of Trablousgharb and Balkan."[57]

All this proves that the donations did not cure at all the financial scarcity of the Ottoman Empire.

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[57] Seyfettin Gursel, "Osmanli Dis Borçlari", **Tanzimat'tan Gumhuriyet'e Turkiye Ansiklopedisi,** p. 685.

V- THE REALITY

A- THE SPREADING OF PANIC

To gain the support of the Western public opinions, the Italian propaganda spread the news of atrocities by Turks. That was a classical weapon used too much against the Turks. "Christians massacred by the Turks" was a pill very easily digested by any Western public opinion. But it had to be supported by some facts. Alexandria riots had created a fear and nervousness amont the Italians and Christians.[1] Every move in that direction would be to the advantage of the Italians.

The spreading through Beirut media, by **"a special service from Alexandria"** of Turkey's desire of invading Greece (with an army of 600 thousand), while the Italian war was in its first months and at its most fierce phase, could be explained by that aim.[2] At an interview with an Ottoman Armenian, an Italian journalist's first questions was **"does a danger of massacre exist for Europeans in Constantinople."** The reply was not very satisfactory for the Italians as he said that **"the government will not permit it".**[3]

For the anti-Turk and anti-Muslim press it was a good opportunity for provoking the public opinion. **"According to the Central News Agency, wrote Le Figaro, agents of the UP are arming Muslims of Izmir secretly. Christians fear a massacre and the consuls of European powers** who are aware of what is happening, have immediately informed their governments."[4]

Was it right? Did a danger of massacre really exist and did the consuls really warn their governments of such a danger?

Reports by the British consuls all over the Ottoman lands show just the opposite:[5]

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[1] Kitchener to Grey, Cairo 22.11.1911, FO. 371-1258/46661.
[2] **Reveil,** 10 and 21.10.1911; **Lissan al-Hal,** 19.10.1911.
[3] **Messaggero Egiziano,** 23.3.1912.
[4] 17.10.1911.
[5] All from the FO. 371-1254: Monastir, 4.10; Prevesa, 30.9; Skopije, 9.10; Scutari, 9.10; Damascus. 17.10: Jerusalem, 6.10: the same is reported by the American consul in Tripoli (1.10.1911): "It does not exist an enmity towards the foreigners", quoted by Akil Barbir, art. cit.

Monastir: "There is no sign of fanaticism on the part of Muslims towards the Christian population... The Turkish government has confirmed the instructions from the Ministry of Interior that the populace should remain calm and respect the rights of all foreigners, including Italians, in the country..."
Prevesa: "The Italian navy bombed the Turkish destroyer Tokad which run aground... Many Muslims have been armed and were wandering in the streets of the city... This morning the declaration of war was announced by public criers, with assurances for the tranquillity of the population by the government which adopted the necessary measures... Tranquillity reigns all over..."
Skopje: ".. the outbreak of war was received by the population of this vilayet with calmn, no demonstrations of any kind were made against the Italian consulate..."
Scutari (Albania): "Authorities and the population of Scutari kept till now a very correct attitude towards Italians... and I am convinced that no hostile demonstration may take place unless central authorities decide for it..."
Damascus: "Allegations of molestation of Italians are entirely false..."
Jerusalem: "The news of declaration of war reached here on the 30th, it is quiet everwhere..."
Erzerum: ".. news of the war reached here while the deputies were explaining to the people what was achieved at the parliament during the last session. There was a big excitement... Nothing happened.. The governor stated that if the Italian subjects desire so he can secure their protection here; if they ask for it, he would send them to the border under guard..."

Reports from Salonica, Istanbul and some other places which we mentioned earlier confirm the same: It was quiet all over. Another observation which comes to the notice by the study of those reports is that the sources of massacre news were infallibly Italian. In some very rare cases British consuls were dupes of such propaganda and not surprisingly it happened in Libya. On the 21 October 1911 the Consul General of Tripoli informed the Foreign Office that **"rumours are circulating that all Europeans, clergy men and Maltese of Benghazi have been massacred."**[6] The consul **F.Jones** of Benghazi already informed London of that possibility on the 29th September 1911:

> "I have the honour to report that on the 27th instant I was informed by four members of the Maltese community here, that a strong anti-European felling had been aroused among the native Muslims in consequence of the rumoured impending occupation of the city by Italian troops. It was added that the local authorities yielding to the

[6] J. Alvarez to Grey, FO. 371-1254/42540.

popular clamour, had given orders for the effects of the new Italian Consul, who had just arrived, to be opened at the custom house and be examined with the result that thirty-three Mauser rifles were found, as well as a large quantity of cartridges. But in this connection I have the honour to add that according to information received from various sources the number of rifles so found did not exceed half a dozen and it would seem that the first report as to the quantity of cartridges was also exaggerated.
Subsequently word was brought that the natives were out of hand and it was feared that at any moment an indiscriminate massacre of the Christians might begin and several persons came to the Consulate to ask for shelter and protection. ....
Yesterday, I was assured that several of the Italian residents here had gathered at the house of the dragoman of the Italian Consulate adjoining this house, with the intention of taking refuge here in the event of an anti-Italian outbreak."[7]

In spite of this prudence the consul must have been influenced too much by the excitement to transmit such feelings nevertheless at the end of his report he asserts that everything is absolutely calm:

"I have the honour to add that as far as I am aware, there has been no case of serious assault upon any Christian as yet though in one or two cases British subjects have complained of having been annoyed in the streets. I fear it must be admitted, however, that the appearance of an Italian vessel of war might bring about a change greatly to the disadvantage of the Europeans here."

Like everywhere else nothing has happened at Benghazi either. We even have an Italian witness, the correspondent of **Corriere Della Sera,** who reached Benghazi on the 27th September and stayed at the British Consulate, until the Italian occupation three weeks later. We can follow all the events from his book:[8]

— "Priests of the catholic convent tell me that the Mutasarrif Murad Fuad Bey has assured them that there will be no molestation and have added that he assumed the responsibility of their integrity during the whole period... But could it not be possible that the people force even the Mutasarrif to some deplorable excess..." (p.41-42)
— "We know that the bedouins are fierce and fanatic and are armed

[7] FO. 371-1254:40530.
[8] Guiliano Bonacci, **Gli Ultimi Giorni di Bengasi Turca,** Roma 1912; The concordance of the Bonacci's observations with the British Consul's remarks in his report dated 24.10.1911 from Benghazi to Grey, is striking:
"In closing this report I venture again most respectfully to submit that the Turkish authorities, notably the Mutesarrif Murad Fuad Bey and the chief of the gendarmerie, Mehmed Khairi Bey deserve the heartfelt gratitude of the non-Muslim residents of this town for their vigilant core of the safety of all during the anxious time that has passed." (FO. 371-1256/44329).

up to their teeth... On the 2nd October the Mutasarrif ordered Christian shops to be closed. Zaptiés [police] are patrolling in the streets, there is no disorder, everything is calm." (p.44)
— "4th October. It is rumoured in the city that Tripoli was bombarded by the Italian Navy... I went to the convent, everybody talks about the bombardment but the real situation is unknown." (p.55)
— "6th October. everything is calm." (p.64)
— "8th October. Everything is calm. Two passengers of a ship brought the news of the occupation of Tripoli by Italians... Hundred armed bedouins are wandering in the streets of the city.." (p.67)
— "10th October. Armed bedouins are in the city... Mutasarrif has placarded in front of the Telegraph-house in the center of the city, a telegram which purports the occupation of Massua by the Turks.... [This victory] electrified the people and they celebrated it by shooting, in the air... Everything is quiet... Mutasarrif informed the Consul [British] that those were celebrations of the victory and that he must not worry at all..." (pp.70-73)
— "12th October. Everything is quiet." (p.73).

— "13th October. It was the birth anniversary of the Sultan Mehmed Rechad. The city was illuminated. Groups of children run in the streets of the city singing songs: Al Arab Jonzur Sultan al Italian = God destroy the Sultan of the Italians." (p.73)
"16th October. Calm complete.
"18th October. Italian navy anchored in front of the port of Benghazi and sent an ultimatum.
"20th October. Italian soldiers landed and hoisted their flag. Turkish zaptiès delivered their arms by saying "Fatherland is lost", most of them are crying." (p.137)

For a while even the international press fell in the "massacre" trap but soon it was realized:

> "Notwithstanding the news published by the foreign press... The calm of the Muslim element is obvious."[10]

The game of "**massacre rumours**" was played in some other cases also by the Italians. On the 16th October 1911, The British ambassador in Istanbul writes to Grey, concerning the rumours of the murder of Italians working on the Hedjaz Railway:

> "... [this is] declared absolutely false by Minister of Foreign Affairs, who states that it was circulated by Mr.Tittoni in Paris... Rumour [is also] declared entirely without foundation by consul at Jeddah."[11]

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[9] Sic.
[10] **Figaro,** 8.10.1911, from Salonica.
[11] FO. 371-1254/40792.

Later on it was even rumoured that the Italian prisoners were murdered and tortured by the Turks. That was denied directly by a letter signed by five Italian soldiers, enclosed in a letter of Nechat Bey, commander of Tripolitania front, praising the friendly behaviour of their captors. Those letters were also published by **Corriere dela Sera.**[12]

"Massacre stories" did not create the desired effect: panic of and repulsion towards the Turks in the European public opinion.

Per contre the tactic to create a panic among Ottomans by way of disturbing them by bombings had a more effective result. The sign was given by **Andrea Torre** in **Corriere Della Sera** before the end of October 1911, when responsible Italian understand that the resistance in Libya will be stronger and longer than they expected. He reminded that a complication in the Balkand could be very dangerous for Turkey and that Sublime Porte has to consider the peace.[13] A report by the British representative in Sofia shows how much that was an organised trick:

> "The Italian Minister in Sofia, Count Bosdari, has been named the chief agent to collect information about the Ottoman State... His letters arrive through the Austrian post. An Italian secretary in Istanbul, is in contact everyday with the German Ambassador... Six levantine Italians work under the orders of Bosdari... A few days ago Count Bosdari informed me that trouble had been expected in the Balkans by his Government, and that they hoped to profit by it."[14]

Although a secret agreement existed between Austria and Italy, which engaged both countries to cooperate for the autonomy of Albania **"in case Turkey withdraws",**[15] Austria was particularly attentive to any single-handed act by Italy. Its warnings prevented Italy from playing too openly on the Balkan Trump. On the other hand the decisive result was obtained later on by the events is the Balkans.

It was not a coincidence that the first attack by the Italian navy was directed to the Albanian coast. That happened even before the declaration of war.[16] That and the following attacks on **Singin** had two aims: To provide the security of the Italian homeland against any attack by the Turkish navy. And secondly to oblige the Turkish forces in the Balkans to stick to their positions as if an Italian attack might be

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[12] **Stamboul,** 2.2.1912; the letter of Nechat Bey was dated 18.1.1912.
[13] Paolo Maltese, op. cit., p.145.
[14] Sir Bax-Ironside to Grey, Sofia 27.10.1911, FO. 371-1254/42450.
[15] Eugenio Passamonti, **Negoziati Mediterranei... etc,** 1941, p.190.
[16] Genel Kurmay, Osmanli Italyan Harbi, Ankara 1981, contains ample information on it; also Genel Kurmay, **Harp Mintakalari... bombardiman tarihleri,** Ankara 1937; Before the bombardment of Tripoli four places have been bombed, of which three were in the Albanian coast: Preveza (29.9), Gomenitza (Resadiye) (30.9), Singin, (3.10).

directed there any moment; thus securing the back of the Italian forces proceeding towards Libya.[17] The importance of disturbances in Balkans has to be judged according to the fact that the largest of the Ottoman armies (The Second Army) with its headquarters in Salonica, could thus be paralysed and immobilised. Only in Albania the number of the Ottoman soldiers reached 70-80 thousand.

The already existing nationalist-autonomist current was followed with sympathy in Italy and "unofficial help" through volunteers and activities of the catholic priests reached the insurgents regularly. On the other hand the Italian official circles were making all the efforts to prove "innocent" of such a cooperation. But, even the Albanian deputies in the Ottoman Parliament claimed that the revolt was instigated and financed by Italy.[18] News about the expedition of four thousand rifles from Italy to the Albanian revolutionaries was circulating also among the diplomats at the Montenegro's capital.[19]

Italy was not able to create in the Balkans the panic it needed, but contributed immensely to the destabilisation of the area by volunteers, clergymen and through Montenegro (The king who was the father-in-law of the Italian King) and used the uneasiness as an element of blackmail towards the Ottoman State to find a solution (peace) to its unsuccessful campaign in Libya.

The real trump which Italy had and which it used effectively to reach its aims has been the spread of the fear of bombardments on the coasts. The number of bombings were comparatively high; 13 places on the Anatolian and Syrian coasts were bombed 16 times, and 9 placed on the Red Sea 17 times.[20] And the effect was impressive.

First, appeared the news of the transfer of the war to the Aegean and the invasion of some islands, in newspapers like **Giornale d'Italia, Corriera d'Italia** etc...[21] The subject of how to threaten the Ottoman Empire in some other places than Libya was seriously discussed in Italy.[22] Also the Italian chief-agent in the Balkans, **Bosdari,** proposed in his above mentioned report to lean towards the Aegean. Then all the Ottoman coasts were considered.

W.I.Shorrock points out numerous frigid confrontations between French foreign minister poinczré and the Italian ambassador because of

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17 Genel Kurmay, **Osmanli Italyan Harbi,** p.126.
18 Sitting of 8.7.1912 by Sahin Dino.
19 Count de Salis to Grey, Cettinjé 9.10.1911, FO. 371-1254/40607.
20 Genel Kurmay, Harp Mintakalari..., pp. 5-7.
21 P. Maltese, op. cit., p.145.
22 Gaetano Mosca, **Italia e Libia,** Milano 1912, p.99.

France's decision to send warships to the Syrian waters to protect French subjects, also **"her traditional clientéle"**, the Francophile Christians of Lebanon.[23] The French move would prevent any panic, and could be a security against any local clash between Muslims and Christians. Italian irritation by such a positive move can be explained only by the desire of the countrary.

Everybody knew that Beirut-Mont Liban area was more receptive to any tension between Muslims and Christians. Also public opinion was more dynamic.[24] For centuries local elements were fighting with each other (Maronites, Duruzes, Bedouins etc..) if they did not fight with the Ottoman government. It must not be a coincidence that immediately after the Alexandria demonstrations Beirut and Lebanon were put into a real panic by the news of the possible bombing of all the ports of Syria. The creator of that news must be a connisseur of how a public opinion was directed towards an internal clash. We report fully the letter of the British Consul in Beirut to the British ambassador in Istanbul, who transferred it to the Foreign Office:

> ".. On the 4th of November, a telegram arrived from 12 Syrian gentlemen in Cairo on behalf of Syrians and Lebanese in Egypt as follows: The enemy menaces the coast of Syria. All Ottomans expect their brave brethern of Syria and Mont Lebanon to unite for the defence of the honour of the government and of the country in a manner worthy of their well known courage and earn the gratitude of their brethern of Tripoli.
>
> The signatures on this telegram belonged to all sects. On the 5th instant the Arabic newspaper Al-Moufid reproduced this telegram in a special supplement which was widely distributed. It also added that the local authorities were ready to distribute arms to those who wanted them, and it recommended to Muslims to remove their families to a safe distance from the town. The acting Vali, General Hashim Pasha, refused to supply arms and published a notice to the effect that there was no official confirmation of the news, and calling upon the inhabitants to remain quiet, as the government was prepared to defend the town, but if they wanted their assistance they would call for it.
>
> This alarming news coming at a moment when the Muslims were jubilant over the exaggerated reports on Italian reverses in Tripoli, tended to create a general panic among Christians as well as Muslims, each fearling reprisals from the other.
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> Chief of police Husnu Bey undertook the responsibility of

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[23] W. I. Shorrock, op. cit., p.79.

[24] Ghassan Twayni, "Dawr al rai al am fi al nahda al arabiyya", **Al Abhas,** III/3, septembre 1950, pp. 341-354, contains an interesting review in the public opinion sensitivity in Lebanon since the 19th century.

maintaining order with the additional help of 250 soldiers whom the general placed under his orders, and up to the present he had succeeded in preventing any molestation of native Christians or foreigners... [after giving details on the departure of hundreds of families from Beirut paying 4 to 5 times the usual transport fees and the five particular trains which left for Damascus, he follows] telegrams were received welcoming their brothers to whom they offered protection and hospitality whatever might be the creed they belonged to and expressing a readiness to come to Beirut and help them to fight the enemy. The nervousness all around was so great that the local authorities prepared to place their archives in the Ottoman Bank. Muslim pupils were withdrawn from the foreign schools and French cruiser "Jules Ferry", which was under orders to sail for Tripoli (Syria), was retained here till yesterday morning by which time comparative calm had been restored."[25]

The great excitement was also transferred to the Ottoman parliament by an inflammatory telegram:

> "Agencies spread the news that Itlay intends to send naval forces to the Syrian coast to force Turkey to give up Tripoli People are in a big excitement, instead of losing one single bit of land from Tripoli they rather prefer to be buried under the ruins of the city and ask to be armed. Anybody at the age of carrying arms will do his duties completely."[26]

The Minister of Interior sent a telegram to the Government to reassure the people, which also was published by the local papers.[27] But the tension increased by that news. The British consul in his report warned:

> "The situation has not been improved by the reports of alleged Italian cruelties perpetrated in Tripoli, and it is feared that Muslims may retaliate on Italian subjects."

The report continued with details on the **"general uneasiness on the part of Christians"** in all Syria, although it accepts that there was no trouble.

It took few weeks to be convinced that all those were just "rumours":

> "The panic which reigned during the last period because of the news announcing the bombardment of Beirut by the Italian navy, vanished for good. Many families which took refuge in the Mount-Lebanon returned to the city... The press has regained its usual tone and the newpaper criers are no more as excited as before. Dispatches which

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[25] Lowther to Grey, 18.11.1911, FO. 371-1258/47158.
[26] Sitting of 6.11.1911, OP. p.190.
[27] **Reveil**, 7.11.1911.

arrive here do not attract anymore the attention of the public and seem to have lost their importance."[28]

The effect of the rumours reached such a level that a fire watcher in Izmir even dreamed of having seen an enormous bird which he thought to be an Italian aeroplane.[29]

Of course rumours about Italian navy were more often circulating:

"The governor of the Archipelago (Aegean Sea) has issued the following manifesto:
Bad intentioned rumours of a nature to excite the spirits are spread on the subject of the arrival of the Italian fleet at the waters of the Archipelago to attack the islands. If agaist any expectation the enemy fleet reaches here, it is natural that necessary measures will be taken by the government. But as the bombardment of the islands by the enemy fleet is excluded even if it reaches and people must not pay any attention to those rumours and continue with their business."[30]

The simple collision of a lighter with one of the legs of the Istanbul bridge, was interpreted at Pera (The European quarter) as the existence of bombs under the bridge, and that troubles were imminent in Istanbul. **Sabah** newspaper remarked:

"All those rumours are nothing but some canards circulated by some people with fertile imagination. The fact that police agents rushed to the bridge to see if there was any serious damage after the collision, was interpreted by everyone in their own way and through word of mouth it ended by the spread of the claim of a bomb plot."[31]

From than on Italy never ceased to bomb Turkish ports and spread news of landing forces in one or an other corner of Ottoman lands, and kept alive that feeling of panic and incapacity of the Ottoman navy to prevent them. A media which was already bitter about the "**powerlessness of the Ottoman state during the loss of Cyprus, Egypy Bosnia, Roumelia, Crete and now Tripoli**" was calling as dreams, any claim of success and future actions.[32] three days after the reading of the telegram from Beirut at the parliament, a deputy was warning from the chair:

"It is rumoured that Italy, after Tripoli, will bomb the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean coasts. Are we waiting for the enemy to arrive at the gates of Istanbul?"[33]

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[28] **Liberté,** 1.12.1911.
[29] **Liberté,** 10.11.1911.
[30] **Liberté,** 27.11.1911.
[31] **Liberté,** 15.12.1911.
[32] **Reveil,** 30.9.1911.
[33] Vartkes (Erzurum) on the sitting of 9.11.1911, OP. p.245.

Two months later another deputy, as known Arab nationalist, **'Abd al Hamid Zahrawi,** summarized again in the parliament that feeling of panic:

> "The powerlessness of the State is obvious in that affair. That State was able to send neither army nor food. Do you listen carefully? when that State acts so helpless, nations and communities which are its subjects loses their hopes. Everybody has to understand that. it has to be declared openly: Tripoli is being lost today. Who can guarantee that we will not lose tomorrow our Syria, our Hedjaz, our Iraq?"[34]

In his very long speech he warned that this **"poor and inactive nation is on the verge of disappearance".**

Such an anxiety was common in Syria and Lebanon. The Beirut paper **Al Rai-ul Am** in an article reminded the end of Andalusia, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia and all those powerful empires and the role of the people who contributed to their collapse.[35] Many of the local papers published news concerning the possible annexation of the Syria to Egypt or of its occupation by a foreign power; polemics on the subject during January 1912 were very often filling the columns of the papers. The **Al Sabatt** newspaper reflected the general feeling as follows:

> "It will be more opportune to fight the internal enemy, the real one, than to call on the people to get ready to expel an imaginary external enemy... The state of demoralisation, anxiety and fear has reached such a stage that some are thinking of organising a committee for national defense... It is curious to note that the government cannot demand any more which is of interest from the military angle, without having the commentators deducing thousand suppositions; and the consuls of the powers cannot make a step in the country without inflaming in the imagination of the people of a complot; and a foreign warship cannot appear at the horizon without exciting the minds to suppose the happening of a great event, like the occupation of the country by a foreign power as the minimal alternative.."[36]

The real bombardment of Beirut came out at the end of February 1912, but the fear was always kept alive during that period. It had a deep effect on the Syrian-Lebanese and Egyptian Arabs, and on the future events of the area. This is why it is important to study the facts and their reflections on the public opinion in the area.

The 24th of February 1912, Italian warships **bombed** the Beirut port and sank two Ottoman warships, Avnullah and Ankara. They sent an

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[34] Sitting of 9.1.1912, OP. p.714.
[35] 25.1.1912.
[36] 14.1.1912.

ultimatum to the governor, but started the bombardment. without waiting for the reply. 95 persons (55 military men, 35 civilians and 5 policemen) lost their lives and some hundred were wounded. Many buildings were destroyed. A panic ensued and ruffians attacked military stores, wherefrom 1080 rifles and 90 boxes of ammunitions were stolen. They raided also the prison. Some big shops were plundered. Nearly the same which happened after the bombardment of Tripoli was repeated. Ten persons died during the riots, two of them presumed to be Italians were killed.[37]

Martial law was immediately declared, precautions were taken for the security of the people and the calm restored quickly. The governor himself, accompanied by zaptiés and public criers inspected the streets of the city and assured the people that eveything was under control. But the chain phenomenon of rumour and panic had already started to work. Although martial law authorities announced their determination to suspend the newspapers which would excite the spirits, it could not stop the publication of the following news.

> "Druzes of Djebel Hamel attempted to attack the tribes who are their enemies, when they heard about the bombardment... In Damascus, Safed, Acré, Baalbek, Tripoli, Aleppo, Hauran, Hama, Homs and in all of Syria, citizens were ready to rise for the defence of the country... Untrust worthy news still spread in the city and creates a big disquiet particularly concerning a new bombardment of the ports. ... in order not to irritate the people, the traditional gun salute is omitted during the mawlid (Prophet's birthday) ceremonies..."[38]
> "The most absurb and fantastical news concerning what will happen in Beirut, in Syria etc... this evening, tomorrow morning or the next day, the next week is spreading unceasingly in Beirut. Even though nobody knows anything, eveybody supplies information about the affairs... The excitement reached also Aleppo, where a very strict security service and patrol system are organised."[39]

The newspaper **Al Raouy,** published in Damascus, presented the Beirut bombardment in its issue of 17.2.1327 No.177, in such an exciting way against the government, that it was suspended by the order of the martial law.

In April 1912, nearly two months after the event, the panic was still the main subject of the Syrian littoral,and Italians made everything to keep it alive. A letter sent from Tripoli to Syria depicts that state of sprit very vividly:

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[37] **Reveil,** 27.2.1912.
[38] **Reveil,** 2.3.1912.
[39] **Reveil,** 7,3.1912.

"Yesterday afternoon, a high black smoke was noticed on the sea in the direction of Cyprus. Very soon the silhouette of a ship became clearer. It was undoubtedly a frigate; but what nationality?
Accustomed for many months to the unpleasant surprises of the Italians on the different coasts of the Ottoman Empire, we were expecting to see the enemy appear one of these days. The intrigued population crowded the quays; in few minutes they were full of people; with binoculars it was possible to distinguish the three colours: red, white, green. It was really Italy, and the flag was hoisted not to the back as in the time of peace but on the front: that was sign of war.
It stopped at a distance of one kilometer and half from the port. On the shore, the number of people increased. In the city shops were closed and anxiety became widespread: What will happen?
Guns were directed towards the city, ready to explode.
The crew all on the deck seemed to be ready for action.
Rumours and anxiety grew in the city. Families quit their houses to take refuge in the gardens. Different consuls were active, and tried to assure the people that nothing would happen; but nobody listened to them.
At last around three O'clock, after having stationed for an hour, just the time enough to check out the situation, the frigate returned back and disappeared without any demonstration. The initial fear is appeased but not fully, it is rumoured: they simulate to disappear but will return later during the night.
Everybody returns home happy that it is over with fear this time. Will the Italian warships come back? Who knows. And if they reappear will they dare to bomb a defenseless city? Who would know? Those Italians are so exasperated with their failure in Tripoli that they can do anything."[40]

By bombing they could attain no military results other than the revival of the feeling of panic. The fact that Italians were interested only in the propaganda field is proven by the denial — official denial — of the bombing, by the semi official Italian newspaper of Egypt, **Messaggero Egiziano.** In its 26/27 February, 1912 issue, two days after the attack, the newspaper declares in big capital letters occupying the whole headline:

"Il Bombardemento della Città di Beyruth éuna menzogna = The bombardment of the city of Beirut is a lie."

It contains an official denial as well as a leader article about that denial the next day. On the 29th, the attack is confirmed and it is stated that the powers will not protest for "armed event" of Beirut. The first of

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[40] **Reveil,** 30.3.1912.

March issue states that the attack was directed at the Turkish military ship only, that the city was not bombed, that the damage was caused by the explosion of the Turkish ammunition and that those dead or wounded are the result of the panic and disorder created by the armed people who ran freely in the city.

This proves clearly the lack of any military aims of the bombardment. But the effect which it could have created on the Christian public opinion of Egypt must have been minimised and that was what **Messaggero Egiziano** was trying to tempert. Italy did not care much about the Islamic public opinion in Egypt, but was apprehensive towards others. An important Lebanese-Syrian minority was living in Egypt. When the Muslim reaction came out by condemning Italy for directing a crusade against Muslims, Beirut's Christian papers supported it with a modification:

> "Can it still be called a Crusade when the **Italian** bombs did not make any differentiation of Muslims and Christians Let's be simply Ottoman without distinction of religions or race."[41]

Italy by this act was spreading the panic on the Ottoman lands but was losing the support of the Christians at the same time; though it needed desperately the Egyptian support and neutrality. Indeed a little later it would be Egypt which welcomed the Italians expelled from Beirut, Aleppo, Damascus and Jerusalem.[42]

Immediately after the Beirut bombardment telegrams started pouring from all along the Mediterranean and Aegean ports. For example it was reported from Izmir, that **"Italian military ships being noticed at large, it was concluded that a landing was under consideration; people took precautions against such a possibility, a milice of volunteers was formed, the ships anchored at the entrance of the port were prepared for sinking, to block it."**[43]

By bombing distant places or by simply showing their ships, Italians were helping the imaginations which were already very active in the spread of rumours. For example the claim of the bombing of Dardanelled started a month before it really happened (18.4.1912). Early denials of the Ottoman government was contradicted by the bombardment itself. Rectifications by the Sublime Porte served nothing but the further propagation of false rumours and of panic. The communiqué of the Ministry of Interior issued after the Beirut affair shows the great sensitivity on the subject:

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[41] **Reveil,** 2.3.1912.
[42] **Reveil,** 9.3.1912.
[43] **Reveil,** 5.3.1912.

"As it is decided by the govenment to resist the enemy until the last moment, in accordance with the instructions already issued, it is necessary to invite the civil functionaries of the littoral to prove the enthusiasm and courage of the Ottoman Nation.
It is time for every Ottoman to conserve the union in front of the enemy; the slightest disorder is strictly forbidden. If the smallest event of that kind happens, it is necessary to inform us immediately so that the martial law could be declared there immediately."[44]

The decision to bomb the Red Sea ports was not a military aim only - Supporting Idriss- but to combat the Turkish propaganda also which preached among the Arabs that Italians were afraid of attacking.

> **"The moral effect of the Hodeida expedition on the Arabs was very impressive, the Italian prestige grew in the eyes of the undecided tribes... and some like the Zaraniks accepted to attack the Turks energetically after it."[45]**

Increase in the prices of the foodstuffs, particularly in Istanbul and Syria, was the immediate effect of this panic. And rumours spreading all over in a chain process, brought about the interruption of the economic activities. A British journalist was on the island of Chios when the news of an Italian invasion "Within few hours" reached there. Nothing happened till the end of the war, but the immediate effect was that **"the perspective of an attack paralysed completely the trade and industry of the islands, and the misery is felt among the people."[46]**

By repeating those rumours in an irresponsible way, agencies and newspapers being distributed or appearing on the Ottoman lands contributed to the panic, as much as the Italian sources. According to a certain Syrian Agency, **"political circles believe that an action outside Libya is imminent. The Italian navy's attack on the Dardanelles is only a prelude. A new action also in Tripolitania seems to be imminent."[47]**

The Italian game was successful only because it had deep effects on the public opinion. And they kept on with this game. Italian navy struck at different points continuously. Dardanelles was bombed on the day of the opening of the Ottoman parliament (April 18th, 1912). Then they landed forces on the island of Rhodes. Italian actions had become the daily topic of the talks along the Ottoman coastline. Public opinion which had become a little bit indifferent to the Libyan war news was

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[44] **Reveil,** 20.4.1912.
[45] Camillo Manfroni, **Guerra Italo-Turco,** Roma 1921, Vol.II, p.1.
[46] **Reveil,** 20.7.1912, the correspondent of Daily Telegraph; in its issue of the 2nd March 1912, **Reveil** reports that "some merchants of Damascus increased the prices of the most necessary food-stuffs, on the basis of Beirut events, although they were plentiful in the country."
[47] **Reveil,** 30.7.1912.

interested now for its own sake. "People were sitting in coffee houses looking at the sea and were guessing."[48] Officials were often sending denials but to no avail, rumours were spreading regularly. One newspaper remarked that:

"These fights take place in the imagination of some people who enjoy to be appreciated in the eyes of naives, as well informed on the world matters."[49]

Is it not the aim of the propaganda?

The Ottoman government was surely aware of this general tiredness and atmosphere of panic. So in a moment of standstill in the military actions, and 7months after the start of the war, **Tanin** official newspaper of UP was again reminding in its leading article **"A Turk dies but does not surrender!.. Either Tripoli or war till the end"**[50]. And meetings were held in many places from Aleppo to Ipek (Albania) with the slogans **"War till the liberation of Tripoli".**[51] It must be recalled that at the same moment peace negotiations were being held secretly with the Italians.

B- ECONOMIC DEPENDENCY

Italy was not the most important commercial partner for the Ottoman State. Only 10% of the Ottoman foreign trade was with Italy and in the Ottoman Public Debt, it had a share of only 1,28%.[52] But whereas the imports and exports between the two countries were equal in 1895, Ottoman imports was the double of the exports in 1904. In the shipping business from the Ottoman ports, Italy had a more important place compared to most of the European countries. In 1902/3 with 345 ships of a total of 3,85 million tons, it was the fourth after that of Russia and France. This quantity was three times of what it was in the year 1973/4. Immediately before the war Italy exported to Turkey materials worth 70 million Francs and its imports from Turkey amounted to 10 million Francs. The words of Huseyin Cahit, prove how much embarrassment could Turkey cause to the Italian trade."[53]

That was also pointed out from a different angle by the leftist press. **Avanti** warned that the closure of the middle-eastern market will create

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[48] **Stamboul,** 30.4.1912.
[49] **Stamboul,** 14/15.6.1912 and many following issues.
[50] Stamboul, 19.4.1912.
[51] Stamboul, 1.5.1912.
[52] Angiolo Mori, **Gli Italiani a Costantinopoli,** Camera di Commercio Italiana a Cons., Modena 1906, pp. 102-103.
[53] 2.10.1911.

an important crisis in the cotton industry which would affect 150.000 workers.[54] It also reminded that that could affect the problems of immigration and a boycott of the business of the Italians residing in the Ottoman lands (approximately 50.000) could become more disastrous.[55]

Logically, economic ties had to be more important for Italy than the Ottoman state because the Ottoman state, being the importer, could remedy the cutting of relations by directing its imports to any other European country, where as Italy would have lost its markets. Because of the financial situation of the two countries just the opposite happened.

A German socialist, **(Parvus)** cooperating with the Young Turks, also thought, like **Huseyin Cahit,** that Italy would suffer more from the economic angle. But in his book he cites more examples of Turkish difficulties:

> "In addition to the war expenses, the Ottoman government also lost the income from the Trablusgharb province. On the other hand the decrease of the imports caused the diminution of the customs income. The diminution of the exports had also a disadvatageous effect... For example the Italian Monopoly of Tobacco sotpped the purchase of the Turkish tobacco. Kavala only has exported 1,5 million kgr. less this year. The exports of raw silk and silk cocoon also suffered, because in retaliation of the Turkish decision to increase customs duties for Italian goods, they charged them high taxes."[55b]

As Italian sources confirmed it, Italy entered the war with a full treasury, and did not have any financial difficulty during the 13 months of the war.[56] Italian media declared proudly that **"Italy has one billion of gold in reserve at the Banca d'Italia".**[57]

That explains the arrogant liberty with which Italian media as well as some mediator states were advancing a financial solution to the Libyan problem.[58]

The idea of a financial solution was advanced even before the declaration of war. To the proposals of the **Idea Nazionale** and the

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[54] **Avanti** 14.10.1911, quoted by Maurizio Degl'Innocenti, op. cit., p.201.

[55] Ibid, 9.10 and 29.11.1911.

[56] O. Kologlu, Mudhakkarat.., p.118; By the end of November 1911 the Italian government claimed that all the expenses amounted to only 65 million Lire, while **Avanti** advanced the number to 100 milion, M. Degl'Innocenti, op. cit., p.202.

[56b] Parvus Efendi, **"Turkiyé nin Mali Tutsakligi",** (ed. M. Sencer), May yay., Istanbul 1977, p.229.

[57] **Messaggero Egiziano,** 27.1.1912.

[58] Djamal Zakariya Kasim, art. cit., p.312.

Adriatica, an Istanbul paper replied categorically on the 12th of September 1911:

> "Some Roman papers consider the Tripolitanian problem as a matter of money; they advance the possibility of an agreement through the payment of an indemnity by the Italian government or the guarantee of yearly instalments. It seems that the method of liquidation of the Bulgarian and Bosnian problems created an erroneous hope in Italy. None of the particular conditions existing in those places existed in Trablousgarb, which is a governorship directly subject to the Ottoman Administration. An attack on that province would be a matter of national honour for the Ottomans."[59]

The unofficial financial proposals turned into official proposals by the Italian Foreign ministry, immediately after the declaration of war. Its representatives abroad started to mention the possibility of reaching peace "**by granting** material and moral compensation to Italy."[60] A pro-Italian Ottoman-Jewish deputy, **Karasu,** started secret negotiations by his own initiative which failed.[61] European media was used to manage Turkish amour-propre for a peaceful solution **"as Italy was ready for any kind of concessions, including the material ones."**[62]

The **Egyptian Gazette** was forecasting that **"the war will not last long. It will end soon because Italy will make some payments to Turkey in return for Tripoli and that will be the solution."**[63] Its leading article of the 6th October 1911 was even more categorical to the question **"Why are they fighting?"**. The reply was that **"the Turkish side fights for money and happily religion has nothing to do with the war."**

Those who proposed the above solution were conscious of the economic-financial situation of the Ottoman Empire. It had big difficulties in narrowing the growing gap in its budget. The only applied remedy was to cut the expenditures and investments of every ministry. Many important sources of income for the country were under the control of the international **Public Debt (Duyunu Umumiye)** organisation. The remaining income was never sufficient for the needs of the country. Capitulations were preventing the formation of an industry or business to compete with the West.

The indignation expresse unanimously by the Turkish and Islamist

[59] **Sabah,** the leading article: "Yanlis telakkilere karsi = Against erroneous considerations."

[60] Rodd to Grey, Rome, 12.10.1911, FO. 371-1254 telegram No. 103 and the same Rome 15.10.1911, FO. 371-1254/40517.

[61] Alberto Theodoli, **A Cavalli di due Secoli,** Roma 1950, pp. 59-61.

[62] Figaro, 1.10.1911.

[63] 4.10.1911; A French writer M. Giblet in the **Correspondance D'Orient** (quoted by **Reveil,** 23.1.1912) defended the same idea and stated precisely that Turkey being bankrupt and Tripoli very poor, the only choice for Turkey is to give up the war and Tripoli."

press towards such a solution created a strong obstacle to the Italian schemes.[64] By mid-October Italians themselves renounced it, as no positive approach came forth from the Turkish side. The interesting point is that the campaign of "material concession" introduced by the Italians was being refuted by themselves now, as if the inappropriate proposal came from the Sublime Porte:

> "Italy which, at the moment when she formulated her ultimatum, consented without too much repugnance to all sacrifices necessary for compensationg the Turks for the loss of their province. She would voluntarily pay a real high indemnity and even tolerate the Turkish suzerainty on Tripolitania. Actually she does not want to hear any more about this last point. She desires to annex purely and simply the land, which her armies are trying to conquer... If the war continues for a long time, Italy whose trade is subject to considerable losses, might take the pretext to refuse to concede to any indemnity, whatever the amount.
>
> As for the Turkish government, it was very conciliatory at the beginning. Unfortunately, it is more and more submerged by the public opnion, by the exigencies of the Young Turk party. It could have imposed a peaceful solution to the country, if it had happened promptly and immediately at the beginning.[65]

The deadly blow to the "solution with payment" came from the prime minister **Said Pasha,** who refused it from the chair of the parliament:

> "Some states are proposing financial concessions. In my belief the country can not be sold for money."[66]

In reality, the Sublime Porte was in an acute financial crisis. On 27.11.1911, while presenting to the parliament the budget of 1328 (March 1912-March 1913), the minister of Finance Said that a deficit of minimum 4-5,5 million Liras was expected from 1327, which had to be balanced with a new loan from Europe. With a long range program and by cutting public expenditures and investments he expected to have a balanced budget only by 1331 (= March 1915-March 1916). He added in the parliament that extraordinary expenses incurred by the War were not included in the budget and warned that if the Ministry of War would ask for increase in its budget, he would refuse it.[67]

So it was a vicious circle. The Ottoman state, independence in appearance, was in reality a colony as much as Tunisia or Egypt.

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[64] Particularly in the Indian Muslim press; Also **Al Manar** (Vol- 14/p.933) warns: "Tripoli cannot be transferred with money... in such a case the Ottoman State will lose all its prestige and religious respect..."

[65] Figaro, 15.10.1911.

[66] Sitting of 19.10.1911, OP. p.29.

[67] Sitting of 27.11.1911, OP. p.455-458.

Ottoman state was able to survive if it did not invest and could not make war even if it is for self-defense. In order to afford a war, it did have to contract a loan from Europe. As a Western language newspaper put it, when someone declared that Capitulations can only be eliminated by war:

"Will it be a war with the money loaned from Europe, against Europe."[68]

So when the problem was posed from that angle, the solidarity at the international financial and business circles was becoming more effective than the Islamic solidarity.

This is why, from the economic angle, instead of Italy it was the Ottoman state which was in trouble. If the demands for loans were refused by the European banking and Credit circles -where Italy could have more power to influence- not only the war but also the state as a whole would be much more dangerously risked and could accede to the worst of conditions. That explains the precaution with which the Ottoman government tried not to irritate the Western media, which was under the control of the financial circles.

The international institution created to solve the financial problems of Turkey, the Public Debt, was itself a tool of those international financial circles. It had deposited high amounts on the Italian shares. The declaration of war did not affect his policy of investment. As an Ottoman institution it did not think fit to sell those shares but kept them. **"Thus the Public Debt was helping the enemy with Ottoman Money."**[68]b In a moment when the Turkish Treasury was in need of money, it could prove its penchant for its home land by selling Italian shares and by investing the obtained amount to Turkish Treasury bonds.

In reality, the ties between Italy and Public Debt were such that, when whith the **Ouchy (Lauzanne)** agreement Italy accepted to pay 50 million Francs of war indemnity, it deposited it to the Public Debt, instead of paying it to the Porte as it ought to, without receiving the consent of the Ottoman government.[68]c

On the surface, political considerations were predominant in the European scene; in depth economic necessities were predominant.

The double game by Britain of supporting Italy **behind the scenes** in its action and emphasising its neutrality to satisty her Muslim subjects,

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[68] Reveil, 10.1.1911.

[68]b Parvus ef., op. cit., pp. 243-44.

[68]c Ibid., pp. 63-64.

is described in detail in an article by Hachim al-Takriti.[69] The British policy was variable in accordance with the change in 'degree of friendship between the UP and Germany. If it was too close, Italy had to be detached from the Triple Alliance, for which purpose concessions had to be conceded. The British ambassador at Rome was considering the problem only from the angle of the control of the Mediterranean. He reminded that an Italo.British cooperation (with Sicily, Tripoli, Augusta and Taranto in Italian hands, and Malta under British control) may eliminate any other power from that sea.[70]

Britain with her government and press was very carefully following the political fluctuations. This is why pro and anti campaigns were intermingling, and this is also why they had difficulty in convincing the Eastern observers of the sincerity of their policy:

> "The hue and cry of the English and French non-official papers which are attributing this attack by Italy to piracy and robbery is only due to the fact that if Tripoli falls into the hands of Italy there would be great danger to Tunis and Egypt, both through land and sea.
> This fear of danger is aggravated by Italy's membership of the Triple Alliance with Austria and Germany. So England is not driven through love of justice or sympathy for the Turks."[71]

This inconsistancy in the political field was put aside when a problem with economic overtones was put forward by the Ottoman State: the possible generalization of the annulment of the Capitulations for the Italians.

The Ottoman leaders had been struggling for nearly a century to eliminate all the capitulation rights for the Europeans. When the Ministry of Justice issued a circular on the 7th October, 1911 with the aim of annuling the rights of the Italians, the British Ambassador communicated it to London with a note of serious concern.[72] Furthermore, when authoritative newspapers like **Tanin** and **Journal de Salonique** advanced the idea that the same must be applied to the countries, as well, which will ratify the annexation of Libya by Italy, it indisposed Britain seriously.[73] The fear of the spreading of such an example to Egypt also must have been a real concern for London. Also French circles were against any change in the **"already granted rights"** and were opposing any move in that direction.

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[69] Hachim al-Takriti, Al diblomasiyya al Britaniyya wa al-Adwan At Itali ala Libya 1911-1912, Madjalla Kulliya al Adab, Benghazi, No, 4, 1972, pp. 51-81.
[70] Rodd to Grey, Rome 10.10.1911, FO. 371-1251/40359.
[71] **Habl ul Matin,** 2.10.1911.
[72] Lowther to Grey, Therapia 12.10.1911, FO. 371-1255/41663.
[73] **Tanin,** 2.10.1911; 12.11.1911; FO. 371-1254 46199, Lowtherto Grey.

For Germany the problem was political as much as economic. It was Germany which pressed Turkey, through its ambassador **Marschall,** not to be hasty in declaring war because it was trying to prevent the Triple Alliance from disintegrating.[74] But the economic interest was very pressing as well:

> "For the German imperialism it was an unpleasant situation; on one hand they were partners in an Alliance with Italy; and on the other Turkey was a state which had opened its doors and windows to the German capital. The weakening of Turkey would not be suitable for the German imperialism... The German banks did not take part in the peace discussions with Turkey -Which started by April 1912-7.
> On behalf of all, the administrators of the Deutsche Bank were informing requearly the German Foreign Office about their claims... A guarantee for the preservation of the German interest in the construction of the Turkish railways was reminded. The French capitalists also had the same kind of interest, and in that regard negotiations were held between Paris and Berlin. In November 1912 a mixed commission was set up with the aim of protecting the interests of the Turkish State Bondholders."[75]

It must be born in mind that there was no difference of opinion between Germany (the supposed ally of Turkey) and Britain or France, in their approach to the problem of Capitulations. When Ottoman State cancelled all capitulation rights during the First World War, Germany refused to accept it. To unite for their common interests, was the particularity of the capitalists as in the case of German and French businessmen, while their respective states were trying to undermine each other.

French capitalists were the most concerned with the fate of the Ottoman State, as they were the largest investors in that country. According to the business circles 3/4 of the Turkish shares, equal to 4 billion francs, belonged to the French capital. That made them the most concerned on the issue of the war and were continuously recommending to Turkey to accept a compromise:

> "Nobody will be surprised under existing conditions, particularly our Italian friends less than anybody else, to see us so keen for an arrangement, which, while securing Italy the good part of it, will save at the sametime the dignity of Turkey."[76]
> "We have 4 billions invested in business in Turkey... It is with our money that they will fight. Any loss on the part of Turkey will be the

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[74] Paul Meyer, **Die Neutralitaet Deutschlands und Oesterrejch-Ungarns im Italienisch-Turkischen Krieg. 1911-12.** Thesis, Got-Tingen 1932.
[75] Gunter Heidorn, **Monopole, Press, Krieg,** Berlin 1960, p. 308-9.
[76] **Figaro,** 1.101.1911, article by R. Recouly "Le conflit entre l'Italie et la Turquie".

loss of France. Any decrease in the value of the shares will be on our expense... It is the Frenchmen who pay the expenses of the war... Bombed ports and lighthouses depend on the French capital to be rebuiet...[77]

On every occasion the French media recommended a quick solution for the war, and generally it was directed to Turkey. Papers in French published in the Ottoman lands (**Le Reveil, Stamboul** etc..) and in Egypt, followed in general the same line imposed by the "homeland media". **Stambul** supported the idea that Tripolitanian problem could only be solved by the interference of Europe with some measures to satisfy the amour-propre of the Sultanate. In its opinion, a compromise "less humiliating" could be reached through the mediation of France. The Ottoman State had simply to leave the door open for such a mediation; and it did not even hesitate to condemn the UP for pushing the State to intransigence.[78]

It cannot be denied that this strong campaign by the Western business circles, which invested in Ottoman lands, had a big effect on the policy of the Sublime Porte. It affected also the boycott efforts against the Italian products. A full embargo never materialized. In the parliament customs taxes on Italian goods were increased by 100% but with some restrictions as in the case of sulphur which was vital for the Aegean viticulture. The Minister devlared that, if the opposite is the case, the grape exports would suffer.[79] That gave courage to other businessmen: **Nafi Pasha,** the deputy of Aleppo, in the name of the businessmen of Aleppo, brought to the parliament a demand for the same kind of exemption for those who had invested large sums of money with Italy. That was refused,[80] but it did not stop the business with Italy, at least secretly. **Al Ettehad** newspaper of Beirut, under the title of **"Treason to the country"** exposed Beirut businessmen who were continuing to import Italian goods with French, British or Austrian marks.[81]

It must be remembered that the Istanbul branch of the **Banco di Roma** continued its activities till 2nd January 1982.[82]

Could the Sublime Porte behave in a different way?

At the stage reached in the first decade of the 20th Century no other action could be expected from the Ottoman State; it had no control on

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[77] **Figaro,** 2.10.1911.
[78] **Stamboul,** 29.9., 4 and 16.10.1911.
[79] Sitting of 25.12. 1911, OP. p. 632.
[80] Sitting of 15.1.1912,. OP. p. 802.
[81] **Reveil,** 28.10.1911.
[82] **Reveil,** 9.1.1912.

its own country, and finance. All the commercial and financial decisions depended on European circles. A panic witnessed at the moment of the declaration of war at the **Bourse of Galata** was enough to warn against further irritations. A week later the Bourse became calmer, but then "**a very strong crisis in the commercial field started and the local banks which usually concede credits easily, began suddenly requesting reimbursement and refusing now credits.**"[83] Even the declaration of a general moratorium was advanced. It was the result of the incapacity of the **Bank of Metelin** to pay 60 thousand Sterlings, because of the suspension of payments by the **Bank of Egypt.**[84]

The same crisis was felt in Beirut, the business center of the Syrian area:

> "The financial situation suffers very much from the actual situation. Credits are conceded with big difficulties and the small merchants are in extreme difficult. It is rumoured that many houses are on the verge of collapse. Brokers are the most affected from the war. Ships are refusing to touch our ports, and there are great difficulties in expediting the products to their destination. Railways suffer also from the war. Contracts are being cancelled, the supply of coal became very scare and it could only be bought from Alexandria at any price and with uncertain conditions. The Gaz society of Beirut risked also to stop its services and nearly cut out the illumination of the city."[85]

Reveil claimed, in its issue of the 11th of January 1912, that the customs incomes of Beirut fell to 350-500 Turkish liras daily, from an average or 2.000 liras. Indeed French and Britain consular reports show that in 1911, when the Italian-Ottoman War disrupted commerce, both imports and exports of Beirut fell by about one-quarter from their high points of 1908-10.[85b]

A claim made by the **Messaggero Egiziano** also is interesting. It pretends that the war had reversed the commercial relations of Egypt, while the Turco-Egyptian business is falling,the Italo-Egyptian relations has shown an increase of 280 thousand Eg. Liras. Decrease is easily understandable as the blockade of the Ottoman, and even in a sense, of Egyptian coasts was very effective. But the increase of the Egypto-Italian trade needs some consideration. As in Algeria, Tunisia

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[83] **Figaro,** 8.10.1911.
[84] **La Constitution,** 25.10.1911.
[85] **Liberté,** 1.12.1911, Letter by Fathallah Saggal from Beirut dated 24.11.1911.
[85b] William Ochsenwald, **The Hijaz Railroad,** Un. Press of Virginia, Charlettesville 1980, p. 134.
[86] **Messaggero Egiziano,** 7.2.1912; news distributed by Agenzia d'Italia the 4.2.1912.

and some other places, boycotting of the Italians and their business was also proposed in Egypt. But it was not as successful. Only in Egypt did the people put real pressure on shops and offices and it seemed for a while to be successful. But soon all was stopped under the governments neutrality program.[87] The financial ties of the khedive himself on some projects (like railways, etc..) had surely played a role in the matter. This is why it was rumoured that ministers sacrificed the Ottoman state by taking bribes from the Italians.[88]

The idea of boycotting Italian products was advanced simultaneously in every part of the Islamic world.

Halil Khalid, in the name of the Orientals who met in London, sent a telegram to Istanbul saying that **"the Mulsims here are proposing the promulgation of an imperial firman for a strict boycott"**[89]

In Salonica, the famous warden of the porters **(Hamalbashi)** of the port ordered the boycott of the unloading of the Italian ships.[90] As we mentioned earlier, the same happened in Zanzibar. Press campaigns in Istanbul, Egypt, etc.. were witnessed.

In Iran even a **"fatwa of takhrim (= religious prohibition)"** was issued.[91]

Afghan merchants working with and in India recommended also an effective boycott of the Italian goods.[92]

The failure among the Indian Muslims of the boycott or the **"economic war"** as described by some papers[93], is worth studying to understand the reason behind its failure to reach an effective stage all over the Muslim World.

Immediately with the declaration of war, preaching of boycott started in the streets and mosques of India.[94] The contribution of the press to ignite the fire of the campaign came with the article **"Jehad with Italy"** of **Zamindar** (Lahore):

> "Non-Muslims misinterpret Jehad. It is not a crusade but it simply means an effort which may be made to reach either a spiritual or a worldly end. Boycott is also a form of Jehad. Muslims intend to wage

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[87] Djamal Zakariya Kasim, art. cit., p. 334; since the structure of the Tunisian boycott of the trams was different, we did not consider it as a boycotting of the Italian business.

[88] Yunan Labib Rizl, art. cit., p. 310.

[89] **Sabah,** 7.10.1911.

[90] **TCAI,** p. 155 ff.

[91] **SR,** 1/18, pp-350-351.

[92] **Civil and Military Gazette,** 9.11.1911; **Vakil,** 22.11.1911.

[93] **Oudh Akhbar,** 9.7.1912.

[94] **Akhbar-e Islam,** 2-4-7. October. 1911.

> Jehad with Italy in that they want to boycott Italian goods with a view to impressing upon Italy that Muslims are not a dead nation and that they feel it keenly when they see their coreligionists in trouble... Do boycott Italian goods; if not Muslims of India would prove traitors to their prophet... Fezs of Italian product has to be burned in bazars... We thank the British government because it does not interfere, so we have all the liberty to boycott the Italian goods... Do distribute this Jehadnama among the people, and Imams should read it in the mosques."[95]

This Jehadnama had an undisdainful repercussion as many newspapers published the text integrally.[96] Others joined the campaign **"to show the world, that Muslims even in their degraded condition are resentful"**[97] and were hoping that **"if this national feeling spread throughout the Muslim world no power on earth would be capable of destroying Islam."**[98]

The easy spreading of the invitation carried with it some other considerations. Some proposed to reveal the names of those who do not conform to the decision of boycott as "traitors to Islam",[99] others advanced that with the exception of Turkish and British goods all the other European products must be boycotted.[100] Even a reader proposed the creation of an inter-Islamic economic structure:

> "Indian Muslims have to create commercial ties with Turkey, and boycott the manufactures of Italy, Greece, Austria, Germany and Russia; thus curtail their needs and utilize the money thus saved for promoting "Islamic trade" between India and Turkey, a course which would end quite a few of their difficulties."[101]

The feeling was so strong that some tore down the lining of their jackets because it was of Italian manufacture.[102]

But gradually the anti-boycott campaign became stronger. Three weeks later a paper remarked that although the boycott was in force everybody was still carriying their Italian made fezs -the symbol of Islam- on their heads.[103] A Muslim paper admitted after five months

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[95] 8.10.1911.

[96] For example: **Rohilkhand Gazette** (16.10), **Sahifa** (26.10), **Tafrih** (28.10).

[97] Jadu (Jaunpur), 24.10.1911; Al Bashir (Etawah), 31.10.1911-19.11.1911. 19.3, 2.4, 9.4.1912; **Al Mushir** (Moradabad) 11.11.1911; **Mohammadan** (Madras) 9.10.1911 **Jaridah'i Rozgar** (Madras) 25.11.1911; **Akhbar'a Islam** (Bombay) 7.11.1911; **Habl ul Matin,** (Calcutta) 22.1.1912 etc..

[98] **Muslim Gazette** (Lucknow) 14.1.1912.

[99] **Zamindar,** 4.11.1911.

[100] Ibid., 1.11.1911.

[101] Ibid., 22.10.1912.

[102] **SR,** I/18, pp. 350.

[103] **Tafih,** (Un. Provinces), 28.10.1911.

that the boycott did not function as desired.[104]

We will consider the political aspects of the problem in detail in the next section of the book. Here we will only dwell upon the reasons behind the economic dependence. A British-leaning newspaper of Lahore, summarized it, as early as the first boycott claims started:

> "Madras Muslims held a protest meeting and a resolution was passed to boycott Italian goods. They invited the other Muslims also to join them... It is ill-advised, because... we import from Italy goods amounting 355.000 Sterlings while we export there 3,3 million Sterlings worth goods. Only the hides and skins are worth 600.000 Sterlings and the business is in the hands of Muslims... Italians will not suffer from such a decision?.. Do Indian Muslims propose to sacrifice this market to prove their faith in the Pan-Islamism cult?"[105]

C- IMPETUS ON THE LOCAL AND NATIONALIST CURRENTS

1. OTTOMAN STATE AND TURKS: SHARPENING THE CRISIS OF THE OTTOMAN MELTING POT

The ex-Sultan Abdulhamit's observation on the state of mind among the Ottoman politicians about the war is worth mentioning. It shed light on the general mentality of the period:

> "The hesitation was such that, while Trablousgarb was lost, the opposition jubilated in the halls and galleries of the parliament."[105b]

It must be kept in mind that large section of the opposition was non-Turkish. Then it is clear that two groups existed. One, a dynamic section of the Islamic society was insisting on a Jehad, refusing the existence of enmity between Turks and Arabs and was helping financially the efforts of War.

But it is important to know what percentage of the Islamic society they were representing within the intelligentsia and within the **"mute majority"**.

First we have to consider that the Ottoman Empire was a multi-national and multi-religious state. Islam was the state religion but the existence of all the other religious groups was accepted constitutionally. The too much repeated "Ottomanism" or "Ottoman nationalism" was a concept of unity of different religious groups under the aegis of Islam. They were conceived as religious "Millets" but in reality had become "nations" under the effect of westernization and the participation of

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[104] **Al Bashir,** 19.3.1912; **Hitavadi,** 20.11.1911.
[105] **Tribune,** 7.10.1911; **Mysore Star,** 23.10.1911.
[150b] Abdulhamid' in Hatira Defteri, Selek yay., Ist. 1960, p. 143.

non-clerical members in their "national councils". This is how gradually Greeks, Serbs, Bulgars etc.. had gained their independence as nation and that was what the remaining groups in the Ottoman structure were also aiming at. These groups were easily irritated with religious actions. especially those like a Holy War, which was creating Christian solidarity against Islamic solidarity. That solidarity was expressing itself, not as unity of all the Christians in the Ottoman lands. On the contrary they were as divided as possible in the Ottoman lands, but each group was in cooperation separately with a Western power, with which it had cultural and economic ties.

Like the Christians, Muslims also had formed nationalist groups in the Ottoman parliament. Arab and Albanian groups included Muslim and Christian deputies. So nationalism prevailed more than the religious factor in 1911. That nationalist solidarity was also effective outside the parliament. The revolt by the catholic Albanians **(Malissore)** was backed without reserve by the Muslim Albanians. The same can be said of Syria and Lebanon, where the Arabs of both religions were acting more in the name of Arabism than Islam. All those were not aiming necessarily at the destruction of the Ottoman rule; and they were not also necessarily secular minded people. The acceptance of the "language of the Qoran" by the Christian Arabs for nearly a century also as a part of their own heritage had created the union of opposite elements, although in many other questions the differences continued as before. Concession conceded by the Christian Arabs on that point helped their approach to the Muslim Arabs for the search of a common (and englobing also the Islam) heritage. It also helped the creation of a secular Arabic press, the first and the most important step of the Arab nationalist current. The refusal of Arabic as the second official language by the Ottoman State, and the claims of autonomy, united them even more than before, on the basis of some local nationalist groupings.

The sudden opening of the society in 1908 for free discussions and the false belief that the level of Europe could be reached thus in a few years and the inability to solve problems pending for at least two centuries had condemned UP to carry all the blame for the errors and misdeeds of the Ottoman past. From the angle of the public opinion, pointing out to the "constitution" as the all enveloping remedy for the problems was a mistake. The magic of the constitution had been over magnified. When after four years of constitutional life, seeing that nothing was changed and that the deputies were discussing still the articles of the constitution during the war days, the public opinion started seriously to reconsider if the previous regime was not right in some of its attitudes. Here

especially UP lost the support of an important part of the Islamic public opinion, Arabs as well as Turks.

The Turkish element, the ruling group, was confused in that context. They could not claim Turkish nationalism as they would be discarded by the Moslems, nor could the claim only the Islamic solidarity as it would be discrimination against the Christians; both cases would be the refusal of the **"Ottoman melting pot"**, and would bring an end to the empire. During the discussions on the military service law, an Armenian deputy remarked that the duty was charged only to the Turkish element and that it had to be applied evenly to all the nations of the Empire. Then a Turkish deputy complained of not being able to make any defense by naming the Turks:

> "There are two subjects which nobody dares touch; one is the mention of Islam and the second is to talk about the Turkish element. To deal with the first is judged as reaction, and the second as favouring nationalism."[106]

Turks were occupying the main posts in the administration, language was a favour in the advancement, Turkish nationalism as a literary current existed, but officialy Turkish nationalism could not be defended. This remark applies in particular to the Ottoman lands; outside of the empire, Turkism had already taken roots, and that particularly in Russia where they were in a minority statute. It is a known fact that the Turkish, Tartar and Muslim intellectuals from Russia played an important role in the formation of Turkish nationalism.

Other groups were freely mentioning their national interests, national aims from the chair of the parliament against the conception in the constitution and against many warnings. In that context Turks were sticking to an Ottoman nationalism, outdated, and which was in clear contradiction with all of its composing elements. As **E. Kedourie** remarked, the concept of Ottomanism contained the seeds of its own destruction, so insisting on imposing it, meant facilitating its end:

> "This doctrine was bound to disrupt the Ottoman Empire... it laid down that the citizens of the Ottoman Nation were to have a common consciousness of their Ottoman nationality, and thus achieve the unity which would be the efficacious bulwark of the Ottoman empire. This doctrine was artificial and had no roots in the country, it could appeal to nobody's loyalties, which went, as before, to the family, to the clan, and to religious community. To establish and run the new order on it, as the Turks attempted, was to build on sand.

[106] Talat (Ankara), Sitting of 25.10.1911, OP. p. 77.

> Ottomanism had another drawback. It tried to justify Ottoman power to Ottoman subjects with reasons that could easily be invoked in order to justify the overthrow of this very power, should the opportunity arise. In Macedonian, Armenian and Arab breasts the sacred ardours of nationalism could be fed by fuels other than those of Ottomanism."[107]

In that context, to the appeal of the Sultan in his opening speech that the only solution might come from Ottoman unity, the parliament's message of reply indicated openly that **"the misunderstanding still exists in the unity of elements [forming the Ottoman nation]"**[108]

Split with local and ethnic interests, the Ottoman parliament became a forum for discussions on nationalist aims, even during the war days. A Christian deputy warned:

> "I have seen in the papers a telegram sent by Egyptian Arabs. Those citizens, aware of the disaster threatening the country and considering the danger in which the nation lives, invited the parties to end the discussions and unite their action. Are we not ashamed... from what we are doing?"

On of the autonomists of Beirut, Reza Solh, replied:

> "You could not understand that."[109]

Also a telegram for invitation to unity sent by Indian Muslims was mentioned from the chair, by another deputy, but nobody changed their line.[110]

Solutions proposed by the opposition to the ruling UP were all aiming at the loosening of the administrative ties within the Empire (local rights, autonomy, federalist system etc...) They were criticizing, not without reason, that the decentralization tendency which existed in the first program of the UP had never been applied; on the contrary centralization was more tightly imposed than before. While attacking this policy, nationalities in the Empire, never wanted to give the slightest guarantee or accepted any measure against the dismemberment of the Empire: particularly the law on the obligatory military service for all the citizens -including the non-Muslims- was continuously obstructed by non-Turk and Christian deputies.[111]

The British Consul's report from Jerusalam, in the early days of the

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[107] E. Kedourie, **England and the Middle East -The Destruction of the Ottoman Empire 1914-1921,** Sussex, The Harvester Press, 1956, pp. 59-60.

[108] Sitting of 22.11.1911, OP. p. 409.

[109] Sitting of 9.11.1911, OP. p. 245.

[110] Sitting of 27.12.1911, OP. p. 645, Sayyid Ahmad (Yamen).

[111] Ottoman parliaments' sittings particularly during the end of 1911 and 1912 are full of such examples.

war stated that the only existing nervessness was among the Christians **"who were ready to run out from the country with the fear of being recruited because of the war."**[112] Copies of documents existing in the **Libyan Historical Research Center** show the existence of such a strong tendency among the Greeks recruited in the Ottoman army. They ran by dozens to the Italian side and offered their services as volunteers to combat the mujaheeds in Libya.

After the **Tanzimat,** with secular approach, religion lost gradually its grip as a uniting element. And around 1911 the armed forces were the only element to keep the state on its feet, in front of the parliament and the press which were playing the countrary role. The very strong anti-Military campaign after 1908 directed at the Young Turks and the UP, within and outside Turkey, aimed at destroying that last element so that the dismemberment of the Empire could be materialized more easily.

But the difficulty was that nobody knew exactly how to solve the problem of the intermingled structure of the ethnic groups within the empire. A strong anti-Turkish campaing, common to all other nationalities, was coupled with campaingns by ethnic groups against each other for more than half a century. Fights between Greeks and Bulgarians, Albanians and Serbians, Bulgarians and Romanians, and everybody with the Jews, Maronites with Druzes were the preludes to this dismemberment by creatin **"non-mixed ethnic zones."** Even the Armenians who very rarely exceeded the 20-25% of the population in Eastern and Southern Anatolia, were administring a guerilla war to expel the Muslims and create "their majority".

In the Middle-East and Balkans different communities lived without delimitation of areas centuries before the advent of the Ottomans. The **Pax Ottomana** had encouraged even more the intermingling. So these communities never had the problem of "nationality." Now they were faced with such a dilemma. Ottomanism had failed to find a solution to it but the new proposed solutions contained more seeds of contradictions and tension than before. The talk of the Minister of War, **Mahmoud Shawkat Pasha,** in the parliament, on 20.12.1911 summarized the situation perfectly:

> "My christian compatriots, I call on you. We have a common interest. If we lose this country to the invasion of foreigners you can be sure that you will lose also your committees and nationality... My Moslem brethren I call on you, see that two Muslim states, one in the west, the other in the east [indicating Morocco and Persia] are falling and it is only the Ottoman government which has preserved today its

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[112] Jerusalem, 6.10.1911; FO. 371-1254.

> independence. We are going also to destroy that unique Islamic government with the differences and clashes existing between us; that's my fear. Still I am confident because we have lots of soldiers who will die for the sake of their religion and their country."[113]

These discussions were repeated even in a sharper way in the press. Additionally, party conflicts were adding to the split, and the Turkish nationalism avoided in the parliament existed in the media.. Coupled with a weak government the public opinion was under the influence of a division than of a unity of aims.

2. SYRIA AND LEBANON: ISLAMIC SOLIDARITY FEELINGS DIRECTED TOWARDS ARAB NATIONALISM WITH THE COOPERATION OF MUSLIMS AND CHRISTIANS

The British consul at Beirut reflected the general feeling of the Muslims at the early stage of the war, as follows:

> "The Arab Muslims of Beirut are not so keen on sacrificing their lives and their fortunes on a war which they know must end disastrously for them and their country."[114]

This proves that even if a real "nationalist current" did not exist, the split among Muslims (Turks and Arabs), necessary for the cooperation of the Christian and Muslim Arabs for a "conscience for local interests" had surpassed the degree of a simple reaction, and came close to the "nationalist concept" in the Western sense. Exactly the same which happened in Albania.

If we check out subjects of discussion in the Lebanese press during the war, we will be amazed by the multitude of articles on the local autonomy and "Arab rights", compared with the articles or comments on the Libyan war:

Requests of two Arab deputies **(Ruhi al-Khalidi and Chekri Asly)** on the interdiction of the appointments of Arabs to some posts in the Ministry of Interior; Decentralisation forgotten by the Young Turks; **A. Zahraoui's** article on the crisis of the country and its future implications; inactivity of the Arab deputies to defend the rights of the Arabs; critics to the destruction of the privileges of Mount-Lebanon; the extreme tendency towards Ottomanisation etc..

More interesting are the articles which aimed at emphasising dangers or uncertainties on the future of Beirut and Syria.

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[113] Sitting of 20.12.1911, OP. p.601.
[114] W. I. Shorrock, op-cit., p. 79; FO. 195-2371, October 10,1911.

The two articles of **Rafik Al Azm** in the **Moayyad,** reproduced also by the **Al Ettehad al Othmani** of Beirut, reminds people of the dangers concealed in the political anarchy:

> "They must know that Syria and the Arabic countries connected with it are threatened before all the regions of the Empire, and their fate will never be better than that of the Tripolitanians... European States are coveting this area... Syrians have to consider it and must tighten their ties with their brethren of the Jazirat-al-Arab, so that they might be a support for them in case of need... Syrians have to arm themselves and form national defence committees..[115]

Many of the local papers published news concerning the possible annexation of Syria to Egypt or of its occupation by a foreign country and polemics continued for months in 1912. We will repeat here some of the articles already mentioned earlier in this book.

A. Zahraoui remarks that the situation is dark and serious attention must be paid to the plot instigated by an alien hand. A Beirut lawyer, **Alph. Zenie,** commenting on this article, invites the people to look and consider the future more seriously.[116]

Al Rai al-Am reminds us of the fates of Andalousia, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia and all those powerful empires, and the role of the people who contributed to their collapse.[117]

While the war in Libya was in its most violent period, the **Al Sabatt,** an Arab autonomist newspaper, reflected the general feeling as follows:

> "It will be more opportune to fight the internal enemy, the real one, than to call the people to get ready to expel an imaginary external enemy... The state of demoralisation, anxiety and fear has reached such a stage that some people already think to organise a committee of national defence... It is curious to note that the government cannot demand any more information which concerns military questions, without having the commentators deducing thousand suppositions from it; and the consuls of the powers cannot take a step in the country without inflamming in the imagination of the people a plot; and a foreign military ship cannot appear at the horizon without creating in the minds the possibility of a big event, as the collapse of the country as the minimum alternative."[118]

Whatever be their personal feelings, when leaders were sceptical, the common man becomes more prudent.; The mute majority after

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[115] **Reveil,** 16.1.1912.
[116] **Reveil,** 19.1.1912.
[117] **Reveil,** 25.1.1912.
[118] **Reveil,** 30.1.1912.

expressing -and not always- its feelings would expect to be guided. So, while at the start of the war the Islamic solidarity was expressed by masses in different parts of the Muslim world, the scenes of disunity exposed by the administering circles, the inability to solve the difficulties and indifference shown by the "public-opinion-guiding-intellectuals", directed them towards a period of expectation or towards the surging of some new targets.

this diversion of aims, profiting from the inter-effecting potential of a dynamic Islamic public opinion, expressed itself in the case of the Libyan War, by giving a new impulse to local and more limited solutions and to the further rise of nationalism in different Islamic communities. Meaning the divorce from supra national cooperation and by being in conformity with the anti-Panislamism of the West, that diversion got also the full support of the European powers.

> "What finally ended the patience of Syrian leaders with the Turks in the matter of reform was the outbreak of war with Italy in October 1911.. [and later Balkans..] These events convinced the Syrians that a meaningful reform would never be granted from above while the Young Turks were preoccupied with warfare in other parts of the Ottoman Empire... The Syrian reaction to Turkish difficulties took varied forms. Reformist societies were organized to force the hardpressed Turks to grant sweeping measures of decentralization and autonomy."[119]

A French diplomat who visited Syria and Lebanon in June 1912 reported the desire of many Muslim groups to get rid of the Turks with the aid of a foreign power.[120] Another diplomat pointed out the tendencies of the Christians towards France and of the Muslims towards Britain. French and British Foreign Office archives are full of reports of demands of cooperation coming from Arab leaders, who were mostly holding responsible posts in the Ottoman administration (deputies, officers etc...)[121]

This tendency was not kept secret. On the contrary , it was expressed in the columns of newspapers like **al Muktabas.** It created such an unfavourable feeling that, notables, sheikhs and ulama of Syria presented, at the beginning of October 1911, a communiqué to the governor of Syria:

> "We are observing with regret that **Al Muktabas** and other newspapers following its line, published in Syria, are trying to

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[119] W. I. Shorrock, op. cit., pp. 77-78.
[120] Ibid., pp. 79-80.
[121] Shorrock and E. Kedourie in their cited books give ample details on the subject.

undermine the power of the government; to spoil the religion, science and the ulama; and to introduce discord into the minds of the people particularly between the noble Arab people and the consenting umma of Turks, by publishing wicked articles. They claim also to be the porte-parole of the Syrians and particularly of the Arabs. We, the undersigned notables and leading persons of the country, declare that as we are against such allusions which can spread discord among the nation, and create dangers for the country, we cannot accept as the porte-parole of the nation such misleading publications."[122]

The joining of the Muslims with the autonomist-indenpendentist current became the milestone in the Turkish-Arabic break. The role played by the Christian Arabs to stimulate that break is worth studying. A survey by a French observer of the Arabic press of September-December 1911 points out the cooperation of all the dynamic forces of Islam for a **"panislamic awakening"** and relying on a commentary of **Al Moayyad**[123] remarks that **"the actual Panislamic awakening is so strong that even the Syrians joined it."**[124]

In reality what the French-Christian observer meant was that it was the contribution of the Christian Arab elements which transformed the dynamism of Muslim Arabs into a nationalist current, by diverting the target from the foreign enemy (The imperialist powers) to the local uneasiness (The Ottoman State).

As illustrative example of this cooperation for the local problems is the declaration signed by Syrians settled in Cairo, to protest the Khedivial permission for the perfermance of **Aida** next to the Pyramids, by an Italian company. It mentions the pain felt from the Italian bombing of Beirut, but avoids condemning the main reason, the attack on Libya.[125]

3. ALBANIA: AN OPPORTUNITY TO RE-EMPHASIZE AUTONOMIST CLAIMS

The same phenomenon can be noticed in Albania, with some differences peculiar to the conditions of the country. The declaration of war by Italy, even the bombardments of the Albanian coasts had a restricted effect on the leaders. Out of the few telegrams sent to Istanbul, generally they considered the situation as a profitable one for their aims. The British Consul at Uskub reported:

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[122] **Ikdam,** 25.10.1911.
[123] 7.10.1911.
[124] **Revue du Monde Musulman,** Vol. 8, February-March 1912, p. 214.
[125] **Reveil,** 7.3.1912; the signatories are: Hassan Hemadé, Alexandre Trad, Georgi Zeidan, Selim Bey Ayoub Tabet, Abdallah Beyhoum, Halil Mutran, Mahmoud Hamadé, Wadih Bostani, Vlado Bustros, Vlado Sursock, Antoum Khayat, Habib Antonius.

> "...the outbreak of war was received by the (skopije) population of the vilayet with calmness, no demonstrations of any kind were made against the Italian consulate. The chief differences which it has made have been a temporary relaxing of the Albanian tension... Opposition journals of a mushroom character have been springing up without censure, and their utterances have been growing more and more unchecked; group after group has seceded, till practically all the strength it had left [with the UP] was in the civil functionaries and a minority of the officers."[126]

It continues by remarking on the dissatisfaction with the formation of the new government, the telegram sent by deputies mentions their intention of giving a vote of no confidence, etc... But no interest in Libyan affair is expressed, and no change of behaviour has taken place because of it. The interest was focused only on the main local problem, as the British Minister at Cettinjè (Montenegro) puts it:

> "The main unrest in Albania between the Muslim and Christian Albanians had been the concession which the Turkish Government was forced to make to the Malissors [Christian Albanians] who have been able to maintain their right to carry arms to which great importance is attached by all Albanians..."[127]

Indeed, pretexting military preparations in Montenegro, an Albanian deputy sent a telegram to the prime minister immediately after the declaration of war, in which he expressed the loyalty of the Muslim Albanians to the State, but added the necessity of distributing 100 thousand rifles among them for defence.[128] Knowing the difficulty with which the armaments of the Albanians had been confiscated. The Sublime Porte turned a deaf ear to the claim, but could not prevent the consequences.

We must recall that since 1909 -and in some places even during the **Abd-ul Hamid** period- the disarming procedure of the individuals and tribes was into effect in different parts of the Empire as Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, Anatolia, Albania. When, during early 1911 Albanian tribes were asked to deliver their rifles to the government, the reply was: **"You want our rifles?... Come to pick up yourself, we will present them to you anointed with the pig grease."**[129]

During the same days Albanian deputies were pouring on the parliament telegrams criticising irregularities in recruiting in their

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[126] W. Hough to Lowther, Uskub 9.10.1911, annexed to Lowther to Grey Constantinople 14.10.1911, FO. 371-1254/42 41635.

[127] Count de Salis to Grey, Cettinjé, 9.10.1911, FO. 371-1254/40607.

[128] Hough to Lowther, Uskup 16.10.1911, FO. 371-1254/42635.

[129] reported by an Italian Catholic priest.

constituencies. A deputy objected to it by remarking that to bring individual events to the parliament was not a proper behaviour in the wartime, and asked the refusal of the petition. But it was accepted, with purely internal political considerations, to oppose UP.[130]

It must also be noticed that the military problems were not the only subject of discord between Albanians and the Ottoman administration. The introduction of the Latin alphabet instead of the Arabic letters created a complex problem. By rejected it Young Turks sided with the Muslim Albanians, but could not impede its use by the Christian Albaninas, supported in that move by the Italian Catholic Church. Muslims forgot very easily that preference of the Ottoman government in their favour and demanded to accede to the same concessions as the Christians.

Also the efforts to end some tribal traditions, as vengeance etc.., created a dislike towards the Young Turk regime. A French observer who praises Young Turk's civilizing efforts in Albania remarked on the difficulty of introducing them because of the **"Strong method"** applied; especially after **"the policy of favour"** of the **Abd-ul Hamid** period.[131]

So, from a common point of discord and privilege (as in the case of Pan Islamism for Muslim and Christian Arabs) Albanians were carried towards unity, under the nationalist current.

Contradictions between the Islamic, Ottomanist and Nationalist faces of the problem is put forward by the same observer:

> "I read in the 8th **May** 1910 issue of the **Progrés de Salonique** an interview with M. Shawkat Pasha. He declares: 'If a foreign power, profiting from our internal struggles, declaires war, I will attack it with my armies and with the Albanian rebels together. Instant-aneously,the rebellion will end in few hours, if a war declaration threatens our country.'
> I remember also that a prominent UP leader Nazim Bey, said the same and believed that if they destroy the feudals, all of Albania will join them... Alas!.. today the war is declared but the Albanians create the same difficulties as before for Turkey."[132]

That shows that the Albanian society was in the search of another solution for itself, than plain Islamic or Ottomanist formulas, and which neared more the nationalist solution.

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[130] Sitting of 28.11.1327, OP. p. 495.
[131] A. Duboscq, op. cit., p. 160.
[132] Ibid., p. 166.

4. EGYPT: CONVERGENCE OF NATIONALISTS AND ISLAMISTS TOWARDS LOCAL SOLUTIONS

The nationalist effect of the Libyan war in Egypt, Tunisia and the other North African countries is reflected by many writers.[133]

Their particularity was that while in Syria, Lebanon and Albania there was a search for getting rid of the Turk, with the help of some European countries -France and Britain in the case of the first two- **"whatever the cost was"**[134]; in the others, the current ran in the opposite direction. Egypt was trying to get rid of Britain, where as Tunisia and Algeria of France. So instead of the **"ugly Turk"** it was the image of **"The Turk of Ottoman the saviour"** which was presented to the public opinion.

The effect of the Libyan war on the Egyptian public opinion had been to start open discussions on Egypt's position in the world: Is it an independent state, an Ottoman province, or a British colony?

Certain questions were in every mind and on every tongue:

Why do we not participate in the war? Why do we not let the Ottoman army pass through Egypt to help the mujaheeds? Why is it not the Egyptian but the British administration which orders the measures to be taken at the frontiers, to protect the neutrality of Egypt? How can it be that the Egyptian government can ignore the war under the pretext of not being informed about it officially?

They could not get satisfactory replies, but those discussions gave way to three currents:

1) Mujaheeds in general and some Turkish officers (As **Anwar**) fighting in Libya without much help and in very poor conditions, became an example for freedom fighters, for nationalists and the people who really aimed at the independence of Egypt.[135]

2) Pushed Egyptian nationalists **(Hizb al Watani)** to a more direct confrontation with the British Imperialism (It was no more the civilising Britain) and to claim the Ottoman Suzerainety to overcome it.

3) Forced Britain to establish direct control over Egypt and gave the opportunity in the long run to cut its remaining ties with the Ottoman State. Thus the British administration ignored the people more, and put

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[133] Takriti, ar. cit., pp. 68-69; quoted from, Z. B. Y., Al Harb Al Italiyya al Turkiyya 1911-12, Moskova 1967, pp. 108-109.

[134] W. I. Shorrock, op. cit., p. 80.

[135] Abd Al Rahman al Rafii, **Tarikh Misr al Kavmi min 1908-1919** noted by Djamal Zakariya Kasim, art, cit., p. 328.

more emphases on cooperation with the Khedivial family and an encouragement for a dynastical solution to the Egyptian problem as an alternative to the nationalists claims for full independence.

The confrontation of those three elements resulted in some peculiar introvert polemics. The Libyan War and its heroes became symbols of the Egyptian internal political life.

With the help of the press restrictions, prosecutions and The British guided press, the control and guiding of the public opinion in a certain direction became possible, which in turn was helpful to the British aims. Admittedly, that was not an easy task.

The cooperation of the Khedivial administration with Italians to help the revolt of **Idris** at Asir was only an open secret.[136] Egyptian administration was acquiescing to any measure found necessary by Lord Kitchener, as the nonutilization of the money collected from the people for military aims, interdiction of the passage of Turkish Officers and war material through Egypt, etc... All those were rendering the Khedivial administration very antipathic to the public opinion at a moment when fighters were dying under Italian fire and when particularly Arabo-Turkish victories became more real than those exaggerated in the early days of the war.

To combat the idea of a rapprochement between Arabs and Turks, a very particular tactic was used. Next to the success and heroism stories emanating from Libya, a campaign which aimed to magnify the disagreements between Turks and Arabs was conducted.

We will study the problem in a little more detail because Egypt, during that period was an important "public- opinion- creating- center" for the Arab World, and also was able to influence other Islamic countries like India, etc..

To concentrate on the separatist currents in Syria was one of those tactics. Interdiction of the distribution of **Al Ahram** in May-June 1912 in Syria, for "**publishing articles harmful to the order**" is a proof of it.[137]

The attribution by some Egyptian newspapers of the aim "**to create an Arab Caliphate in Tripoli**" to **Anwar Bey,** who had refused to conform to the peace conditions and declared his willingness to continue the combat, is interesting. It meant a separatist move even by the most advertised and esteemed hero of the war.

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[136] Italian Prime Minister Giolitti declared it officially, Giovanni Roncagli, op. cit., Vol.I, p. 47.

[137] Reveil, 20.6.1912.

His telegraphic reply of the 16th October to **Al-Alam** newspaper shows how much conscious he was of the game played behind the curtains:

> "I read with regret the publications which are the fruits of an imagination. Those unconceivable publications are nothing but the seed of discord which is blooming in the mind of some intriguer who has no attachment to the faith nor to the country. All the world must be aware that I am a Muslim before everything and am a free Ottoman at the same time. My only aim is directed towards the sublimation of the honour of Islam and the existing Caliphate... I felt the need to send this rectification to disclose the character of those people who devote their efforts to destroy Islam and the country and to serve the foreigners."[138]

A campaign to discredit UP was conducted in a very careful way. For example **Al Muktataf,** which dealt with the Libyan War only once in 1911 and never in 1912, consecrated a serial on "How was **Abd-ul Hamid** dethroned" criticizing UP, in all its six issues between January-June 1912. It had also a large coverage on Britain and India.

The campaign concerning Kamil Pasha, the ex-Ottoman Prime Minister, famous for his Anglophile tendencies and enmity towards UP, and his meeting with the British King on his way to India, is also interesting. It was known that **Kamil Pasha** was against a war for Tripoli, and proposed a compromise by keeping Benghazi for the Ottoman State or for Britain.[139] Also in the review of the famous Arab historian **Giorgi Zeidan, Al Hilal,** the Libyan War was used more as a pretext for renewing Turkish-British friendship.

According to **Caesar Farah "Al Muqattam unabashadly promoted British interests and for all practical purposes was the organ of the occupation... (while) Al Muayyad promoted Khedivial interests, and Al Ahram waved the tricolore in the name of freedom and all-freedom seekers."**[139b] It must be noticed that the interests of the Khedive were concording on many fields with those of the British and that real islamist press was not very powerful.

The most important among those publications was undoubtedly **Al Manar,** which was accepted as an authority in the Arab and even Islamic world. The parallelism of the contents of **Al Manar** and **Al Moayyad** -the well known Anglophile paper- is not a secret, as most of

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[138] **SR,** II/35, pp. 179-180.

[139] **SR,** I/2, p. 43.

[139b] Caesar Farah, "Censorship and Freedom of Expression in Ottoman Syria and Egypt", in **Nationalism in a Non-National State: The dissolution of the Ottoman Empire,** Haddad, a. Ochsenwald (eds), Ohio 1977 p. 174.

the articles of Manar were published first in **Al Moayyad;** for example the very important serial "**Al mas'ala al-Sharkiyya = The Oriental question**" which lasted for four issues between October 1911 and January 1912 deals with the Libyan War, but more specifically with the problems of the Ottoman Empire and was first published in **Al Moayyad** in a serial of 10 articles.

Al Manar defends before everything the necessity of a **"hearty return to the Islamic solidarity (Rabitat al-Islam)"** and the rights of the Ottoman State in the face of the Italian attack on Libya.[140] It calls Istanbul **"The capital of our state"** and adds that all the hearts of the Muslims are with the State at this moment. On the other hand **Manar** is against any illegal contribution from Egypt or from the other countries to the efforts of war in Libya. It is also against the Jehad in the sense of military war. In short it is against any dynamic activity by the Islam; in that regard it is opposed to the ideas of Ahmad Lutfi in **Jarida.**[141]

Before entering in a detailed survey of **Al Manar,** we like to transmit the views of **Charles Wendell**[141b] who shows how **al Jarida** and **Ahmad Lutfi** avoided any Pan Islamist action:

> "The outbreak of the Tripolitan War (...) gave Lutfi an opportunity to lash out at another aspect of the historic **umma** as a political institution -the jihad- which **al-Afgani** had tried so hard to resurrect, and which now became the slogan for the xenophobic journals of the native press. The Occupying Power had forbidden the sultan's proclamation of war to be published in Egypt, and forbade the sending of Egyptian troops to Libya, but many newspapers took up the cause of the Ottoman Empire, and attempted to arouse enthusiasm among the masses and to get them to enlist voluntarily in the Turkish forces and to send money to the Turkish war chest. Lutfi called upon the Egyptians to abstain from any display of religious fanaticism, since any such demonstration would simply give the British additional excuses for prolonging the occupation. (In the Al Jarida of October 21, 1911 he wrote): 'We say this, and avow it before Allah and all mankind, that the Egyptians must not, in the interests of the country, make religion -under these circumstances- the basis for their political acts. They must repudiate today as they have in the past, any accusation of religious bigotry (al-ta'assub al-dini), i.e., "Pan-Islamism and fanaticism" (al-ban-Islamiyya wa'l-fanatism). For they have found out that this accusation was one of the major pretexts

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[140] Vol. 14, p. 930; For a study of Al Manar during the Libyan war, see cit. art. of Ahmad Ibrahim Diyab.

[141] Vol. 15. NO. 1., p. 36.

[141b] C. Wendell, **The Evolution of Egyptian National Image,** Un. California,1972, p. 235.

employed by the British for remaining in Egypt, and that they are still making use of it up to the present moment.'

Lutfi knew however that the danger of xenophobic/ religious outrages was far from unreal, and took pains to point out to his readers that modern warfare was conducted for practical advantages not for the sake of the religion, and that in this too the East must imitate Europe.

'We say this in the light of the credo we have been advocating for some time, namely that our political actions must be based on the utilitarian principle because we are living in a time when this is the way things are done, and because the modern civilization from which we draw all our strenght is so constituted. The West fights with this weapon, and the greatest danger could befall us if we do not imitate it in this respect.'

He points out that Turkey herself was not blind to his modern principle, and that the editor of a newspaper in Beirut, Al-Balagh, had been prosecuted for publishing an inflammatory article entitled (The Pope Declares War on the Caliph), because it caused disunity and mutual hostility between the Muslim and Christian populations of the Ottoman State. In Egypt too some newspapers were adopting this dangerous tone, not out of real conviction, but merely to attract the applause of the mob. (And he continues:)

(In the Jarida of October 22, 1911, he writes):

'We say this because we see that the movement to assist the empire has taken on the form of a religious jihad from its very inception, and that the expressions used by some newspapers call inmistakably for a Jihad.'

(In the Jarida of October 22, 1911, he adds:)

'Will not our colleagues show some regard, for conscience's sake, for the welfare of the Muslims? For what welfare that they have turned into a plaything so that the mob (jumhur) will trust them and follow them in whatever they say or do?

In the context of an earlier article, "The Nation Must Be Satisfied" (La Budd min Irda' al-Umma) of July 7th, 1908, Lutfi unreservedly threw in his lot with local nationalism and against Islamic internationalism (....) In the history of his own country, Lutfi placed the Turks on the same level as the British, as foreign invaders and despots (....) So Egypt, despite the Pan-Islamic propaganda and the incitement to Jihad, 'knews of a certainty that the first step towards independence is to establish (herself as) a definite entity and an individual political (power), and to indicate her separateness from all other Islamic countries. She took this step in 1841, and has held firmly to it until today' (Al Jarida of October 22d, 1911).

In spite of the dissidence between **Jarida** and **Al Manar,** it contained a lot of common points on the localist tendencies.

Al Manar entered very rarely into the details of the war in Libya, but

in its 14 issues from 4.10.1911 to 12.11.1912 it dealt in a very detailed way with the Ottoman State in relation to the war and Europe. The imperialist face of Europe is stressed with statements like "**They want to destroy the Caliphate as they destroyed the papacy... We have to be vigilent against the frauds of Europe... The real fanaticism exists in Europe... Exploiters are aiming to divide Iran, Turkey, Maghrab** etc..."

In one of the articles concerning the Ottoman Empire it states that Indian and Egyptian Muslims are the most advanced in three fields, science, wealth and freedom, thanks to Britain;[142] and it invites Tunisians to resist France to reach the same level. On that occasion it condemns also the policy of France for having divided Tunisia and Algeria.

In its opposition to the UP, **Manar** remarks, that the Kamil Pasha government was toppled during the 31 March reactionary rising by UP **"with the instructions of the Sionist German Jews";**[143] it praises very much the meeting of Kamil Pasha with the British King in Port Said;[144] it claims that it was Germany's support through Sionist Jews which encouraged Italy to attack Libya;[145] it criticizes **Al Arab** published in Istanbul and **Tanin** for their Turkish nationalist views,[146] and adds that **"Turks are oppressors in their own country as well as in the Arab lands because of their ignorance of religion and the administration of the community."**; it attacks the policy of UP favouring the Turks vis-à-vis all the other nationalisties of the Empire; and at last criticizes the **Hakki Pasha** government for having speeded up the Italian attack with its negligence.[147]

What was the proposal of **Al Manar,** which criticizes nationalism but supports "localist" tendencies in the frame of decentralisation, to the Islamic societies in presence of the Libyan example?

From the above mentioned approaches which bring limitations to the "Islamic solidarity" formula, the proposals of **Al Manar** for the Islamic societies can be deducted.

During 1912 **Al Manar** dealt very rarely with the Libyan problem,. A short note in the 3 issues is followed by another short one in the 5th issue. We learn from a note in the 3rd issue that **"the owner of the review has left for India."** With the 6th issue starts a serial concerning Indian

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[142] Vol. 14. p 837.
[143] Vol. 14, p. 754.
[144] Vol. 14, p. 876.
[145] Vol. 14, p. 927.
[146] Vol. 14, p-930.
[147] Vol. 14, p. 781.

Muslims and British Administration in India, with a praise of the moral power of the British, which he deduces from the cleanliness of the ship and the discipline existing on it.

Articles concerning the Russian Muslims during the same period, necessitates also a close look. Generally they are transmitted from the chauvinist-Panslavist **Novoye Vremiya** newspaper[148] and relates the most positive conditions of life for the Muslims of Russia: friendliness of the Czarist administration,[149] modernism brought in Bukhara,[150] full freedom of cult,[151] etc... Even the comment on the Russian intervention in Iran is quoted from **Novoye Vremiya.**[152]

All those create a clear image of the **Manar's** proposal: It is for the betterment of the Islamic world by evolution and by **"advancement of the Islamic values again to the forefront of the society",** by the Islamic education of the individuals, and not by war or physical struggle.

Among the Europeans, only the British could provide the necessary conditions for such an advancement. Not criticizing Russia -the ally of Britain- for its actions in Central Asia and Iran, **Manar** attacks Italy clearly only in one place, when it refutes the Italian propaganda that Arabs are favouring Italy against Turks, and states that **"their aim is simply to destroy the rule of the Qoran and eliminate the State of the Caliphate."** But its real criticism is directed more to Germany for being the evil spirit behind Italy. With insinuating a relation between the Jewish connection of the UP, and the German Jew's support to the Italian attack, **Al Manar** seems to concord perfectly with the general line of the British propaganda.

In Egypt the independist current entered a new phase with the impact of the Libyan War. The line of separation between the nationalists and the reformists (evolutionists) became more clear. The first, more conscious of the long range impact of the British imperialism, and how much a return to the Ottoman rule could facilitate the attainment of their aims, insisted on a active and immediate solution. The fighting capacity shown in Libya was a good example. While the latter -Islamists in general- advanced a more expectative, a passive stand and thus instead of enforcing the religious, i.e. ultra-national, formulas, pushed the intelligentsia towards the first, a more immediate nationalist and local solution.

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[148] On **Novoye Vremiya** the best research in the West is Effie Ambler's cited book.
[149] Vol 15/ p. 210.
[150] Vol. 15, p. 231-232.
[151] Vol. 15, p. 256-259.
[152] Vol. 15, p. 228.

5. TUNISIA: REINFORCEMENT OF NATIONALIST SENTIMENTS BY SUPPORTING ANOTHER MUSLIM COMMUNITY

In Tunisia, the first active opposition to the foreign rule after thirty years happened in connection with the Libyan War. As **C. Sammut** points out, it helped the **Young Tunisians** and the people to become aware of the "colonial system" and to give up hopes on its civilizing role. While that forced France to tighten its control over the colony, Tunisians became more conscious of the necessity of a direct action for their rights. **"By supporting another Islamic community, Tunisians reinforced their own nationalist sentiment."**[153]

The anti-Italian demonstrations of February 1912 resulting from the killing of a Tunisian child by a tramcar driven by an Italian ended in the boycotting of the tramways where most of the employees were Italians. It aimed to gain equality with foreign workers, even with the French. So starting from a general Islamic solidarity Tunisians arrived at a local solidarity and the defense of limited interests which had a more nationalistic colour. It must be emphasised that it was not a Pan-Arabist tendency. Like many Egyptians it tended more towards Istanbul:

> "While the Ottoman 'revolution' and the Tripolitanian War brought the Young Tunisians into line with the Turkish Reformers, Bash Hanbah (....) explicitly disclaimed any affinity with Egyptian nationalism."[153b]

6. ALGERIA: SEARCH FOR INDEPENDANCE THROUGH ISLAMIC SOLIDARITY

Algeria had forty years of armed resistence (till 1871) followed by forty years of comparatively peaceful period under the French rule. **"The war between Italians and Turks permitted the Algerian Muslims to reveal their solidarity with the latter!"**[154] It was the revival of the resistance. It helped react to the obligatory military service imposed by France in February 1912. Algeria which was left alone by the Islamic World during its struggle against colonialists, returned with that reaction to the search of a more active place within the Islamic solidarity. While in 1913, at the **Arab Congress** of Paris, many were trying to cut their ties with the Ottoman State, **Young Algerians** were sending their sympathy to the Young Turks.[155]

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[153] C. Sammut, RHM. No. 10/11, p. 126; also Ali Mahjoubi. op. cit., p. 131.

[153b] Sturt E. Brown, "Pan-Islamism in the thought of Ali Bash-Hanbah", **Essays on Islamic Civilization,** Donald P. Little (ed.), Leiden 1976, E. J. Brill, p. 79.

[154] A. Nouschi, op. cit., p. 23.

[155] Ibid., p. 26.

The bilingual (Arabic, French) Oranese newspaper **Al Hack,** founded in October 1911 claimed to be **"the organ of the defence of the Muslim's interests"**. The Tripolitanian War helped them to remind people of the events of the past century which ended with their submission to the colonialists. In its issue of 11 May 1912 it a parallel between the two events:

> "Will we be ashamed of our race? A race of valiants and martyrs who in Tripolitania are amazing the World? That race although defeated, gained the respect of the conquerors.'"

The expression "race" must not mislead the reader again as a Pan Islamist tendency. It was used because the expression "nation" was not suitable for the Muslim vocabulary, furthermore "race" was more often used by the Western Media in the early 20th Century. As Djeghloul points out,[155b] **Al Hack** was particularly concerned with the local problems like **"the law of the indigenes",** the said and the administrators, the conscripts etc... It is particularly interesting that the pseudonyms used by the writers belongs to the past historical and cultural glory of the country like **Arroudj and Barberousse** (The famous Turkish seamen brothers who founded in the early 16th Century the **Algerian Odjak** -vice- royalty) and **Djouha.** The only effective contribution of **Al Hack** was to collect 344 thousand Francs for the Turkish Red Crescent.

7. IRAN: EXAMPLE ADVANCED FOR TO REACTIVATE PEOPLE FOR STRUGGLE

> "The Persian ulama residing in Iraq do not seem to have shown a noticeable reaction to the invasion of other Islamic lands such as Morocco"[156]

Indeed Iran, because of the lack of a real independent and country-wide press, was slower to react to those events. The telegram sent by the Iranian parliament to the Ottoman Parliament during the early days of November 1911, is a perfect example of their inward looking approach. It ignored absolutely the existence of any Libyan problem and was concerned only with obtaining the Ottoman help in reaching a solution worthy of Iranian dignity:[157]

> "Do you want to see the collapse of a nation?,.. Are you not going to suffer from the violation of Iran?..."

[155b] Djeghloul Abdelkader, **Elements d'Histoire Culturelle Algerienne,** Enal, Alger, 1984, p. 87-89.

[156] A. Hadi Hairi, art. cit., p. 373.

[157] Sitting of 3.11.1327, p. 518 OP. p. 518.

Even **Hablul Matin,** the staunchest defender of Islamic solidarity, was advising Iran to struggle to find her own solutions. On the 9th October 1911 it stated that "**Iran should, before it is too late,** increase its strength by leaps and bounds and learn to stand on its own legs... Strength and strength alone can save Iran."

In another article it recommends exploiting the discord among the European powers "**as the attention of England and Russia and the other Powers is just now engrossed by the Revolution in the Far East [China] and the Turko-Italian war**", and adds:

> "The present shortcoming of Iran consists in not having a strong legislative and a military department... Iranians! Take care and do not let the opportunity slip off your hands... Simple protests are of no avail now. Nothing can save you and your countrymen but an army of 200 thousand. If the Iranians have any love for their country, and desire to retain their sovereign rights... let them give up their individual selfishness and unite together to increase the military strength of their country now... But should they allow the opportunity to slip, they must bid adieu to their sovereignty for ever."[158]

The same is repeated in an article of the 23rd of October, where it expresses the hope that "**there would be nothing surprising if the present policy of Britain's Foreign Minister, of sending troops to the South of Iran causes indignation, of not only the Iranians but of the whole Islamic world.**"

Could an Islamic state really show more than indignation? The Ottoman State in trouble itself with an imperialist war could do nothing more than proposing a peaceful mediation "**to find a solution suitable to the interests and dignity of both sides**" which it had refused vis-à-vis the Italian attack.[159] Being busy to attract all the European powers to her side, the Ottoman Foreign Minister approached the Czarist ambassador very peacefully as a mediator in the name of Iran and got the guarantee that "**Russia accepts the integrity and independence of the Iranian State.**" But he added that "**Russia cannot remain indifferent to her interests and rights.**"[160] That meant her rights acquired by the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 which divided Iran into zones of interests between the two. Notwithstanding, the Ottoman Foreign Minister declared in the parliament that, even "**the Iranian ambassador thanked him for the fruits of his mediation which aimed to solve this unpleasant problem in a proper way.**"

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[158] 16.10.1911.

[159] The dilemma of both governments was that they could not refuse mediations but all the proposal were to their disadvantages.

[160] Sitting of 3.12.1327, OP. p. 544.

So the unwanted status-quo was saved -merely by words- and everybody was expressing his satisfaction.

The reaction by the ulama came later, and combined with the complaints of the Italian attack on Libya. The fact that **"the Italian occupation of Libya has attracted more attention and has received more antipathies in Muslim world than other interventions"** is due to **A Hadi Hairi** to the extraordinary propagandist campaign undertaken by the Ottoman government. Shia ulamas, living in Iraq under the Ottoman administration, instigated by the Ottoman governor to a protest against Libya, must have found it very suitable to join the two events.

Again **Hairi** points out the particularity of the translation of the **Ahmad Sharif Senoussi's Jihad** declaration in to Persian, which was published by the Hablul Matin:

> "Many vigourous and inflammatory expressions have been added to the original texts... The translations, therefore, turned the proclamation into an interesting piece of Iranian revolutionary literature of that period... The reason for these dramatization on the part of the Persian translator lies perhaps in the fact that the Iranian population was less prepared to respond to a call for Jihad... Besides, the religious and political leadership in Iran was not as powerful as that in Libya."[161]

8. AFGHANISTAN: CREATING A DYNAMISM OF ISLAMIC SOLIDARITY, TO USE FOR LOCAL INTERESTS

The policy followed by the **Amir** of Afghanistan is best reflected by the report of the British Agent at Kabul:

> "The Muslims are all angry with the British government... His Majesty the Amir is also very sorry over its attitude with regard to the passage of Turkish troups through Egypt. He thinks that the said government is at the bottom of the conflict and that, if the passage is not allowed, she has to be forced to it. Outwardly, he has assumed an attitude of equanimity, but inwardly is much afflicted and watches the development of events very keenly.... (the events) create sympathy with Turks and enmity towards the British government."[162]

Whatever be his indignation in the face of the Libyan affair the Amir was more concerned with his own position between Russia and England, particularly at a moment when his closest neighbour Iran was suffering the pressure from the both. A desire for a more dynamic

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[161] A. Hadi Hairi, art. cit., p. 377.
[162] Kabul 12.11.1911, L/P and S/10/196, India Office.

contribution to the assaulted Muslim brethren existed in the country; especially, the only "public- opinion- creating" organ of Afghanistan, the **Seraj-ul Akhbar** newspaper was for such an act:

"**A spiritual bond which demanded that when a Muslim country, especially the Ottoman Empire, the elder brother, was in danger, this brotherhood should be felt by the others as "an absolute order"**[163] was the general belief of the **Seraj-ul Akhbar.**

M. Schinasi remarks:

> "This statement was meant as a severe reproach addressed, between the lines, to Amir Habibullah for whom the official ties between Afghanistan and the Ottoman Empire were entirely of a religious nature and did not imply any political pressure... Afghanistan's rapprochment with Turkey did not materialize in the way Tarzi so ardently wished. Only a few official acts indicated a non-commital solidarity: during the Italo-Turkish war, in November 1911, the Amir invited his people to make a financial contribution, in lieu of some other from of material aid or active support which the great distance made impossible..... [Gradually] he was forced to concessions in the expression of his free opinion... Little by little, the tone of **Seraj-ul Akhbar** changed. Little by little, Tarzi placed the periodical under the banner of a rather belated Pan-Islamism and of nationalism, which did not preclude, in the end, words of great sharpness."[164]

9. INDIA: OPPORTUNITY TO REVIVE INTERNAL DISCUSSIONS AND THE QUESTION OF LOYALTY OF THE COLONIALIST RULE

In India the problem posed by the Libyan War was more complicated than in many other countries. Events which influenced the Indian public opinion like the Italian attack, the British-Russian joint action in Iran, revolution in China, and the visit of the King-Emperor to India were all jammed into the last three months of 1911. Combined with the ever continuing struggle of the Indians with the British administration and the local discords among different religious and ethnic groups (mainly between Muslims and Hindus) the above were the priority in the formation of the public opinion alternatively.

Before the Italian attack, the Indian press was more concerned with the Iranian problems because of its geographical situation. With the declaration of war, Libya got the lead. We described the campaign for Islamic solidarity at the beginning of this book. That brought with it, polemics among the Muslim, Hindu and Anglo-Indian newspapers.

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[163] Seradjul Akhbar IV, 19, p. 9, quoted by May Schinasi, op. cit.
[164] Ibid., pp. 185-186.

It was a long period of strained relations between Hindus and Muslims.[165] The campaign for a boycott of Italian goods and sympathy for the Turks brought out a new subject of discussion. Invitation to the Hindus, to join the boycott did not receive a very pleasant reply: **"When we asked the boycott of the British goods in 1905, Muslims of India opposed it, now they are preaching what they refused."**[166] It was even qualified as an **"irresoponsible demagogic act."**[167] Another paper remarked that it can have an adverse effect as **"the weaker party will only get its teeth broken by this bite."**[168]

It is clear that the British-leaning press was more unfavourable to the boycott than Hindus. As it is pointed out by a Hindi paper, **"with the war an important change appeared in the Anglo-Indian journals like the Englishman and the Statesman which formerly showed boundless sympathy for the Muslims and which are now disappointing the Muslims."**[169]

Of course the Muslim press was praising loudly any contribution to that cause, by the Hindu press, of intellectuals.[170]

Proposals to Britain, to satisfy the desire of her Muslim subjects by helping Ottoman State, received a large coverage. Many qualified it as the golden opportunity for Britain to win the eternal gratitude of Muslims.[171] Some remarked that **"it was a moral obligation on the part of England" to compensate the damage done to Turkey during the Greco-Ottoman War, where the British intervention caused the loss of Thessalia to Greece."**[172] Some advanced just a diplomatic mediation "which will kill the snake but not bread the stick."[173]

An indignant paper remarked on one subject of the British neutrality:

> "The 60 million Muslim subjects of King-Emperor George V, the ruler, bearing sway over the largest number of Muslim subjects in the world, are extremely alarmed and grieved at the news that, in deference to the so called international convention (Hague) he will remain neutral... Sire, need we explain to you that neutrality in a case

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[165] **Rohilkhand Gazette,** 24.11.1911.

[166] **Gujarati** (Bombay) 15.10.1911; **Oriental Review,** 18.10.1911; **Praja Bandhu** (Ahmedabad) 29.10.1911.

[167] **Indu Prakash,** 3.11.1911.

[168] **Nayak,** 24.10.1911.

[169] **Bihar Bandhu** (Bankipur) 14.10.1911.

[170] **Naijar-i Azam,** 5.11; **Nayak,** 6.11; **Madras Standard,** 7.11; **Muhbiri Dakhan,** 22.11; **Aligarh Institute Gazette** 22.11; **Urdu-i Mually** October 1911 issue; **Sasilekha** (Madras), 12.12; **Sadhvi** (Mysore) 1.11.1911.

[171] **Al Bashir,** 20.2.1912; **Naiyar-i Azam,** 26.11; **Nayak,** 11.10.1911.

[172] **Aligarh Institute Gazette,** 25.10.1911.

[173] Indian Empire (Cleutta) 17.10.

where the weak party is unrighteously robbed of everything by the strong one, means partiality?"[174]

The idea was more explicitly expressed in the memorandum presented by the London All-India Muslim League to the Foreign Office.[175] It urged the British govenment for mediation **"by satisfying legitimate Italian aspiration for economic privileges"** and reminded that in case of refusal **"it might leave the Indian Muslims exposed to the malign influences which seek to undermine British rule in India."**

Of course there were those who opposed **"carrying anti-Italian agitation in India, and particularly meddling with European-problems."**[176] For them that was not an Islamic-Christianity problem but a simple Turkish-Italian difference:[177]

> "The war in Tripoli between Italy and Turkey seems to have unhinged the minds of our Muslim friends and thrown them off their balance. Such a hue and cry have been raised everywhere, that one is led to believe that the end of the Islamic World is near. In public meetings our Muslims friends advocate the boycotting of everything Italian, as if it would hurt the Italians in any way. This war is wanton and unjustifiable in all conscience, but what is the use of all this exhibition? Islam is not a danger. A portion of Africa which the Turks have usurped, is now being wrested by another power. So far as the particular country is concerned, it is only a change of masters.[178]

This approach was forming the backbone of the defence of Britain for its neutrality: **"If Britain interfered against Italy that could provoke a European war which might develop into a world wide conflagration."**[179] In their opinion just a mediation was enough.

Those supporting this idea were criticizing any material contribution to the mujaheeds. The **Raja of Tahirpour** was attacked for promising a large sum of money for the relief fund because **"the famine stricken people of Kathiawar have a superior calim to the Raja's charity than the sufferers in Tripoli."**[180]

Stronger opposition was expressed to the idea of arming and sending Indians to Libya to join the war with local considerations:

> "They, instead of going to Tripoli would in their fanaticism create in

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[174] **Muhammedi** (Calcutta), 13.10.1911.
[175] FO. 371-1254/41154, dated 16th October. 1911, signed by Kazim Hosain.
[176] **Oudh Akhbar,** 29.10; **Indu Prakash,** 27 and 28.10; **Ittihad** 8/16. 10; **Musafir,** 10.11.
[177] **Tafrih,** 28.10; **Bengalee,** 8.10.
[178] **Leader** (Allahabad) 5.11.1911.
[179] **Leader,** 24.10; **Anand,** 19.10.1911.
[180] **Awaza-i-Khalq** (Benares) 16.11; **Anand** (Lucknow) p 9.11; **Rahbar** (Moradabad) 14.11; **Bharat Dharm Neta** (Benares) 20.11.

India a disturbance similar to the mutiny of 1857... and will aim at undermining the English power in India."[181]

The possibility of even a clash between the Hindus and Muslims because of this Muslim campaign was recalled.[182] Another paper compared the Italian claim of **"civilizing Africa by force"** with the Muslim invasion of India centuries ago.[183]

This reaction gave rise to the accusations of Panislamist revival and that Muslims were trying to use Hindus in their game.[184] **The Pioneer** had claimed before the declaration of war, according to a correspondence from Cairo, that Pan Germanism and Pan Islamism were leagued together and have been working against Britain.[185] Now, the war had given the pretext to attack Germany and the Triple Alliance for being the instigators of the Italian attack.[186]

The Germanophobia of the British policy in the first decade of the 20th Century was well known by the Indian press. So many newspapers, just to please the British administration, were recommending, the extension of the boycott on the Italian goods to the German goods.[187] That was also an opportunity to warn Sublime Porte to avoid German friendship[188] by reminding how much Abdul Hamid had lost because of that friendship.[189]

That campaign was leading unavoidably to the conclusion that Islam had no other friend but Britain.[190]

The weakness of the Ottoman State to protect Libya,[191] its willingness to deliver it in return of monetary compensation[192] to Britain[193] were advanced without scruple. The last proposal started a polemic in which an opposite paper remarked that this would mean

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[181] **Kesari** (poona), 31.10.1911.

[182] Ibid., 10.10.1911.

[183] **Hitavadi** (Calcutta) 20.10.1911; **Star of India** (Haydarabad) 28.10.1911, in reply to the newspaper Al Haq, states "the bigotry of that tyrant ruler Avrangzeb or any other Muslem ruler.."

[184] **Kesari,** 10 and 31.10.1911.

[185] **Paisa Akhbar,** 15.7.1911; also **Kesari** 31.10.1911 mentions the Panislamist activities in Egypt.

[186] **Aligarh Institute Gazette,** 18.10.1911; **Mashriq,** 17.10; **Al Bashir,** 17.10; **Madras Standard** 3.10.

[187] **Al Bashir** 31.10.1911 and 19.3.1912; **Zamindar,** 4.11; **Jaridah-i** Rozgar, 25.11.1911.

[188] **Mashriq,** 24.10. and 7.11; **Muslim Gazette** 1.5.1912; **Qaisar-i Hind,** 25.1.1912; **Al Bashir,** 17.10.

[189] **Habl ul Matin** 30.10; **Shams ul Akhbar,** 27.11.

[190] **Oudh Akhbar,** 10.11.1911.

[191] **Saddharma Pracharak** (Bijnor) 1.11; **Tribune** 8.10 and 12.10. **Panjabee,** 10.10; **Swadesamitran** 12.10; **Lolo Pakari,** 16.10; **Vri Hanta Patrika** 12.10; **Bangalee,** 14.10.

[192] **Sar Panch** (Shahjehanpur) 20.11; **Bihar Bahdhu** (Bankipur) 14.10; **Mysore Star** 23.10.

[193] **Mashriq,** 10.10.

surrendering, also Mekka and Medina to Britain in the future.[194]

From the weakness and the wrong doings of Turkey, criticism was diverted towards the Young Turks and their governments. Some were deploring the absence of Abdul Hamid as the sultan **"other wise the war would take a different turn."**[195] And Indian Muslims were criticized for fraternizing too much with the Young Turks **"while they are bent upon ameliorating their own conditions without giving a thought to the rest of the Muslim world, much less to the Indian Muslims."**[196]

Others were warning Turkey against humiliating Islam by surrendering, which would prove their irreligiousness:[197]

> "Young Turks have lost sympathy of the Islamic world on account of their being irreligious. The Constitutional government is not opposed to the tenets of Islam, but a government which makes men irreligious is certainly undesirable. The ex-king Abdul Hamid against whom these Young Turks raised such a hue and cry, was so far successful in that at least he kept his territory safe from foreign usurpation."[198]

The contradiction between the condemnation of any resistance by the Ottoman government as Pan Islamism, and qualifying the same as being irreligious is too obvious; but its reason was too obvious as a contradiction of the Imperialism, which we find in the following sentence of the same article:

"In reality European powers do not like to see the Turkish Empire in Europe at all."

Most of those discussions ended with the question **"Are you loyal to the British rule?" Are you first a Muslim and then an Indian or first an Indian and then a Muslim?"**[199] Of course the discussion brought out many intriguing commentaries from those who did not like to give a straight answer. But the winning formula has always been:

> "Our veneration for the Sultan should in no way detract us from our loyalty to his Majesty the King-Emperor."[200]

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[194] **Urdu'i Mualla,** October issue.

[195] **Zamindar,** 5.10; **Daily Telegraph** (Poona) 22.11; **Oudh Akhbar** 31.5.1912.

[196] **Kesari** 31.10.1911.

[197] **Vijaya Vikatan** (Madras), 7.10; **Akhbari Am,** 27.11.

[198] **Al Panch** (Bankipore), 19.10.1911.

[199] **The Madras Standard** put it as "territorial loyalty and extterritorial patriotism", 18.10.1911.

[200] **Zamindar** 29,31 Oct.; 1,8 Nov. 1911; 6.3 and 24.4.1912; **Shubh Chint,** 18.10; **Arya Mitra,** 16.10; **Leader,** 24.10; **Rohilkhand Gazette,** 24.10; **Aligarh I. Gazette,** 1.11; **Al Mushir,** 11.11; **Oudh Akhbar,** 12.11; **Al Bashir,** 14.11.1911 and 23.4.1912; **Mashriq** 17.10, 14.11; **Civil and Military G.,** 8.11; **Muslim Herald** 6.11; Observer, 4.10; **Dnyan Prakash,** 28.10; **Political Bhomiyo** 20.10; Paisa Akhbar; 31.10; **Akhbar'a Islam** 7.11; **Hindustani,** 20.11; **Abhyudaya** 26.11; Watan 22.12; **Wakil,** 30.3.1912; **Moslem Hitaishi,** 10.5.1912.

It went on with praises of the particularities of the British administration:

> "God has sent the British people to India to rule over the largest body of Muslims to be found in any country."[201]
> "It is the only honest and humane government in Europe"[202]
> "Britain civilised Egypt"[203]
> "It is the lover of liberty"[204]

In reality a clear and unanimous reply to the question **"Which one first, Islam of India?"** could never be reached. Even those defending the primacy of Islam were finding a way of declaring their loyalty to Britain. Usually, as in the case of **Abdul Wahab bin Qintas** deputy of Basra in the Ottoman Parliament, it was declared that the double loyalty was the uniting element between the largest Muslim Empire with the State of the Caliph who was the guardian of the Holy Places.[205]

The comments of **Al Bashir** newspaper brought a wholly new understanding to the question which had very important future implications:

> "... The respect with which the Sultan of Turkey is regarded by the Muslims of the world is not because, as is popularly supposed, due to his position as guardian of the Holy places of Islam.... In the event of some local chief or of any European power exercising sovereignty over Mekka and Medina, that chief or power would be hated instead of being respected by the Mohammedans... The reason why Muslims take so much interest in Turkey is that it is the only Muslim power in the world, and that if it were to lose its independence, the Muslims would find themselves in the same position as the Jews.. The disturbances which have been taking place in Arabia were brought about owing to the desire of some European powers to possess the Holy Places of Islam. It is the duty of the Muslims to try to remove the mistaken impression that the possession of the holy places carries with it any special prestige in the eyes of the Muslim World."[206]

Pushing Muslims into the corner of loyalty thus brought a variety of comments which diverted the problem from the Libyan war and the Islamic Solidarity to the more local and national problems.

In the same way, praises for the strenghtening of the bonds among

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201 **Moslem Hitaishi,** 10.5.1912.
202 **Naiyari Azam** 26.12.1911; 5.5.1911.
203 **Hindustan Review** (Allahabad) September 1911.
204 **Aligarh Gazette,** 4.10; **Abhyudaya,** 5.10.
205 **Zamindar,** 6.3.1912, "An Animating voice from Constantimople".
206 2.4.1912.

Muslims;[207] for the courage of the Turks and Arabs;[208] for the achievements which made possible, the sudden change of the image of the Turk from "savage" to "civilized";[209] the recommendations to continue the war till the final victory[210] created in the minds of Indian Muslims the necessity for an introvert look and to evaluate their own state. Discussions on the future of India from the Muslim angle came on the agenda.[211] The benefit that could be obtained by being interested in it was discussed:

> "The war helped Arabs in Tripoli to regain their old spirit of bravery. Muslims in other quarters of the globe are also profiting by the War in various ways. The only way in which Indian Muslims can derive benefit from it is by utilising it for the improvement of their own and their country's financial condition."[212]

The necessity of self sufficiency and self confidence was better understood with the example of Libyan War:

> "This war will probably be the last war between Islam and Christianity and it will strengthen Turkey or dismember it altogether.. (That proves) that the existence of a nation is maintained by its own arms and not by depending on others."[213]

In the Indian internal politics the partition of Bengal was put before the Muslims, during 1911 and 1912.[214] So, any anti-British or anti-colonialist speculation on the Libyan Affair had to consider its reflexion to that problem. Some remarks of Prof. Bono in his study show how this interaction of the events have been used on the political field.

In one hand, the administration permitted the formation of Red Crescent branches in many places -which were not authorized earlier- and which contributed more to the consideration of local problems than Pan Islamism, although they were rarely able to send groups to the war area.

On the other hand, the colonialist administration inculcated in the

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[207] **Sahifa,** 12.1.1912.

[208] Ample examoles on the subject can be found in the parts on "Islam mist parties and press" and "Action by the people".

[209] **Zamindar** 19.5.1912.

[210] **Al Bashir,** 9.1.1912; **Durbar Gazette,** 19.1.1912; **Al Mushir,** 1.2.1912; **Mussalman,** 5.3.1912.

[211] **Aligarh Institute Gazette,** 3.1.1912.

[212] **Zamindar** 4.11.1911.

[213] **Al Bashir,** 7.11.1911.

[214] Aziz, K. K., **Britain and Muslim India,** Heinemann, London, 1963, p. 214.

public the idea that Britain was helping Turkey in reality, by preventing the explosion of a war in the Balkans. Till early October 1912 that claim helped very much to calm down the Muslim public opinion; and the Austrian consul at Simla (Calcutta) reported to his ministry:

> "Contrary to the meetings at the start of the Tripoli War, the decision taken during the demonstrations which were protesting the behaviour of the British rule, now contain all without any exception, a praise for the British efforts to prevent a war in the Balkans."[215]

10. DUTCH INDIA AND CAUCASUS: CONTRIBUTION TO THE AUTONOMIST TENDENCIES

Again **Prof. Bono** reports in his research that also in the far away South-East Asia (Actual Indonesia) reaction to the Libyan events, seemed to strengthen the Islamic Solidarity "with the danger of creating anti-Europeanism and anti-colonialism." The government of Holland which declared its neutrality on October 1911, showed signs of anxiety because of the effects of the Italian action in the Muslim countries. According to the despatch of the French Legation in La Haye, that was in reality **"the awakening of the Islamic fanaticism which could have had its reflections on India."**

Again **Bono** states that the same anxiety was observed by the Austrian ambassador **Von Giskra** in La Haye. In his report of the October 3, 1911, he pointed out that this war could drive the Pan Islamism which was strengthened in the last years particularly in the colonies of Holland to the stage of a Christian enemity.

The Turco-Italian war created emotion also among the Muslims of the Caucasus, as it is attested in a report of the 7th March 1912, of the Austrian Consul, **Comte Heinrich Crenneville.** Refferring to the banditry activities of the Muslim population, the diplomat observed: **"Since the outbreak of the Italian Turkish War Muslims everywhere are very excited."**[216]

In both cases, it is clear that the nervousness created among the people because of the Tripolitanian war, served the cause of the autonomist or independist tendencies.

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[215] Salvatore Bono, "Soliderieta Islamica...", pp. 35-36.
[216] Ibid, p. 37.

SUMMARY

- MASS MAN IN ISLAM

When one considers the amazing success of Islam in its early days (period of the Prophet and the first four Caliphs) from the viewpoint of the mass man, the important role played by the solidarization of the upper strata with the lower comes immediately to the forefront. This solidarity was the result of certain precepts-qualities which formed the base of the Islamic socio-economic structure during the initial period.

1. Man is free from intermediaries in reaching God; and Islam simplifies the procedure for communicating with God in comparison to the preceeding chain of religions based on the concept of the unity of God, of which Islam emphasizes being the last link and the purest form.

2. To provide practical and quick solutions to the economic problems of the early Islamic period while opening up new horizons to the Muslims, Islam lessened the economic pressure on the mass man of the other creeds, i. e. it alleviated the sufferings of most Christians from feudalism and of Hindus from the caste system.

3. Class differences and discrimination between men, particularly in the case of coloured and the status of slaves -who might even become rulers under Islam- were eliminated. Thus class contradictions were alleviated, which encouraged the formation of a structure of society, more compact, composed of social layer (couch social).

4. Islam imposed the idea of universal solidarity in place of local (tribal) tendencies, thus creating an Islamic fraternity open to anybody and easily accessible, with frontiers theoritically infinite, as Islam tolerates other faiths accepting the unity of God.

The fact that the mass man came to the forefront in such an effective way meant that it was one of the periods of human history when the "social time" accelerated: the unity of the upper layer and the mass man in solidarity under Islam was a revolutionary fact.

Islam, if contained within the confines of the Arabic peninsula, would not have been freed from local characteristics. It achieved universalism with its diffusion in revolutionary dimensions -

considering the communication capacities in the world during the 7th century- on countless civilizations, communities and creeds, as well as, by providing a new and highly advanced synthesis of sciences and arts. This unrivaled success within a comparably short period created in the mentality of both the upper and lower strata the **"conscience and the price of being a member of the Islamic World"**, a concept which overshadowed all the local, tribal and communal ties.

Islam contained the seeds of a large part of its future internal conflicts in this rapid diffusion of the new concept of the egalitarian society. The populations becoming Islamicized were impregnated with centuries-old, deep-rooted local customs and conditions. While a new Islamic socio-economic structure was imposed on newly converted communities with its universalistic principles and institutions, the reaction of new Muslims based on their local conditions also had definite impacts on the Islamic structure. The mass man has been particularly influenced by the local deviations from "pure" Islam since the Porphet's days. The idea that **"that further the generations become from the Prophet's time, the wecker their Islamic faith becomes"** became a general belief.

particularly with the changing of economic rules -compared to the early days of Islam- and the language factor which affected the most at the base, the solidarity between the upper layer and the mass man became increasingly weaker. Contradictions between social layers increased. But as long as Islam remained the most advanced creed of humanity during the period, when its main rival Christianity was submerged in its dark ages, the belief of **"belonging to a faith with the most perfect and final solution"** to the questions of humanity, provided the mass man with the necessary motivation to follow the leadership with trust and confidence. As long as there existed no better advanced and more efficient example of an organization of society, this tendency was the most natural, though the gap between the upper and the lower strata became larger day by day.

Later, the Islamic World was shaken consecutively with crises of the Crusades (11-13. Centuries), Moghul raids (13-14. c.), the Reconquest in Andalusia (14-15. c.) and the discovery of the Indian Sea routes (15. c.). Soon after it withnessed a revival starting at the mid-point of 15th century which reached its peak with the Ottoman Turks (in Europe and the Near-East), Safavids (in Iran) and Turco-Moghuls (in India). It was a new period of diffusion and strenghtening of Islam which solidified the trust and hopes of the mass man in the Islamic solutions proposed by the summit.

Among them, the Ottoman State is undisputably the true inspiration and vehicle of this revival because of its power, its decisiveness in supporting other Islamic communities against their enemies, and its far-reaching influence on the politics of Europe, Asia and Africa. With the "**Pax Ottomana**" the mass man had the feeling of reachieving the past glories of the history of Islam, and his trust in the DAWLA, the State, was renewed.

In the same period, a vicious circle, claiming to be the only solution for the defects of the administration, was formed once again, by subjective considerations. It was the traditional way of replacement, according to the Islamic ethic, of administrators considered ineffectual or corrupt, with the accusation of behaving contrary to the sharia and the sunna, without searching the structural reasons of the defect. It became again the driving wheel of the public opinion forming mechanism. The fact that the upper strata was playing, at the same time the plaintiff and the judge on the rules of Islam for his own benefit, served only to reinforce the vicious circle and helped more to deepen the divergence of the social layers.

During the 15th-17th centuries, the increase in conversions to Islam from other religions helped to strengthen the trust of the mass man in the summit and reinforced his support of the State, the protector of Islam. For that reason, even rebellions and struggles by local Muslim groups against the central power of the Ottoman State nearly never turned into a real separatist of independentist tendency before the turn of the 19th century, and it very rarely did so during the 19th century. This indicates that, even in cases where local autonomist tendencies encouraged cooperations between the local elites and the masses, the belief that the Ottoman State personified the defender of Islam, was particularly prevalent with the mass man.

During this period no renovation, or proposal for structural change which could provide a vehicle for reforms or adaptation of the old structure to meet changing conditions, came from the leadership or the intellectual elite. Thus the mass man, waiting for the surging of the solution from the prefixed limits of the vicious circle, was pushed into a contemplative and pacifist (non-activist) stand. It was a period during which the social time was one of the slowest in Islamic history. A period of fatalism ensued during which no attempt was made to change the course the Muslim society was following.

During the same period, Europe, which had experienced the unsuccessful effects of the driving force of the Christian religion, mounted new approaches in attempting to overcome the limitations

and restrictive nature of its institutions. With the Renaissance it tried to return to the pre-Christian rationalist thinking; during the Reformation, an attemp was made to find a solution to the inflexible structure of the religion; and with Capitalism experimented a new economic structure which would install the larger bourgeois class in the seat of power, displacing the aristocrats and the clergy.

All three of the major currents in Christian social development aimed at directing the European communities to a more secular structure, through which the base tried to draw closer to the elite. Thus gradually the mass man in Europe was drawn into the power structure, gaining a voice in the administration of his society and his participation was reinforced.

Europe, which had already increased its economic power through colonialist undertakings, entered a new era of change when the industrial revolution occured. The search for new markets fuelled the creation of colonialist empires. By seizing the means of production of communities and using a large number of slaves or slave-like workers in the production, capitalism entered the stage of imperialism. In the same period, the precapitalist structures of the Islamic communities not only did not change, but even retracted with an instinct for preservation of their traditional ways, as a defensive move. This created a new element of "reaction" which now appeared in the vicious circle.

The only resisting force to the general assault of Europe, the Ottoman State, gradually felt the tightening of the grip around itself. The world balance which had shifted to the Oceans, turning its back for a while to the Mediterranean (by Spain, Portugal, Britain and France), showed again an interest in the area surrounding Mediterranean, as lands to exploit elsewhere were increasingly divided among colonialists leaving less and less open territory.

Aims at reaching India, the most coveted land of the colonialists, by shorter routes (from Central Asia or Egypt), as well as the emergence of new powers in Central and North Europe (Prussia, Russia), and their desire to advance towards the south to conquer their share of richer colonies, focused a new struggle on the Middle East. It must be borne in mind that during the whole of the 19th century, the Oriental Question was posed by the West as the partition of the Ottoman State's, the Sick Man's, heritage. That meant eradicating the last resisting forces in the world which where all but Muslim. So the question posed to the Ottoman Empire turned out to be purely and simply the question of the future of Islam.

By the end of the 18th century, and particularly in South Asia, Islamic communities became more and more dependent on European powers. The economic infiltration took the shape of political rule. Internal fights between local rulers provided the colonialists with the opportunity of applying the "divide and rule" motto.

Economic infiltration, which was not considered seriously by the Muslim elite, did-not at all affect the mass man in the beginning. At first the contrary occured; they benefitted from the better quality of the European products: **"If you have to be hanged, make it with English rope"** was a noted saying in the Ottoman lands. The base, already, alienated from its own administration, was not immediately reppelled by the intrusion of the foreigners.

It was the Ottoman State which first noted the need to act, through internal structural change, in the face of the threat coming from Europe during the 18th Century. In the following century it became a general tendency throughout the Islamic World. To meet Europe's threat by structural chage was the formula for reform, entitled **"TANZIMAT".** It was an attempt to break the vicious circle, and its starting point was the indisputability of the West's superiority.

At the same moment the problem of what should be preserved of the Islamic structure became urgent. The Islamic structure had traditionally been unquestionably accepted as being the best, the most advanced and the final. Thus, it was not possible to suddenly overturn the centuries-old structure, to change in a short time the ideology rooted in centuries of tradition, and to accept adverse ideas based on European structure; particularly when it was presented -purposefully- by Europe, as being a Christian solution, an idea which is basically in contradiction with the faith and mentality of Islam, "the final link of the chain".

At that point the mass man became more concerned with his traditional values, the instinct of preserving his own existence and personality come forward. On the other hand, the administrative-intellectual-enlightened circles found it more suitable to dilute the Western formulas with Islamic cover making their reforms more easily digestible and less objectionable to the masses.

Thus, the need to resort to Islam more than ever was felt both by the elite and the masses at the same moment, though their basic reasoning was contradictory. There was at once a move to draw closer to the summit and the masses, manifested in public return to the idea of the union in Islam which was stressed now more insistently than before. It

conflicted with the growing gap between them in every field, economic, ideological ,etc...

The accord between the elite and the masses being not the result of an economic factor (the full diffusion of the economical activities to the base), but solely the result of a "mentality", its roots were fragile. It was an attempt to accelerate the social time by artificial means, the economic structure not having evolved at a speed parallel with it, and the political super-structure being forced to adopt new ways borrowed from the West in contradiction to the existing infrastructure. The uneveness of these developments caused confusion at all tenets of society.

The bewildered mass man expressed a reaction against the foreigners, as well as, against his own administrators, the Westerners. It is to the arrogance of the first, and to the contestable results of the latter's half-solutions, that this reaction was directed. This reaction was described as "fanaticism" in some Western circles, particularly by the emerging cadres of Orientalists in the service of colonialism.

Objectively, the Muslim mass man feeling incapable of advancing any proper solution to the dilemma was becoming more sensitive. Furthermore, the weakness of the local administrations and the intrigues of the imperialists encouraged local ethnic Christian groups towards arrogance and provided them with undeserved advantages (through Capitulations). The mass man had the feeling of losing his economic ascendency even in the daily life, which created a deeper irritability.

The West, which had reached the level of utilizing "Mathematical" methods in every field with the advent of capitalism and industrialisation, contributed to amplify the contradictions felt in Islamic societies. The West employed new methods and tools which were very effective in influencing the vehicles of public opinion, such as the press.

Ideas on human rights and the equality of man began also to spread among the Christian subjects of the Muslim states. Those groups, until then considered with a tolerance which did not exist in the West, had lived with a semblance of harmony as secondary citizens -with equality in many fields- along with their Muslim neighbours, for centuries. The Christian groups began to claim the new ways of Europe without ving developed the necessary infrastructural particularities. It was reation of a mentality of European superiority, an ideological ch rather than an objective assessment of the conditions. For n, this current of thought could not have had influence beyond

the intellectual circles and did not influence the non-Muslim mass man for a very long period.

Indeed, considering the level of masses and of the rural people (Reaya) particularly, there was little real difference in the living conditions of Muslims and Christians. It necessitated an extraordinary stimulant to induce the masses to join the movement towards the struggle in an energetic way. That stimulant was provided by the Western Imperialism.

All minoritie in the Ottoman State became unconscious tools of the imperialism. Quarrels and disputes between groups of different languages and religions increased and took on exaggerated dimensions. They were duped in to believing that the European support was meant purely for humanitarian reasons. That encouraged more the Christians and led to quarrels at the village-level between villagers of different creeds and nationalities. Not only Muslims with non-Muslims, but also inter-Muslim and inter-Christian disputes came into being with parties divided according to their ties to imperialist powers. Nationalism and racism were used as an important element of discord.

The last core of resistance to the West's assault was the Ottoman State, or as it survived in the mentality of Muslim mass man, "The Last Islamic State", or simply, "The State", which became the target of one of the most pitiless attacks of imperialism. The structure of the Ottoman State based on autonomy for the local administrations, under the unity of Islam at the highest level, was shaken. The imperialists chose -more for their own purpose of heritage, than for the sake of the intermingled peoples of the Ottoman lands- to encourage independentist and separatist tendencies, rather than renovation efforts at the top, even if it was at the cost of more bloodshed from the mass man from all sides. Innumerable partition agreements among European powers concerning the Ottoman lands, which encompassed both Muslim and non-Muslim communities which on the other hand were supported in their demands of independence by the same powers, are significant examples of those imperialistic policies.

These developments encouraged more and more the Muslim base towards thinking of unity. By the second half of the 19th century, the new target became the newly uniting element: Solidarity in Islam. The danger of it, which was christened Panislamism by the West, was magnified beyond all measures.

Economically all the Islamic communities were fully dependent on the Western World, which did not want to lose its markets and raw material sources.

The changes facing his world forced the Muslim mass man to come out from his contemplative stand and to attempt to search for a new mentality to motivate his behaviour for his own preservation. Thus the mass man was forced to become active, not only because of internal (economical, administrative) factors, but primarily because of external factors. In that way, the Islamic world was forced out of the vicious circle.

- SITUATION IN 1911

When the year 1911 arrived, ninety percent (270 million) of all Muslims had lost their independence and had become the colonial subjects of Europe. Only ten percent of all Muslims, living mostly in the Ottoman State, were independent. It was a very limited independence, however, even that was admired and envied by other Muslims.

In 1911, the majority of Muslim intellectuals was unanimous in accepting the inevitability of the Western way of progress. Union and Progress, Egyptian nationalists, Young Tunisians, and the like groups were all united on that point. On the other hand, they were becoming more and more conscious of the imperialistic manoeuvres behind the curtains of Western rationalism and progress. The year 1911 witnessed three imperialist assaults which endangered even the partial independence which the last four self-ruled Muslim countries were enjoying. Morocco had been placed under French colonial rule, Iran had been reminded, under the threat of guns, that the Anglo-Russian partition agreement was still in force. Afghanistan feared the same and was on guard against intrusions on its freedom. Furthermore, the socio-economic structure of Afghanistan was not enabling it to influence the other Mualim communities.

The only real Muslim power, the Ottoman State, was experiencing a wide-ranging internal struggle created by its multi-religious and multi-nationalistic structure. On the one hand, it was the seat of the Caliphate and the center of the Islamic World, while on the other hand, it had to deal with countless nationalist currents which flourished under the umbrella of the constitutional parliamentarian regime's free discussion system. Contradictions at the superstructure were sharpened by those at the infrastructure, when the Ottoman State, with its precapitalist structure was aiming at developing a full capitalistic structure and institutions by a full liberal economic system, in a short time.

In such an atmosphere of crisis and under the spectre of the repetition of a general war which had threatened Europe for a century, Italy attacked Libya suddenly and unexpectedly. This action placed Europe

as well as the Muslim communities in the forefront of a very delicate international situation.

The imperialist European states tolerated Italy's act of oppression against Libya on the condition that it would not destroy the European concert and would not degenerate into a general war. They were trying to ensure primarily that hostilities must not endanger the flow of commercial routes in the area and that their Muslim subjects would not be involved in any way with the war.

- IMPACT OF THE LIBYAN WAR

The decisive element which played a major role in the events following the Italian attack was the unexpected resistance and victories of the Islamic side.

In Libya, the first reaction to the invasion was one f bewilderment followed by a fatalist consent, in accordance with Ottoman Govenment's official behaviour. However, soon after the local Libyan mujaheeds started to cooperate with the Turkish Army and the voluntary Young Turkish officers, and mounted a very successful resistance.

Islamic communities across the Muslim World were shocked once more by the Italian assault, but soon after news of victories spread all over the world and Muslim communities rallied enthusiastically to the Libyan resistance cause. Coming at a moment of depression when the Islamic World was feeling insecure, the success of the Libyans was an unexpected achievement, particularly against the unbeatable Europe. The joy was expressed as the victory of Islam over Europe and Christianity. It also contradicted the propaganda which aimed at destroying the Ottoman State, that there was dislike and disunion among Muslim elements, particularly between Türks and Arabs.

The fact that the Libyan people with few exceptions had nearly complete participation of the masses in staging a war against an army many times more powerful, was an impressive example for all the Muslims. It could be followed as a model by all Muslims regardless of social class or nationality.

The Ottoman government was categorically denying the eventuality of a joint action by all Muslims. It searched continuously for a compromise through other European governments for a solution[1] which **"would avoid the charge of having sold the country for money."**

[1] For the preparation of the Ouchy (Lausanne) Peace, see: Mohammad Abd-al Karim al Wafi, **Al Tarik Il-al Lozan,** makt. nashr al Farjani, Tripoli, 1978.

Muslim intellectuals defended, in general, a mortal fight (guerre à outrance). All the Islamist parties and press stated unanimously that the Italian attack aimed to destroy the Caliphate and the last surviving Islamic state. They unanimously promoted the motto of **"War till Death"**, but all envisaged also solutions which would include the European power's participation. In general, they were well aware of their degree of dependence on Europe and accepted that no solution could be reached without its consent. Some Muslims even advanced the idea that **"it is Muslims who are not betraying the ideals of the Western civilization, while the West betrays its own civilization."** So it was again a vicious circle with no effective solution advanced, as their proposals were fully dependent on Europe's tricky policies.

The idea of a general Islamic uprising for deliverence from the colonialist yoke was proposed by a small group within the elite who considered the confrontation against the West as a solely religious event, as well as by some others who saw in it a perfect opportunity to disseminate propaganda which would electrify the masses against alien rules. Theoretically it was an effective approach, but the obstacle lies in its practicability. To persuade the masses to take worldwide action when the majority of the movers at the pinacle of power considered it impossible, even on the local level, was not an easy task.

Furthermore, the fight against Italy staged by the mujaheeds in Libya was in reality a local defensive action. The Islamic solidarity theme was advanced in order to propel the mass man into the struggle. According to the popular thinking the struggle embodied the whole of Islam's being and Muslim identity versus the West. If we except the **Ahmad Sharif Senoussi's** late arriving Jehad declaration -some 3-4 months after the masses started their fight and at a time when already the Muslim mass man out of Libya retracted to their contemplative stand- there was no serious appeal for an Islamic uprising emanating from serious responsible circles. In each case, it was primarily for local consumption that the theme of Islamic solidarity was repeated.

There were some very restricted circles, highly impressed by the influential Libyan example, who tried later on to test the practicability of a universal uprising; and it may be the first time Muslims participated actively in a public opinion forming scheme, by using one European imperialist against another, when Muslim intellectuals joined Germany in its efforts against England and France, later during the First World War.

With the Libyan resistance, the probability and scope of such a total Islamic rebellion was more deeply felt by Europeans than Muslims. The

fear created by the prospect of Islamic revolt in the European colonialist mind was terrible. The image of the rebellion of 150 million Indians against the ruling 100,000 Englishmen (1500 Indians to each Englishman) at a moment when a few thousand mujaheeds were keeping the tremendous Italian war machinery in check, was indeed a very pressing nightmare, not only for the British empire, but to all imperialist Powers.

For this reason the fight with the imaginary monster of Panislamism became a more serious affair for the colonialists than the suppression of a real rebellion under their rule. The fear of seeing the whole of Islam united around the Caliphate to undertake a Jehad forced the colonialists to harden the measures against such a possibility. The distribution of news and the public-opinion-forming mechanisms were readapted to the new conditions created by the Islamic victory in Libya. In some places censorship was imposed or more tightly applied as in the French colonies, or news was manipulated as it happened in British-controlled areas by the Reuters Agency.

Even more interestingly, Italy adapted its own homeland mechanism to the needs of its imperialistic aims. Contrary to the rule of an "open society" which supports the free flow of information, Italy imposed a heavy censorship and prevented any open discussion on the subject. Only with such behaviour was Italy able to unite its society, through a guided press, behind the motto of **"conquest of our promised land".**

Capitalistic societies which reached the level of acting with mathematical methods in every field, were able to guide and direct public opinion by manipulating the news (modifications, exclusions or calculation of the timing of the diffusion of certain news items). On the other hand, the precapitalistic structures, obliged to get the necessary information from the capitalistic sources, and not having the means to verify their veracity, or control their interpretation, were resorting to the traditional methods of spreading the news by exaggeration (quantity of mujaheeds, of prisoners, etc.) to combat the manipulation of their rivals.

While they were aware of their inability to compete with the Western media, the Muslim press did not give up the luxury of imitating the capitalistic manner of the free flow of news, thus sharpening more the contradictions. Invented, exaggerated news together with manipulated news was appearing in the columns of the Muslim papers and was bewildering the mass man even further. And unconfirmed, exaggerated news, created greater deceptions in the long run.

If we consider the situation from the angle of the public-opinion-

forming mechanism, we find that, when widely-held public opinion in an economically and politically impotent society reaches a dynamic stage by some external force, but is suppressed by strong forces which it can not overcome, the issue often is driven to the extremes. Frustration cause the oppressed people to revert to the extremes of their position to make themselves heard and accepted.

On the other hand, the free flow of news provides a positive contribution to a society if the media owns an economic and political independence. In the contrary case, it will play a role which does not conform to the interests of that society, and might lead to solutions falling at the other extreme. Thus, instead of trying to draw nearer or to a middle point, it will help to enlarge the gap between the alternatives. And when one extreme can not be reached, the solutions fall to the other one, without intermediary moderating solutions.

The result will necessarily be the receding of the public opinion which did not find political backing, the increase of the feeling of impotence and deception, and finally to direct itself towards new or previously refused solutions, or even to the other extreme which it originally combated.

As in the case of the Libyan War, the Muslim press not being able to overcome the strength of the European media, chose to apply the exaggerated news tactic, thus ending, in some ways, prematurely the war and insisting on the existence of an aggressive Islamic solidarity, nearly a Panislamism. But with the free flow of news and the manipulation of news, that dynamism had to accept the defeat of its proposals. When most of its victories and the full participation of other communities had to be retracted, nothing more remained to defend but its exact opposite: the local interests.

The Libyan exploit was really a very appropriate one for such a development. It satisfied Muslim's thirst for someting, anything positive. Humiliated daily by the achievements in any field -scientific, artistic, political, military- of the West, Islamic communities clung with enthusiasm to the not-negligible success in Libya. Furthermore this Islamic success was also confirmed by the Western media. It became for a short while the symbol of a total victory over Islam's Western suppressors.

Successes in Libya infected Islamic imaginations so much so that this exaggeration of success was even considered seriously by the colonialist powers. Demonstrations of solidarity by Muslims all over the world increased their nervousness. The fact that Muslim intellectuals and the

popular masses were acting together and in the same direction was a serious warning for the colonialists. The fear of the spread of Islamic resistance to imperialism, as it had occured in Libya, became their main preoccupation. The Western powers did all in their power to channel this energy towards other aims..

In general, the Western powers all supported the collection of money for relief (wounded, orphans, Red Crescent, etc.), insisting that they were intended for non-military purposes. The enthusiasm of the mass man was thus diverted and the result was that the resistance movement was not seriously pursued.

Most colonialists considered any general solidarity action as a dagerous move, but in their particular approaches, differences could be found according to the structure of the Muslim communities over which they were ruling. For France, Russia and Austria-Hungary, which were supporting nationalist currents undermining the Ottoman State, any local nationalist resistance inspired by the Libyan example was suppressed. Their aim was to promote an assimilation policy at home.

Britain was ruling over the largest Muslim community in the world and controlled the most varied ethnic groups, therefore it prefereed nationalistic currents. Nationalism best served Britain's "divide and rule" policy which it imposed on its colonies.

Germany, a late comer to the Imperialist Club, aimed simply at the destruction of other colonialist empires with the purpose of taking over their heritages. In that policy, Germany always considered the Islamic solidarity movement as a useful cooperator. Germany became one of the most deeply interested countries in the Libyan experience and gave it an important place in German plans for the First World War. The reactivation of Turkish-Arabic solidarity, the emerging of the Turkish Caliphate against the British-backed Arab Caliphate, the worldwide reactions of Muslims during the Libyan War which seriously shook the bases of the colonialist empires, affected the German policy considrably.[2]

The real achievement of the Libyan War was the worldwide demonstrations by all Muslims (mass man, as well as the elite) of their solidarity with their religion and with the Ottoman State as the head of the religion. Of course, the scope of the concept "solidarity" was conceived in different ways by different participants and observers

[2] For a condensed research on the German Consul reports and of the press, see, Gunther Bartl, "Al Gazw al-Istimari al-Itali li-Libya" (trad. Imad al-din Ganem), **Madjalla al Buhuth al-Tarikhiyya,** July 1984, pp. 341-366.

(passive, sympathetic, active, aggressive, etc.), and that produced differences in the results obtained from the policies followed according to those considerations. Also, there had been differences in the reactions in each Muslim community, according to their individual socio-economic structures.

One of the most important general phenomenon in that regard, is undoubtedly the spread of panic all over the Ottoman coasts from Albania to the Aegean, Syria and the Red Sea, by continuous bombings of the ports by the Italian navy, which also disturbed the sea transport of food and other materials. It helped spread in Syria and Lebanon the romours that they would also be invaded in turn and that the Ottoman State had no power to prevent it. In other places like Balkans, it speed up the already existing destabilization.

The mass man throughout the Muslim World was very active and effective in the creation of the Islamic solidarity movement. However, the masses returned to their contemplative stand after seeing the non-cooperation of the Muslim elite with their own enthusiasm. The people then became, in effect, a contributing factor by non-activism to the spread of the panic. The non-participation of the elite in the boycott of Italian materials occurred because of the ties of Muslim business circles with European and even Italian commerce. This lack of support made the mass man very reluctant to cooperate with the summit in the resistance movement, although at the start a strong tendency had expressed itself clearly.

The diversification of the money collection, where the mass man excelled, from helping mujaheeds towards relief aims and in some cases their misuse, had again an adverse effect on his enthusiasm.

It is clear from what we surveyed in detail that Muslim communities felt inspired and encouraged by the example of the struggle on Libyan soil. The Muslim communities felt a courage, a dynamic impulse to confront the colonialist powers. It ensured them that they were not fatalistically condemned peoples; that they did not have to be ashamed of belonging to the Islamic World. Since the heavy defeat of 1876-78 in the Turco-Russian War, it was the first direct confrontation with a European power which had brought Islam an unexpected success.

Even during the reign of **Abd ul Hamid,** the so-called Panislamist (or better Islamic Solidarist) Sultan, those expressions had never been used so intensively as during the first months of the Libyan War. Until the Italian attack a hypocritical silence had been kept due to the fear of the Western regimes, censorship, a general conflagration or out of simple

respect. The Italian attack served to provoke the unleashing of all the hidden passions for a period of seven or eight months.

If we examine thoroughly each local case of each Muslim community to determine the relation of the elite and the masses and the methods of creation of public opinion, we will notice the following:

That the action of the summit and the base was simultaneous in the Ottoman lands. The parliament, the press and the mass man reacted in the same way. The Union and Progress kept the control and guided the reaction. As a result of being the administrators of a multi-national and multi-religious state with and official philosophy of Ottomanism, the UP encountered significant difficulties in expressing the scope of their aims. Would they advance a purely Islamic defense or a secular approach?

UP attempted to advance both concepts. Governmentally -for international politics- it remained secular, Ottomanist, while outside the government and when appealing to the public opinion at large, it defended Islamic solidarity. This dichotomy satisfied no one and brought the ideological conflict onto the agenda in a sharper way. the credibility of the Ottoman melting pot or "Ottomanism". Criticism directed towards UP became sharper; some condemned it for fanning religious fanaticism and others for nationalism.

The problem was a crucial one as no one had yet found out a solution to the governance and unification of the multi-national, multi-ethnic and multi-religious nature of the Ottoman population, particularly on the level of the average citizen. Nationalist activist currents, particularly among the Christian minorities, had taken on a new'elan. But what were the Muslims to do?

In general, everybody preferred to avoid open and violent discussions on those subjects, in the Ottoman lands as bloody conflicts had followed every discussion as such in the past. It was through the media outside the boundaries of Ottoman State or by underground means within it, that the nationalist currents were activated. The Italian attack brought the question to the forefront of the agenda. It was an impetus much stronger than any policy that UP would follow to escape the dilemma. Indeed, UP could not save itself from being attacked with the same strength both by Islamists and nationalists.

On the other hand, the events in Libya encouraged those nationalist currents and provided with the opportunity of emerging into the open and engaging in public discussion.

In Syria and Lebanon, encouraged with the panic which was spread successfully by the organized bombings of the Italian navy, the cooperation of Christian and Muslim nationalist Arabs reached a new stage. While the base, traditionally engaged in feuds against each other for centuries, remained on its guard for a full cooperation, the upper layers acted together.

Similar events occured in Albania with the difference that Muslims both in the upper and lower layers envied the concessions given to the Christians by the Ottoman State, and so profited from the crisis created by the Libyan War to re-emphasize their autonomist claims.

In Egypt, where the mass man had been the most active, the influence of colonialist and the Khedivial rule directed the current towards more nationalistic and localized problems; even Islamists, under the same influence were concerned more with that narrow definition of the problem.

In Tunisia, the explosion of the first nationalistic sentiments came to the surface through Tunisian support to another Islamic community. The Libyan affair gave them the opportunity to express their feelings towards the colonialists. In that regard, the action of the mass man seems to be more energetic in Tunisia than the actions of the elite. The same, in very restricted dimensions, happened also in Algeria.

In Iran, we notice that a part of the upper layer used the Libyan example to reactivate the people for their own local struggle. Also in Afghanistan a dynamism was created by the elit, but used only for local purposes.

In India, a very active cooperation of the elite and the base in witnessed. The interest is focused more on the future of the Ottoman State and the Caliphate than the Libyan War, and that mainly for the local, internal political considerations. It gave the opportunity to revive internal discussions (with Hindus) as well as the question of loyalty to the colonialist rule.

It is also interesting to note that even in Libya, the idea of an independence Libyan Republic -the need for local solutions for local problems- was born first during 1912, in the mind of **Farhat Al-Zaoui.**[3]

It can be noted that, starting from an Islamic solidarity reaction where the mass man had a bigger share, the effect of the Libyan War

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[3] A. Said Bagni, "Al Gumhuriya al Trablusiya", **Al Shaheed,** pp. 36-42; also the article of T. bin Mousa, "Jehad al Libiyin al Siyasi fi Bilad al-Sham", **Al Shahid,** No 2,1982, pp. 70-81 describe the activities of Libyans for their own country.

became a kind of activator for the local and in some cases nationalist currents. With that deviation, the Muslim mass man retracted to its initial contemplative stand. It would come out again to the forefront, not with the call for a Jehad launched during the First World War, but later on when nationalist currents (as in Egypt, Turkey, India, Syria etc.) became predominant.

The reason may be that the mass man had lost his trust in the leadership with their half-secular, half religious solutions. Or it may be that the citizens did not find sufficiently convincing the justifications proferred by their leaders. Most probably, since the Muslim society had entered into a more accelerated social time, it had reached some new structural stage which necessitated a proper activating element.

When the war languished on for months without any progress on either side and the dynamic groups of the Muslim World were kept busy by local concerns, the Islamic solidarity movement or idea created by the Libyan War vanished also, leaving in its place a period of expectation. Problems like Albanian and Assyrian revolts -including Muslims- against the Ottoman State caught the attention of the Muslims and brought new doubts about the capacity of materialization of Islamic solidarity.

Soon after wards another and more dangerous event, the Balkan War broke out. The war posed new and more complicated problems to the Ottoman State and the Islamic communities. With the advent of the new event the Libyan War lost its dominant dimension and turned into a local problem, however its implications did not die out immediately. On the contrary, it had considerable influence on the important events of the near future.

The invitation to Islamic solidarity aimed at benefiting Libya did not materialize, but Panislamist tendency had a new impulse in the person of **Anwar Pasha,** one of the leading mujaheeds in the Benghazi front. According to his diary, it is clear that the Panislamist feelings of which he was the foremost defender during the First World War, were the result of the days he spent in Libya. The respect shown to him by the Libyans was not based on "**Anwar, the flag bearer of freedom**" but on "**the sonin-law and representative of the Sultan and the Caliph.**" The experience of witnessing and being one of the creators of the success of Islamic solidarity on a small, but very impressive scale, created in **Anwar's** mind the possibility of finding solutions to the dilemmas of the Islamic World through Panislamism. Anwar's dilemma was in the results of his movement because his Panislamism failed and developed

into a pan-nationalism: Panturanism.[4]

Others, like **Ahmad Sharif al Senoussi** and his mujaheeds, some Syrians and Egyptians also had faith in that solution, till it was proved to be a complete failure at the end of the First World War.[5] A minority of Ottoman federalists also had been affected by this dynamic public opinion.[6] We can point to especially **Abd ul Hamid Zahrawi,** who first was terribly deceived by the events in Libya and even became the head of the Arab separatist movement, but who later returned to the concept of cooperation with Ottomanism. Finally, he ended up as a victim of those internal strains.

So, the efforts to break the vicious circle and to discover solutions within a general Islamic frame to the problems of the Islamic World ended finally in local and nationalist issues. If the Libyan War pushed **Anwar Pasha** towards Panislamism, with the instigation of Germans who had their own imperialistic plans for world hegemony, most of the Turkish intellectuals were dubious on the subject. The loss of Libya and the Balkan defeat even put Istanbul in danger, the capital of the State and the seat of the Caliphate. This threat created a tendency towards self-defense measures through Turkish nationalism. The feeling of being deserted by the rest of the Muslim World and the complete failure of Ottomanism was dominant.

A long-range effect does exist also with the experience of another nationalist leader who appeared on the political scene a decade later. He was **Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk)** one of the leading mujaheeds who fought eight months against Italy and was wounded in Libya, and who came away from the experience with the opposite conclusions to those of **Anwar.** In his diary **Anwar** depicts an optimistic picture of the fight. Even he was dreaming of creating his own independant state in Libya, and had excessive trust in the sheikhs who were leading the local mujaheeds.

Mustafa Kemal, in his official reports from the war front and in his personal letters[7] compares the state of the Ottoman State to the "**last**

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[4] The best criticism of that phenomenon had been directed by Ataturk in his speech of 1.12.1921: "The enmity of the whole world was pointed at... the Turkish nation as the target, only because we pretended to have done big and dreamy, things, without in reality having done anything. We never made Panislamism. May be we said "we will, or we can make it". Then enemies moved: "Let's destroy them before they have the chance." We have not done Panturanism. We said "We can, we will, we could" and they again repeated: "Let's kill!". No more than that. The concept which frightened and bewildered the world is simply that.

[5] On the role of Ahmad Shariff and others in the Holy War: Orhan Kologlu, **Mustafa Kemal'un Yaninda Iki Libyali Lider Ahmet Serif ve Suleyman Baruni,** Ankara, 1981.

[6] E. Kedourie, op. cit., p. 61.

[7] For Mustafa Kemal's impressions during his stay in Libya: Genel Kurmay, **Osmanli Italya harbi...,** op. cit.; and Salih Bozok' un Hatiralari", **Milliyet,** 13-12.11.1979.

days of Andalusia". Concerning Islamic solidarity, while praising the mujaheeds -the mass man- **Ataturk** points out its fragility especially because of the sheiks. Some of his opinions later became the backbone of the new "nationalist" Turkish Republic. These ideas were probably shaped during the days he spent at the Derna-Tobruk front.

At the end, we must recall the shaheed mujaheed **Omar al Mukhtar,** a representative of the elite with the best understanding of the base and cooperation with it. He had never lost his faith in the initial impulse of Islamic solidarity, since the launching of the Libyan campaign. But not being able to change the general flow of the nationalist, inward looking currents, dominant in the whole of the Islamic World, Omar al Mukhtar died as a lonely and forgotten martyr.[8]

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[8] For the life, personality and the influence on the Libyan masses we refer to the book published by the Markaz al-Drasat al-Jehad Al-Libiy, ed. Akil M. al-Barbir, **Omar al-Mukhtar Nashatahu wa** Jehadehu min 1862 ila 1931, Tripoli, 1983.

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الجماهيرية العربية الليبية الشعبية الاشتراكية العظمى

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سلسلة كتب اللغات الأجنبية - ٥

الرأي العام الإسلامي خلال الحرب الليبية ١٩١١-١٩١٢

مراجعة

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